

WHY RELIGION



HORACE M. KALLEN



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POLONIUS: *The best actors in the world, either for tragedy, comedy, history, pastoral, pastoral-comical, historical pastoral, tragical-historical, tragical-comical-historical pastoral, scene individable, or poem unlimited: Seneca cannot be too heavy, nor Plautus too light. For the law of writ and the liberty, these are the only men.*

—HAMLET: Act II, Scene ii.

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To
JULIAN WILLIAM MACK
BELOVED FRIEND AND SUSTAINING
COMRADE THROUGH MANY YEARS

PREFACE

THIS book sets down at last such reflections upon religion as have come to me during the many years that the subject has been in the field of my professional and personal attention.

It is a series of reflections upon what religions are; what they do; how they are born and grow up and grow old and decay or are renewed; what place they hold and what they signify in the story of mankind.

I do not anticipate that what I say here will delight the champions of religion or fortify its opponents. I have sought to treat religion as what it is, a confused event in history and a complex institution in civilization; to analyze without judging, to understand without embracing. My study purposes no vindication and projects no assault. It is offered rather as a somewhat summary record of one particular sequence of events and as an analysis of their significances. As such, it will seem to champions of religion an attack upon its claims to paramountcy in the life of man; to the enemies of religion it will seem a justification of its pretended importance. But to the curious student of men and events this book will, I trust, appear as merely the observations and opinions of a humanist looking at one institution of our civilization in the light of its bearing upon the others, and upon the human nature which breeds and sustains them all.

The present form of this book owes much to the illuminating comments of the students of my courses in religion at the New School for Social Research and at the Peoples Institute. My

PREFACE

friends, Mr. Silas Bent and Mr. Alfred Dwight Sheffield, have given most generously of their time and interest; I owe to them many valuable suggestions, and the kindest help with the proofs. These scanty acknowledgments cover only a very little of my debt.

H. M. KALLEN.

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CHAPTER I

THE PERENNIAL ARMAGEDDON

I

ONCE more the defenders of the faith stand at Armageddon, battling for the Lord. The affairs of the churches, churchmen declare, are at a crisis. Religion stands at the parting of the ways. There is a way of life and there is a way of death, and the battle is joined over which is which. The way of life, Modernists cry, is the new way of science and social service; religion, taking any other way, must die. The way of life, Fundamentalists shout, is the old way of the creeds and personal conversion; religion, taking any other way, gives up the ghost.

This is no new thing in the strife of religionists through the ages. Victory or death has always been the slogan of the sects. The enemy may be as magnanimous as Cæsar, as generous as Buddha, as charitable as Christ; to surrender to him is always the same as suicide. For it is of the nature of creeds to admit no alternative. *Credo quia impossibile, Aut Cæsar, aut nullus*, is the law of their kind. Consequently, they prepare and impose a grammar of assent to deny which is to insure their own death. Alternatives must from the outset, therefore, needs be inadmissible. But alternatives do arise,

to challenge and deny. The history of religions is the history of their unremitting conflicts. The crisis of the faith is a chronic crisis, ever and anon blown acute by passions of doctrine from other walks of life.

Take the current clash of creeds. Does religious history know a generation which has not had its modernisms and fundamentalisms, its heresies and orthodoxies? And for how many generations have these been the same? Whether it is Orpheus reforming early Greek religion or Sallustius and Julian reforming late Greek religion; whether it is Amos reforming the ancient Canaanitish cultus or Ezekiel establishing a Babylonian one, for Israel; whether it be Athanasius against Arius or Roman christianism against Byzantine orthodoxy, whether it be Luther against Rome or Calvin against Luther; whether—need one prolong the list of variations and of conflicts? It stretches to the last syllable of recorded time. Its items may be drawn from any part of the world, from any level of culture. Each differs from its predecessors as one generation from another; each makes its own unique issue and passes, to be replaced by a successor as individual and unique. And likewise each is continuous with what has gone before. The alarums and excursions of the sectaries in the year of grace 1926 also have their continuities, their immitigable identities and destinies. It may even be that they are the last campaigns of a warfare that began with the publication of Darwin's "Descent of Man," that they top off this phase of the clash of creeds to whose defeat and passing the very existence of modernism attests.

What, however, the causes are of the present battle is another matter. The current crisis in the affairs of the churches is not due to intrinsic church problems. The Great War has been declared its occasion. But the Great War was neither its

stimulus nor its sustaining cause. The causes are to be observed in the transformations which the economic and social character of society in America and Europe had undergone during the last two or three generations. These transformations seem to have reached during the post-war period a phase one aspect of which is the accentuation of the chronic crisis of the churches into one acute enough to command headlines and the front page in the daily prints.

That the Great War was the occasion of this event is due to nothing distinctive of the Great War as something unique. Neither its ostensible ideals nor actual characteristics counted significantly in the embittering of the religious quarrels. Its development and conduct served to expose the difference between the professions and the practices of the churches, while at the same time it provided them with a special rôle, the rôle of sustaining "morale" in camp and battlefield and among the mourners. The Great War precipitated a crisis in religions because it was a war, not because it was the Great War. Wars are in their nature crises in the lives of communities. For a time at least they shift the functions and radically modify the structures of institutions. Thus they dislocate habits, displace interests, impose unaccustomed restraints and enable unwonted liberties. This in itself causes an uneasiness which may grow into a feeling of crisis. But in addition they especially awaken, whip up and enchannel massive emotions customarily latent and ordinarily antisocial. Hates and fears, sorrows and angers, and exaltations and depressions—usually episodes of individual psychology or of the minds of small groups, that spend themselves in short swift waves of mob action—sweep over the whole nation, leaving no one untouched by their contagion, infecting every purpose, transforming the significance and use of every object

and person which men and groups ever pay any attention to. Often, when this happens, conditions which have been regarded as normal to the common life, conditions which generations have accepted, will pass into a phase of crisis.

II

The situation of the churches and their creeds was one such condition.

Consider the relation, first, between science and theology. Before the war the influence of science on religious thought and behaviour was no less real, no less effective, than after the war. In the bare three and one-half centuries since modern science began, the churches had conducted an unremitting crusade against it. That much of this crusade had turned into a rear-guard action was due less to the weakness of the defenders of the faith than to the invulnerability of their non-resistant victim.

Science having begun as physics and astronomy, the first phase of the crusade was against the scientific view of the physical universe. Now the inquisition against physicists and astronomers and their teachings has lapsed. Their denunciation and excommunication have not, of course, been rescinded, but they have been ignored, if not forgotten, and it is doubtful if even the infallible pope would any longer promulgate the Ptolemaic astronomy and Aristotelian physics of canonical doctrine. The controversy over the nature of the physical universe was never settled. It was dropped by those who started it.

The second phase of the crusade is still in action. It is against the scientific view of the nature of life, of the origin, development and destiny of plants, animals and man. It was set going by the publication of Darwin's "Descent of Man," and has become an attack on "Evolution" generally. The first

action of this crusade is also over. It, too, was dropped, not settled, and for the same reason as the crusade against physics.

The fact seems to be, controversies never are settled. They come to an end for one of two reasons. The first is that one of the parties to a controversy kills the other. Historically, this has been a favourite method of the churches, and it has its advantages; for while it cannot resolve an issue, it can and does destroy the need to consider it. Controversies also come to an end because people get tired of the argument. After a time one side or the other accumulates an enormous mass of evidence to which both sides are compelled to defer. In the early days of the Darwinian controversy, for example, many unanswerable arguments against evolution were fabricated. Who knows what they were? And they were unanswerable, for the evolutionary view of nature and life is not one about which a logical argument can be conducted, Huxley to the contrary notwithstanding. The theory of evolution is not amenable to logical proof. Its very essence is the use of an ambiguous middle term, the recognition that the world we live in is a changing world, and that hence a thing not only can but must both be and not be at the same time. Logic cannot proceed in this way. Change is outside its province. Ambiguous middle terms render argument impossible. Logic requires unambiguous identities. Logically, if you start with a monkey, you must end with a monkey. Logically you may not start with a monkey and end with a man; as Agassiz pointed out in refutation of evolution: if species exist, how can they change? if they change, how can they exist?

But in nature and in immediate experience it is all the other way. Space presents itself as a continuum without parts, and thought defines it as made up of points each of which is

absolutely separate and distinct from every other. Geometry builds all the continuous spatial forms we know up out of such points. Time presents itself as *Now* in which past and future presently and inseparably mingle. Yet this *Now*, which is logically separate and distinct from *Then* and *Soon*, is something you cannot put your finger on and pin down. To keep *Now* here you require both *Then* and *Soon* to be somehow present—though one has ceased “to be” and the other “is not yet.” In the domains of physics and chemistry the same keeps turning into the different far more obviously and dramatically; everything is something else. Whether you start with protons and electrons all alike and end with the multitudinous panorama of the natural world, or whether you start with the impact of people and events of the daily life and end with the aboriginal elements and laws of the sciences, this is the prospect before you: a succession of ambiguous middle terms, of items that are both themselves and something else at the same time. The identities of logical procedure, the “laws of thought,” are extractions from this doubtful continuum, precipitates of the struggle of a changing organism to resist change imposed upon it from without; expressions of a bias of human behaviour in favour of its own continuity. Logic is an instrument in the struggle for survival, not a vision of the beings engaged in that struggle. It is a device to slow down, and if possible to arrest, change which the changing courses of the living world have themselves brought up.

And this is why there could be no effective argument over evolution. Evolution is a word which designates the successions of orders of events—living and non-living—as they follow one after another in their continuities and discontinuities, as a Same continues to differentiate into others unlike itself. Such a succession is an observation, pieced out by

interpolations deriving from the observation. It cannot be a deduction from an immutable premise given once and for all. Therefore it is not subject to logic. Because the creationist theory is subject to logic, it has the logical advantage. Given the orders, genuses, species and varieties of existence once and for all created according to their kinds, you can define their essences and deduce their qualities and behaviour. But you cannot start with a protozoon in an Eozoic ooze and deduce from that the behaviour of William Jennings Bryan under the cross-questioning of Clarence Darrow on the lawn of the courthouse in the town of Dayton, and the sovereign state of Tennessee, in the republic of the United States of America.

No, logic is all on the side of creationism. Evolution has only correctness to sustain it. And perhaps that is enough. Correctness exists whenever a belief or theory as to a cause brings about, when put to work, the desired effect. Under the impact of the evolutionary hypothesis, the sciences of life and man have been transformed from mere classifications into visions of dynamic relationships; mechanisms of control have been laid bare and put to use. Biologists, working by means of the evolutionary hypothesis, are constantly enabled to bring into existence phenomena of living matter which such creationist biologists as there may be could not produce if they really applied the creationist theory. Civilized existence has been made wiser, safer, and richer. Understanding has been enhanced and insight deepened. While biology has not attained the same range of accuracy and control as the physical sciences, it has done enough to show that being on the track of evolution, it is on the right track. And it is far more recent than physical science.

Whatever its standing with scholastic logic, evolutionary biology has accumulated such a mass of evidence, has developed

such power to forecast results in one or another of its numerous special fields, as to render the basic crusade against it futile. To-day, doctors of the Roman Catholic Church admit the evolution of matter and the "material" aspects of life, and reserve creationism only to the immortal soul. They are rendering unto Cæsar what is Cæsar's in order that God may keep his own.

The Protestants have gone even farther. They have sought benevolently to assimilate what they could not conquer by force. The extreme Modernist identifies Evolution with Providence and replaces the original sin and the fall of man of salvational doctrine with an original sin and "ascent of man" of evolutionary salvation. Or he restates the Christianist salvational scheme in terms of biologic analogy as an aspect of "natural law in the spiritual world." The "ascent of man" is the creation of Henry Drummond, who meant it as an antiphonal response to the "descent of man." And his intention, if not his argument, has stuck. Liberal and educated evangelicals began to transform the insight into events which evolution is into a gospel of hope and vindication of vanity which evolution is not. Evolution, they argued, is no derogation of human dignity. On the contrary, it is a compliment to man. Man is a goal that the protozoön started toward. Like Nietzsche, they hold the ape to be a bridge and a way, a conspicuous stepping-stone among the dead selves left behind. Not, however, as "a reproach and a burning shame," but as a reason for glory and self-gratulation. Where Nietzsche looked to a superman that negates man, man remained, in the view of these evangelicals, the paragon and destiny of the world, the ultimate peak and excellence of its countless protean changes, the glory in which spirit comes to itself in wisdom, liberty and perhaps deathlessness. To biological data were given such

logical forms as would establish this triumphant conclusion. Arrangements like Bergson's "Creative Evolution" are among the most successful and recent of these repatterning of the sciences of life. By their means religion persuades itself that it can live side by side with evolutionary science and not die. And indeed, prior to the Great War evolutionary biology and the churches did seem to carry on in the same world with no more friction than any other two so contrasted natures and objectives.

III

Let us turn now from the pre-war relation between evolutionary science and the churches to the pre-war relation between industry and the churches. Industry is the mother of science and the twin of religious dissent. During the Middle Ages significant heresies grew in countries where cities were large and artisans many, where the manipulation of tools and materials was varied and highly differentiated and where the arts and crafts and trade flourished. Savonarola was a Florentine, and the cynic popes of the Renaissance had the benefit of the civil society of artisan Rome. Protestantism won its victories, where it did win them, through both bourgeois prosperity and peasant misery, but it maintained them through bourgeois prosperity. The Protestant revolution in England in the sixteenth century marks the attainment, broadly speaking, of an equilibrium or truce between industrial civil culture and agrarian Christian cultus which held, roughly, until the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century. This revolution began a series of even swifter and more radical transformations in the habits of men, with no end yet in sight. It shifted the incidence of population from country to city. It enormously increased the size and numbers of cities. It changed the

variety and character of occupations, subdividing old ones and adding innumerable new ones. To the traditional literate vocations—the law, medicine, politics and the church—it added new ones of servants in counting houses, factories and shops. *Clerk* came to mean any underpaid attendant waiting in an industrial or trading establishment. Fewer men made more things than most men could pay for. Population multiplied and misery capped population. Malthus prophesied and, prophesying, laid a foundation for Darwin to use. And all the time the large cities were growing bigger and new cities were growing up overnight. Men and women and children in enormous masses worked and bred and sickened and suffered and died amid gigantic factories and gargantuan slums. The immediate large environment ceased to be the cycle of nature out of doors. The natural setting of the agricultural worker was replaced by the man-made setting of the industrial worker. This, being now the constant background of his behaviour and the daily preoccupation of his senses, replaced the natural scene as the *fundamentum* of his mentality as industrial worker.

How could so great and so swift and so painful a transformation fail to cause a growing disturbance in the feelings of mankind? It cost in the human life of the times far more than any wars did. The suffering that came with it to the masses of men who went into the mines and mills and factories was far greater, and far more lasting than any that natural catastrophe could bring. As individuals grew more and more numerous than jobs they naturally grew more hungry, anxious and angry. Their emotion led to crises in industrial relations, in politics and in class status.

Naturally it reached out to the churches also. Established custodians of infallible salvation though the churches were, this emotion challenged them for immediate relief of imme-

diate bitter need. But the establishment possessed no instrument for such relief, and did not feel it necessary to seek one. Dissent, not complacency, could feel this necessity and dissent tried to provide such an instrument. Late in the eighteenth century England saw the beginning of a new and exclusive evangelical sect. This sect is the Methodist. The power of the Wesleys and their fellow-missioners over the minds of the growing body of the workmen of the period was in direct proportion to the misery and hopelessness of these workers. It was a power exercised against the Established Church of England. Men and women and children, sick and worn in body, covered with rags, hungry for food, starved in mind and feeling, abandoned the parish church for the Methodist chapel. Seeking the bread of life, they were fed on air, promise-crammed. The Wesleyan dissent was like the little match-girl's Christmas dinner, a compensatory dream. Its issue with the Church of England was a factitious one, whose grounds are not in reality. Wesley, no more than the Church of England, had immediate relief of the unendurable and yet endured immediate evil. He invoked the ancient panacea. "Obey your masters," he said in effect. "Do what is required of you in this world and make yourself ready for the next. After all, we have no place in this world; heaven is our home. Don't ask for justice in this world. Your right business is to seek salvation, not justice. You do not deserve justice for you are tainted with Adam's sin. Repent, seek grace and be saved."

Yet Charles Wesley got a great following. His dissent at the time and the place was enough. To join him registered a protest and gave relief to feeling as scratching might, which soothes without allaying the irritation and aggravates the itch. His church, hence, made negligible headway in England. But in the United States and in the colonies, where natural plenty

relieved the man-made famine of Britain and gave the cultus the opportunity to establish itself upon the vital economy of the new lands, it grew to a station of dignity and rank.

There was also the Christian Socialist, Charles Kingsley. He and his sect took a more relevant if equally inefficacious view of the situation of men in industry. But what he accomplished was to practise upon the industrial program of the Socialists much the same sort of change that Drummond, and later the Hegelian and neo-Kantian clerics of the Church of England, sought to work out in the evolutionary sciences of life and matter. As they argued the incidence and harmony of science and religion, so he argued that through religion only could there be any final and definitive elimination of the evils of industry. He wrote tracts and novels, seeking thereby to assimilate into the stuff of the Christian conventions of doctrine the industrial implications of a juster social order. Robert Owen had none of the traditional preoccupations, yet was far more effective. Carlyle had nothing else, and remains a booming tom-tom in an unheeding world. Antireligious Socialists have made an Armageddon of their own, and the ecclesiastical establishments confront the terms of the Socialist issue against them during a hundred years' warfare wherein, again and again, as with the cases of Kingsley and Drummond, clerical capitulation is disguised as religious victory; an attitude or view at first bitterly opposed is later warmly defended. It is adopted because it cannot be successfully combated, not to say, defeated.

IV

The tale of these surrenders is an item in the history of sects and churches. There is here no need to count up the perennial recurrences. Its phases and nodes may be marked off

by such events as the appearance of a new theme called "Social Ethics" in the curricula of institutions of higher learning and theological schools; by the growth in variety, number and specification of such courses; by such book titles as "Jesus Christ and the Social Question," "The Social Gospel of the Churches." Each represents a recession from an ancient infallibility and the taking over of a new one from the armoury of the old Apollyon.

The social programme of the Federal Council of Protestant Churches is, in the United States, a sort of summation and condensation of this process, so chronic to the lives of churches. How normal and chronic may be gathered from the fact that the programme was adopted as early as 1910, that when it was adopted it made no ripple. Its denunciation as heresy came a decade later. When it was adopted there was no obvious social neurosis; the processes of the national life followed in their habitual seasons and cycles. Yet the soldiers of the faith were battling for the Lord at one Armageddon after another. The churches and the sects were no less in opposition. There was no deeper material conflict between the modernist and the traditional concept and organization of religion. The conditions, the matters under controversy, the situations at issue had then, largely, the same anatomy as now. There is not a thing that Modernists and Fundamentalists say to-day that they have not been saying for a generation. The current crisis in the churches has been a continual crisis.

Even the Roman Catholic Church, which pretends to ignore "temporal" change altogether and does ignore it, so far as it advantageously can, but hardly half a century ago promulgated anew the exclusive authority of the "deposit of faith," and vindicated the infallibility of the Pope, has had to pay such attention to the exigencies of machine industry as its hold

on the faithful seemed to require. The Christian Socialism of Catholic countries has had the clergy among its proponents and defenders. Leo XIII had even seen the wisdom of approving clerical interest in social amelioration. And in the United States, the Romanist churches, under the stress of the competition of the public school system and other social agencies, had adopted the programme of encouraging secular interests in the manner of the Protestant Churches and the lay religious societies, like the Christian associations. Finally the Papacy felt constrained to call a sharp halt. Within the period of a year and a little more the ecclesiastical authority in three documents proscribed the whole of Catholic Modernism, which it called a "synthesis of all the heresies." Of these documents one was a decree of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition, enumerating, condemning and proscribing some sixty-five propositions as pernicious and corrupting the faith. The other two are encyclical letters. One is addressed by Pope Pius X to Archbishops and Bishops of Italy, in condemnation of the democratic movement among the clergy and the people and in the proscription of "Christian action"—i.e., participation in economic and social reforms by the clergy. The other is the notorious Encyclical *Pascendi Gregis*, addressed to all the chief officers of the church the world over on the doctrines of the Modernists and summing them up as agnostic in their philosophical foundation, evolutionist and radically critical in method, separatist in politics, and reformist in church organization—as subversive, therefore, of the whole teaching, structure and authority of the church, a synthesis, truly, of all the heresies. Among these heresies there is, with regard to morals, the principle of "the Americanists," that the active virtues are more important than the passive and are to be encouraged in practice. The encyclical named the methods and ordained

the machinery by which this synthesis of all the heresies was to be suppressed and extirpated.

Whether this has been successfully accomplished with regard to the intellectual heresies is not patent. But it is well known that the Americanist practice goes on, its last large manifestation being the social programme of the Catholic Welfare Council, subscribed to by many dignitaries of the Church in the United States and treated with coldness and suspicion in Rome.

This document, significantly, is a phenomenon of the post-war period, a period, as everybody will remember, of considerable industrial unrest. The unrest had many causes. There was not merely the natural let-down of activity with the cessation of martial needs. There was the notorious "open shop movement" of organized employers, seeking revenge for war-time high wages and high-hatting by workmen in the endeavour to "deflate" labour and smash trade-union organization. There was the anxiety of labour during the unemployment of the first post-war depression. There was the loose-footedness of young men taken up by the draft and set down adrift with no place to go. And there was, for America, the still unexhausted war-emotion, deprived of an object by the peace, fastening in succession upon Bolshevism, the labour-union, and the alien. There was with the cessation of the war, the emergence, in the southern mind, in the form of feelings of insecurity and anxiety, of the upset economic equilibrium of the South through the rapid dislocation of agriculture by machine industry. All these disturbances became shaping agencies of various imaginative projections and externalizations of themselves upon the external world. The teaching and organization of the Ku Klux Klan, with its gospel of hatred for the alien, the Jew, the Catholic and the Negro, was

one of the greater ways in which the dark and unmanageable inward trouble was set in the world without, an external evil that could thus be seen, understood, and fought. Another was the "Americanization" movement. Another was the Inter-church World Movement. Another was the Inquiry into the Christian Way of Life. Another was the resurgence of spiritism and the vogue of Conan Doyle and Oliver Lodge and various other mystics and fakers. And still another—in the public eye a basic and lasting one—was the current phase of the recurrent attack of the Fundamentalists on the Modernists. Contrasting as these events and associations are in realism, sobriety, understanding and dignity and range of feeling, they all diverge from the common unbalance of the national equilibrium described above.

Now the issues these various sects fight over, the principles they give battle for, the battles themselves are, on the whole, "old stuff." War emotions and the new conditions have given it new colour and thrown it into new perspectives. But the essence of the conflict is continuously one. Namely: ancient vested interests of head and heart and flesh seeking to hold their places against the transforming pressure of new events, new insights, new ways, new institutions. Traditional Athens against the Greek enlightenment; Hebrew prophet against Hebrew priest; Roman rationalist against the Pontifex Maximus, the priests of Isis, of Cybele, of Mithra, of Christ, and God knows what God else; Oriental cults, one against the other; themselves split into sects as Christianity split and continues to split to this day. Ever new sects form, establish themselves or disappear. Ever religion makes its story in fissions, heresies, hair-fine variations of creed and conduct. Ever, when societies are disturbed and stressful, when masses of men are moved by deep upwelling sentiments in which anxiety and fear and anger and

hate have no small space, and many hungers drive in unwonted ways to undesired ends, new cults come on the scene challenging the old; while the old, their objectives, their methods and their tools renew a lapsed worth. Battle is joined. The defenders of the faith are once more at their perennial Armageddon.

What is there in the nature of religion to make it so?

CHAPTER II

THE ANATOMY OF RELIGIOUS BEHAVIOUR

I

ALTHOUGH the essence of religion is, according to the initiates of modern religious discussion, an inward thing, not to be known except in one's own private realization by means of an inward "religious" or "spiritual sense," in an ineffable religious experience, its realities are available to life and conduct only as other realities are available—in the form of specific and definite behaviour; of actions, words, attitudes, going on at specific and definite times under specific and definite circumstances. The unknown, the intransigently inward, the esoteric, the incommunicable, must, if it is to count, make a knowable and namable difference. It must add something to a situation, something that would not be there unless it were itself there. Or, for the same reason, it must take something away from the situation. And what it adds or takes away must be so substantial that you can put your finger on it, point it out and discuss it. The significance of this something may be *nil* or beyond words serious. In nature it may be nothing more than the verbal addition to an action taking place: as, for example, the word of a man washing his hands that he is cleansing himself before God; or it may be a radical transformation in the position and actions of an individual or a group; as, for example, selling all one has and giving to the poor or changing to a communist mode of life from one based on private property.

Another illustration may make the point clearer. Suppose two metaphysicians, one a materialist, the other an idealist, sit down to sup together. One calls the hors-d'œuvre, the soup, the fish, the roast, the salad, the sweet and the coffee he consumes different arrangements of hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, nitrogen, sodium and one or two other chemicals. The other calls them states of God's mind or a succession of his own ideas or forms of consciousness. Both, however, dip them up with their spoons, cut them with their knives, spear them with their forks, chew and swallow them in the same way. The unmistakable differentiae between the two metaphysicians at dinner reduce themselves to the names they give the things they eat, and to the sentiments that go with the names.

Or suppose that you are a poor Sicilian immigrant at work digging another subway, still further to facilitate the stretching of the distance between life and work which are so characteristic of the American economy. Being an immigrant, and from Sicily, you are likely to be unaware of the eighteenth amendment, and disregarding of the radical alteration in your dietary habits that, in consequence of it, your Americanization would require. You are accustomed to dine off an onion or two or a bit of garlic and bread and wine. Dining off wine, you are an undesirable alien, a scofflaw fit only for deportation. But the next morning before breakfast you go to church. You confess and are absolved. And there you see the priest celebrate communion, with bread and wine, now without onion or garlic.¹ But it is quite proper for him to drink wine. When he drinks wine in church, or for religious purposes, he is not a scofflaw, not an alien fit only for deportation. The wine is "sacramental,"

¹ Onion and garlic were once religious instruments. Now they are "superstitions"—charms against the evil eye, diseases of sorts, witchcraft and other forms of ill-luck. Their strong smells are the stuff, literally, of "the odour of sanctity."

and holds a power and exercises an influence which under no other circumstances is ascribed to it. And the same transformation happens to the bread. What strange something has been added to or taken away from the ordinary bread and wine of the daily life to give them this imputed potency, to make them, that were customary and profane, now the substance of the sacrament? *Some* unmistakeable differentiating factor must be manifest, if there is to be any discourse at all about religion. Should this factor be an utter mystery, so that it cannot, at least, be pointed to, then the silence which mysticism implies is the only proper course. But neither the mystics nor the more conventional religionists are given to silence. On the contrary.

Doctors and saints of the churches of the world endow the bodiless and esoteric ingredients of the various religious structures with well-ordered identities made up of symbols, arrangements and sequences which are attributed to them, and which, practically, they are attached to (like streamers to a Dyak's head) or incarnated in. Unmanifested or unmanifestable transcendentials and ineffables of theology and mysticism do not figure in any direct or primary important way in the aggregate of religious behaviour, and the minds that are concerned about them are eccentric to the religionist norm as that may be discussed and elicited from the history of religions. Religious behaviour is by and large dependent on response to objects and events ponderable, concrete and not beyond analysis. The trail of them in the histories of religions is broad and sure. Behaviour is religious when it is response to such objects or to situations in which such objects play a prepotent rôle. What they are made of? how they come to be? what they do? what responses their being and doing draw out from men? how these responses differ from mankind's responses to the other objects that make up the world of their experience?—these

are among the major questions to which an anatomy of religious behaviour must seek answers.

II

Let us then first look at the common and conventional types of religious action in which we all of us, at one time or another in our lives, have participated. Such behaviour is collective and standardized. It takes place at fixed times, in definite places and follows a set pattern. It supplies quite enough objective material to begin an analysis with.

Imagine that, according as you are a member of some Christian sect—Catholic or Methodist or Presbyterian or Unitarian; or of some Judaist sect—Ashkenazi or Sephard or Hassid or Reformed; or some Mohammedan or Bahai or Brahmin or Buddhist sect, you proceed on the proper regularly recurrent sacred day—Sunday, Saturday, Friday—to a special kind of edifice called variously church, synagogue, temple, chapel, etc. Edifices of this kind are characterized by a mode of architecture peculiar to themselves. They are built not primarily for men to live in nor to perform any of the work of the daily life in. They are built to house special objects, used on special occasions for the performance of special kinds of action. Now consider these special kinds of action. They make up the ritual or service of the church. Whatever the sect or religious society may be, its ritual or service requires the assembling of a group of men and women, or of men only or of women only. The group may be large or small. Its number may be indeterminate, or a fixed minimum—like the ten male adults of the Jewish minyan—may be required before the service can be initiated. Responsibility for this initiation sometimes falls on one, sometimes on more than one, person. He is then and

there the religious leader of the group. The actions he sets off and directs are many and varied—the repetition of certain set sentences, like the Lord's Prayer; the singing of certain songs; movements of the hands, like making the sign of the cross; genuflections; set steps in various directions; swayings and posturings of the body; facing in different directions: to the East or to the West.

Nor are the movements made at random, and without accessories. They are minutely and elaborately co-ordinated with the arrangement of various objects. They are determined with reference to those objects whose own pre-established distribution decides how the spaces in the central hall of the sacred edifice shall be disposed. These objects may be addressed, handled or adored. They may be things to worship or sacred tools which are used in the conduct of worship; books—like Bibles, hymnals, prayer books; worked materials—like censers, crucifixes, scrolls of the law, communion services; garments—like the prayer shawls, skull caps, phylacteries of Judaists; the ecclesiastical vestments, apostolic rings, caps and croziers of the Christians. Enter an orthodox Jewish synagogue of a Sabbath—and you will see a congregation, prayer shawls on their backs, *siddurim* in their hands, facing the east wall, against which is the curtained ark of the law holding the sacred scrolls, a dim small light always burning before it. In any Christian house of God, of a Sunday, you will find only the ministers garbed in special religious vestments, even if they consist of nothing more than the long-skirted coat known as the Prince Albert and a white string tie. Between that stenograph of an ecclesiastical garment to the ornate dress of a Roman prelate on festival occasions, there are gradations that grow in complexity as the orthodoxy and traditionalism—and wealth—increase. Often other differentiae are added—like the tonsure, a particular man-

ner of wearing the hair, or other modifications of the body and its coverings. Sometimes the feet are bared.

Also services vary in elaboration. A Unitarian service may consist of a prayer, a hymn or two and a sermon. Contrast that with the detail and structure of a Catholic mass—with the complicated movements, as of a dance, that it requires, the number of participants, the various tools like the crucifixes, images, censers, incense. Consider the furnishings of the Catholic Church—the elaboration of the altar, the portraits of God the Father and the Mother of God, and God the son and God the Holy Ghost, their retinues of servants, angels and saints; the votive offerings; the consecrated instruments.

It is not needful to continue the enumeration. The furniture and trappings of churches are the familiar, though to the lay mind indiscriminated, machinery of the religious establishment. They are there for any one to see and to think about. To see and to think about—yes, but not for any one to use. Their use is restricted to a special class of person who has been specially prepared for it by training and discipline. Religious paraphernalia usually exert positive religious efficacy only in the hands of such persons; in the hands of others, they are inert and sometimes maleficent since the profane touch, like that of Uzzah on the ark of the Lord is, like every broken taboo, worthy of its own punishment and automatically generates it. The trained adepts in the manipulation of religious instrumentalities, the specialists in religious behaviour are the clergy: rabbis, ministers, priests, in their ranks and hierarchies. Their task is to make right use of the instruments of the service and to direct the congregations in the proprieties of ritual behaviour and religious attitude. Their exhortations and admonitions must be primarily conversant with these matters, although, of course, sects vary on the range of a minister's

themes. In a dissenting church talk may be had about anything, but orthodox ministers usually confine themselves to religious questions properly so called. If one does range, it is not because a question of politics or art or drama or literature concerns him as such, but because the subject has raised a special issue of conduct that is taken to be in some intimate way bound up with one or another aspect of the religious behaviour of which the adventuring cleric is the expert professor. Normally his business is priestly exegesis, not prophetic pronouncement.

With the limitation of the religious theme goes also a certain limitation of religious speech. It is not only that certain words—the name Jahweh, for instance—may not be pronounced except under very special and exigent conditions, it is that the speech itself, in the most unorthodox pulpit, from the mouth of the most secularized clergyman, has an antique and liturgical flavouring, a flavouring which becomes intense and the very substance of the speech itself, as you move inward toward the central traditions of the great religions. There the language of religion is not at all the vernacular of the daily life or of current letters. It is sacred language and it is dead language, the very meanings of which may be beyond the ken of even the professional religionist who is its expert user. The Latin of the Roman Catholic service, the mediæval Greek or old Slavic of the orthodox, the Hebrew of the Jew, the Sanskrit or Pali of the Brahmin or the Parsee, the Koranic Arabian of the Moslem—they are holy tongues, but they are alien and dead tongues so far as the uses of the daily life are concerned. The English of the King James version of the Hebrew Scriptures, of the Book of Common Prayer, of the Hymnals and Psalmodies, of any liturgical work, is the English of a bygone day. It sets the tone and defines

the manner of ecclesiastical diction, and manifests itself even in the illiteracies and ineptitudes of "Science and Health."

The ideas that are communicated by means of this antiquated or dead language vary from other ideas in one or two essential respects. Examine any sermon, any prayer, any hymn, any secondary religious script or any fundamental sacred text. What more do they deal with than the commonplace fortunes of the daily life, the cyclic hazards of the seasons and the elements, the various objects and events people quarrel about: birth, marriage, hunger, thirst, sickness, drouth, passion, war, death, in their specifications and occurrences? The things men feel about and talk about and fight about from day to day since the beginning of human life? Nothing more. But they give them a special turn. They describe them as reward or punishment, as the effects of the intention or the design of unseen conscious beings whom they call gods, ghosts, demons, spirits.

It is the business of the religious experts to work upon these unseen beings, to speak for them and to them. They function as the middleman between them and the congregations to whom they, the experts, minister.

III

Pass now from the major formal religious assemblies of the conventional type to the less formal, more irregular ones: like the mid-week prayer meetings of the evangelical churches or the nightly congregations of the Salvation Army. What is it that makes of the Salvation Army a religious body and of the bass drum—any anthropologist will tell you how ancient and honourable a religious ancestry it bears—the castanets, the cornet and the tambourine, religious instruments? What makes the uniform of the Salvation Army a religious vestment?

When, in response to the great drum, a crowd gathers round the salvationist band, with its banners, its Bible and its squalor, when the crowd hearkens to the testimony of the brothers and sisters, and gives ear to the tale of salvation by washing-in-the-blood-of-the-Lamb, has the crowd become a religious gathering? If it has, what has made it so? What has made perhaps these very same people over into a different group from the one they composed when they were listening—also summoned by a drum—to a bull-necked health expert naked to the waist, urging upon them from the seat of an automobile the saving virtues of an exerciser?

Or turn to the interest of the public evangelical religious occasions in the United States—the revival and the camp meeting. In these assemblies dissenting orthodoxy takes its orgiastic fling. It abandons the established good manners of liturgical routine for religious transports generated *ad hoc* by devices hoar and conventional as religion itself. The church gives itself the purge of an emotional holiday, paying itself out for the deprivations and repressions of the inhibitory *mores* of its communicants, for the way of life that rebels among the evangelicals condemn as “puritanism.” Beginning in the pews with an orgiastic excitation of fear, anger, jealousy, lust and hope, the “revival” ends on the mourners’ bench with the acknowledgment of sin, repentance and the acceptance of the grace of the Lord’s salvation wherein men and women have “come to Jesus.” When that flaming evangelist, the Reverend Mr. William Sunday, D.D., makes his vivid word pictures of the condemned and unattained, in most cases the unattainable, pleasures of this world, those pleasures are to that degree at least vicariously attained, and enjoyed. The savour of them is all the richer in that they are described as the sins of those in whose lives they are actual, for which the sinners are to burn

in eternal fire. The sins from which one is saved oneself are nowise so specific. Sin is here the name for the oppression of the collective mood which the evangelist works up, as salvation is the name for the relief from the strain of it which comes through the action of going to the mourners' bench and confessing sin. The changing tensions of a stage-play or the varying fortunes of a football game involve objectively the same whipping up and relaxation of emotion. What renders the one religious, the other not? Plays and games, be it remembered, were once also in and of themselves religious. Can it be much else than the bearing which, under the manipulation of the evangelist, the attitudes of the congregation come to have toward themselves, Jesus, Satan and the neighbour?

Now let us look at a few other examples of religious behaviour. Here is one from antiquity. One of the duties of the priestly groups supported by the Roman State, was delivering judgment concerning the desirability of a public policy—a war, a campaign, an alliance, a battle—by reading the flight of the geese, or the sequence in which fowl peck at grain, or the markings on the liver or other vitals of sacrificial animals. Priests with such duties were called augurs, and augury is a form of religious behaviour, requiring especial and elaborate training. What makes such, to us silly, acts religious? If you were told that Mr. Hearst's omniscient Mr. Brisbane had gone to the top of the Woolworth Building in New York City and having there seen a flock of thirteen geese flying north in a semicircle instead of an acute angle, announced that the United States must join the League of Nations, what would you say about his sanity? Would you call such behaviour religious? Yet there was a time when momentous decisions of state were made by the government of the greatest empire of antiquity apparently on no other grounds.

Again, religious behaviour consists sometimes in saying things. Saying very formal things such as set prayers, or singing hymns or songs, or in "speaking with tongues." Very early, indeed, first of all, religious behaviour was complete in dancing, sometimes wild, sometimes measured, often it was only changing one's bodily posture; kneeling; bowing; swaying; whirling; leaping; laughing; weeping, etc.; taking on and putting off certain objects, tracing certain definite figures in the air, touching some particular portion of one's own body or another's, cutting one's hair or letting it grow; circumcision, castration, orgiastic festivals; cannibalistic ritual meals; orgies of communion, diets limited to milk or vegetables, fasting; washing ritually as by baptism or bathing in sacred rivers, refraining from contact with water; the sequence of the sacraments like "penance," marriage, extreme unction; going without buttons on one's garments, wrapping oneself in dense coverings, wearing no clothes at all; adoring images and symbols, caring for and tending them; breaking them; worshipping animals; worshipping abstractions, rejecting everything concrete as religious; gashing oneself with knives or whipping with lashes; fighting; refusing to fight. And so on. A comparison of rituals and rules of religious conduct will show that for every positive mode of religious action there is a precise opposite, that the total is nothing less than the discovered total of human conduct. And close analysis cannot discover a single type of religious action which is in any intrinsic way different from the same action as it occurs in the daily life. Every item in a religious action has its homologue in the non-religious sphere.

What renders it religious in one connection and non-religious in another?

These modes of religious behaviour are what may be called public. They are performed openly, and they have the sanction of public opinion and community support. But there are other modes of religious behaviour which we may call personal and private. Such are modes which are not openly demonstrated, and with regard to which public opinion is inert or inimical. The action taken is taken directly by the worshipper himself, and when he is alone. It does not require, indeed it does not allow, the intervention of the professional religionist: of the priest or mediator publicly functioning. If the service of a professional is required he—or she—is usually an outlaw professional and practises the priestly ministration in secret. Discovery either of the lonely personal ritual or the service *à deux* is likely to cause shame and produce denial.

This order of religious behaviour embraces such actions as private prayers for the attainment of not altogether social objectives—prayers such as a devout burglar might deliver up before setting out on a professional quest; imprecations expressive of some deep-lying enmity openly unsanctionable. The category of what is usually called “superstition” falls within this order: actions, for example, designed to obviate the consequences of spilling salt, breaking mirrors; sitting thirteen at table; beginning an enterprise on Friday or on the thirteenth day of the month; seeing the new moon over one’s wrong shoulder; putting one’s shirt on inside out; putting the right shoe on last; getting out of bed on the left side, and so on. These actions are performed alone. Rituals requiring a mediator are those whose objectives are the return of lost articles; communication with the dead; prediction of one’s general destiny in marriage and fortune; augury as to the outcome of specific enterprises in immediate contemplation. The priestly ministration here is given by persons we nowadays call as-

trologers, trance-mediums, palmists, crystal-gazers, phrenologists, card-readers. Their circumstances to-day are reduced. They have lost caste and station. But in antiquity and on the lower levels of contemporary orthodoxy their function was publicly discharged by public religious functionaries. Among the civilized as well as the uncivilized peoples of the non-Christian world it is still so discharged. The priests of Buddhism and Tao have this duty in their routine.

IV

We have seen now what modes both public and private religious actions fall into. To understand more fully what it is that renders them religious let us look a little at their occasions. First, the public occasions. These, in our Judæo-Christian world, are the regulation days of rest and festival; the Sabbaths—Saturday or Sunday: the holidays—Easter, Thanksgiving and Christmas and the lesser festivals. Beyond these set times come those occasions in which a community suffers a crisis. Disease may cause a crisis leading to religious action. For example, during the influenza epidemic, there were held over and above the regular religious meetings, innumerable prayer meetings, designed to bring about the abolition of the disease. Sometimes there are special services of prayer for the recovery of men in public place, as during the last sickness of Mr. Harding. Again, drouth, menacing the food supply, may cause a crisis. At such times country churches and sometimes city ones hold special prayer services for rain. Strikes, like the coal strike with its menace of cold and the sequelæ of cold, cause enough anxiety to evoke special services of intercession for relief. Prayers for the settlement of the strike were numerous and the reasons they urged upon the Lord not such as to convince operators or miners. War, of course, is always a

crisis, and is always an occasion for religious behaviour, each of the embattled neighbours praying for the victory of its own side. Nor does religious action occur only when a crisis is already mature and a community is in the midst of it. Religious action often takes place when a crisis is merely pending. Times of hesitation, when nations or communities or lesser associations of men are in doubt about their policies and programmes, are times of prayer for a decision not by the judgment of man merely. Thus when the late Mr. Wilson was unable to make up his mind to declare war against Germany, prayers were offered up asking Jehovah to make the decision for him and to declare it through him; often, to make a special kind of decision for Mr. Wilson—the right one, namely; the right one being that which the partisans in their own hearts preferred, and which consequently could not, with ease, be anything but the will of Jehovah.

Indeed, it is a part of the routine of regular prayer to review the questions of public policy of which the issue is in doubt, and to request a resolution—according to God's will, of course, but with unmistakable intimations as to what his will could most divinely be.

In sum: religious action is elicited by crisis. It is a mode of behaviour resorted to in times of doubt and uncertainty, when the affairs of men are in solution and their minds are weighed down by anxiety over the outcome. Disasters on land or at sea, the menace of disease, famine, defeat, or death, in any or all of their degrees and intensities are the outstanding occasions of public religious behaviour.

What then about Sundays and holidays? Are they not feasts? What of all the ordinations of thanksgiving and rejoicing? Are those also not religious actions like the petitions and supplications? Of course, they are. Look, however, at

their origin and for that matter at the current significance of these regulation festivals. The testimony of the archæologists and the anthropologists is that the seventh day is a *dies nefas*; action is taboo, because, under the changes of the moon, the heavenly influences are considered inimical. The seventh day is a day of crisis, a turning-point in the lunar cycle. Long before Jahweh and his chosen entered recorded history, this was known and with ritual action countered and offset.

As for Easter, Thanksgiving and Christmas—what cult in what part of the world cannot parallel these seasonal festivals? They are typical—the springtide festival of mourning over the death of vegetation and joy over its resurrection; the festival of the harvest and the autumn sowing when the soul must be purged so that the seed may be sure to sprout; the festival of the cycle of the sun, at the turn of the solar year from the short, dark, barren days of winter into the steadily longer ones that move toward spring. Crises in the phases of the lunar month; crises in the phases of the solar year, crises in the cycle of the agricultural season; crises in the pastoral economy of the mating and breeding of cattle and sheep—these turning-points in the open, inevitable aspects of the life-cycle of men labouring for bread in a world which was not made for them, but in which they happened and grew, are the standard inevitable occasions for religious behaviour. Through what immemorial seasons must these times of the month and year not have been observed before they were realized; realized before they were remembered and anticipated; remembered and anticipated before they were prepared for and their happy outcome assured by the mimetic ritual which is their human rehearsal at the starting-point of each and all of them.

For the more traditional religionists of our world, indeed,

subordinate crises are marked with subordinate festivals. Catholic and Episcopal calendars celebrate in saints' days still other phases of the cycle of earth and heaven, midsummer night and All-Souls' day; the Jewish pentecost and new year and feast of lots, the ritual petition for rain and the peace of the dead—what are they but present aspects of the same anxieties and hopes that made the Greek Anthesteria, the Thargelia, the Thesmophoria? These are all names for elaborate religious action designed to protect the sprouting or the grown or the planted life from the enemy that threatened in the changes of the sun and moon and the presence of the dead.

The protection, the self-generated assurance, were inevitably crowned with success. For the cycle of the seasons and the movement of the sun and moon everlastingly recur, and the anxiety is of the hearts and hopes of men, not of the insecurity of the event. The sun rises whether Chanticleer crows or not; grass grows and water runs and flocks cast their young whether or not man dances or sings and weeps. Forever the changing phases of the seasons bring their moods, their anxieties and exaltations; forever they bring "spring fever," "midsummer passion," "winter slowness." The immemorial actions of which Easter and Thanksgiving and Christmas are the present forms still are repeated by the labouring masses the world over, to ensure the future and purge the heart. They are repeated even by the sophisticates of evangelical Christianity, who have forgotten their occasions and have perverted their meanings. Men have now long known that these ancient rites cannot assure the future; but in their season they renew them; and gain hope and easement from their practice. For they are each an action which releases the perennial emotion that the seasonal crisis awakens; each relieves anxiety and moderates exaltation, enabling mankind to go about its business with a

quiet heart. To most men, however, they remain ancient ways of forestalling impending disaster by an anticipatory rehearsal of victory; in the drama of the ritual, the resurrection always follows the death of the God.

Besides the open crises we share with our neighbours, there are those which pertain to our secret hearts and which we cannot with the best will make public. These are the occasions for personal religious behaviour.

Broadly speaking, they fall into two classes. One consists of all those occasions of divided mind, of inner conflict, when "two spirits within the bosom speak." The strain of such a conflict is often the total substance of evangelical sin, and the pressure to seek relief is the drive toward conversion and the attainment of grace. When such a course is for one reason or another not open, action is likely to take place that falls into a ritual pattern. Some of these patterns are standardized and classed as superstitions; touching wood, for example, others, like sub-vocal praying, are held to be correctly religious. The second class of occasions for religious behaviour comprises all those confrontations with the world around you in which you feel balked, hemmed in with no way out; or in which you feel the way dark and obscure, or the outcome uncertain. A first journey, a major operation, a new business, the eve of battle or other danger, are typical occasions. The action you initiate the enterprise with may consist of anything—yourself putting a floral horseshoe in the window of your new shop; putting a Bible you have never read and are not likely to in your breastpocket; furnishing yourself with a "lucky piece," a scapulary or a rabbit's foot; sprinkling yourself with holy water; touching wood or a Negro or the scroll of the law; making the sign of the cross; repeating a paternoster or the Shema; turning your shirt inside out; spitting three times;

turning around seven times; securing sacerdotal blessings and purchasing the special professional services of the expert religionist to pray, celebrate masses, read psalms, or whatever other mode of religious actions the case may, in your and the specialist's judgment, require.

The situations which eventuate in religious actions of this kind vary with the complexity and the sophistication of the persons who get into them. Some will respond at once by means of them to any crisis and any conflict. To others, they will be courts of last resort; brought into play, without volition perhaps, after all the more usual and secular modes of resolving inward conflicts and controlling outward situations have been tried and have failed. To others, again, they are accessory to the secular mode, insurances against their failure, re-enforcement of their power to succeed, on the principle that "I am not superstitious, but—," that "I am not a Christian Scientist but—," and that "God helps those that help themselves." So, if you are ill, you consult the regular socially-sanctioned scientifically-trained physician first. If, over a longer period of treatment, you do not feel that you have been helped, you may turn first to the charlatanry on the fringe of the profession, then to the osteopath, then to the chiropractor, then to the Chinese herb-doctors, then to the Christian Science healer; and finally, as in a case that has come under my observation, to the witchdoctor, his brew, his amulets and his charms. If you are "playing the market," and your studies of the tape end in losses, you may turn to the astrologer, the card-reader or trance-medium for direction, as not a few men on the Street do. You may bet on horse races under the guidance of your own dreams. You may choose between John and James or Mary and Martha by means of the illumination of your destiny secured from a fortune-teller or your own reading

of the cards. You may make momentous decisions of your affairs under the guidance of your dear departed, speaking through a trance-medium; or of the Holy Ghost, speaking by means of a sentence from the Bible on a page you have opened at random and picked blindfold with a pin. . . .

v

The public rituals and organized services of the churches, the secret rituals and private liturgies of individuals, what do they add, what do they take away from the evident structure and process of the situations which occasion them and to which they are applied, for relief, for victory, for security? Apparently, nothing. They seem superfluous growths upon the actual mechanics of the situation, clogging them, and likely to hinder rather than to ensure relief, victory and security. By intent, however, they bring to bear a new, invincible power, able to nullify or destroy whatever it is that disturbs, that threatens, that hurts. This power is to feeling a different kind of power from that which operates in the routine of daily living, and even in most of its exigencies. It is called in when that no longer works. It is called in to accomplish what that is unable to accomplish. If that is natural, it is supernatural. Religious behaviour is an operation upon the supernatural, a manipulation of it for various public or private ends whose attainment by means of natural causes is in doubt.

Now one outstanding trait of supernatural agency, perhaps *the* outstanding trait is, that for it the notorious idealist maxim, *To be is to be perceived*, does not hold. On the contrary, for supernatural agency to be is to be *not* perceived. At least, to be hardly ever perceived. Supernatural agency is never in the first instance an object of direct perception at all. It does not of itself appear among the furniture of the religious institu-

tion. It is represented by surrogates, images, symbols, repositories, sanctuaries, which it is regarded as able to enter and leave at will. It is declared to exist unseen, in hierarchies of power from the most high gods to the least ghost, and your religious ritual is designed to bring it to bear on your affairs at the point of their crises, to make it work for you, to avert the evil that threatens you, to secure the good that you desire.

Let us pause a moment with this supernatural. The modern mind, even when it is religious, is apt to manifest impatience with the more articulate and precise conceptions of it and to mitigate its alienity from the "normal" or the "natural" by setting it off on the confines of nature, and limiting its domain to the eternal decrees, the everlasting providence of a single omnipotent god. Immediacies of supernatural action, the miraculous, the modern mind is sceptical of and more than a little inclined to scoff at, though it is these immediacies which religious behaviour is initiated to draw out. So let us look a moment at this supernatural. Whatever else it may be, it is something unseen, which has the power infallibly to control, to modify, to transform, objects in the natural world; such a power as objects in the natural world do not themselves have. It is this potency and nothing else which first distinguishes it from the natural. The distinction sets it over against the natural, presumes and counts upon its peculiar constitution. Natural and supernatural are mutually supplementary and complicative ideas. The complex sentiment and behaviour-pattern they express is a late one in the history of commonsense. There are contemporaneous primitives in Africa and Australia with a culture on the level of the Old Stone Age to whom this distinction is meaningless. You may say that their experience has not led them yet to discover the supernatural or to discern nature. To them existence is a plane circle in which all

beings pass from one mode of manifest individuality to another, and everybody, whether vegetable, animal or human, is his own grandfather. Gods, devils, angels, imps, as a different order of beings from men, animals or plants, are not known. The shock, the suddenness, the depression and exaltation of feeling that accompany the cycles of heaven and the seasons of earth and all the drama that they make are one with them; the passions that events awaken are part and parcel of the events. The small diurnal curve of feeling with its sharp declivities and high peaks is the measure of the undeviating smooth great cycle of the heavenly bodies and the earthly seasonal swing around the sun. All is melodrama, nothing order. Nature is distinguished when the regular is separated out from the dramatic, and the cycle of change can be left to work itself out without the reactions of the curve of passion. Nature is the rule of *laissez-faire* in cosmic economy.

VI

But to the human heart *laissez-faire* is an intolerable rule. When its own passion cannot turn the course of events in the way of its desire, it seeks another passion which can. Now this other is always latent just on the edge of the natural order, and "beyond the horizon" makes its unknown fringe. Moderns, particularly modern intellectuals brought up in the atmosphere of science and the automatic machine, can hardly hold in mind how difficult it is for their own selves to sustain continuously and consistently the identity of the little pool of passions that each of us is, to keep clear and sharp the distinction between ourselves and the rest of the world. In fact, the boundaries are always being overflowed, from both sides. The world and our hearts are constantly letting our sense of things drop to the depths of the Old Stone Age, where the

continuity of being was the fulness of man's realization of it, and his hungers, not his vision, provided his knowledge of the world.

An illustration from the greatest of modern psychologists may help to make the point clearer. During the academic year, 1905-1906, William James was visiting professor of philosophy at Leland Stanford University. He was there in April, 1906, during the great California earthquake. Here is what he writes about it:

When I departed from Harvard for Stanford University last December, almost the last good-bye I got was that of my old Californian friend B: "I hope they'll give you a touch of earthquake while you're there, so that you may also become acquainted with *that* Californian institution."

Accordingly, when, lying awake at about half past five on the morning of April 18 in my little "flat" on the campus of Stanford, I felt the bed begin to waggle, my first consciousness was one of gleeful recognition of the nature of the movement. "By Jove," I said to myself, "here's B's old earthquake, after all!" And then, as it went crescendo, "And a jolly good one it is, too!" I said.

Sitting up involuntarily, and taking a kneeling position, I was thrown down on my face as it went *fortior*, shaking the room exactly as a terrier shakes a rat. Then everything that was on anything else slid onto the floor, over went bureau and chiffonier with a crash, as the *fortissimo* was reached; plaster cracked, an awful roaring noise seemed to fill the outer air, and in an instant all was still again, save the soft babble of human voices from far and near that soon began to make itself heard, as the inhabitants in costumes *negligés* in various degrees sought the greater safety of the street and yielded to the passionate desire for sympathetic communication.

The thing was over, as I understand the Lick Observatory to have declared, in forty-eight seconds. To me it felt as if about that length of time, although I have heard

others say that to them it felt longer. In my case, sensation and emotion were so strong that little thought, and no reflection or volition, were possible in the short time consumed by the phenomenon.

The emotion consisted wholly of glee and admiration; glee at the vividness such an abstract idea or verbal term as "earthquake" could put on when translated into sensible reality and verified concretely; and admiration at the way in which the frail little wooden house could hold itself together in spite of such a shaking. I felt no trace whatever of fear; it was pure delight and welcome.

"Go to it," I almost cried aloud, "and go it *stronger!*"

I ran into my wife's room, and found that she, although awakened from sound sleep, had felt no fear, either. Of all the persons whom I later interrogated, very few had felt any fear while the shaking lasted, although many had a "turn," as they realized their narrow escapes from bookcases or bricks from chimney-breasts falling on their beds and pillows an instant after they had left them.

As soon as I could think, I discerned retrospectively certain peculiar ways in which my consciousness had taken in the phenomenon. These ways were quite spontaneous, and, so to speak, inevitable and irresistible.

First, I personified the earthquake as a permanent individual entity. It was *the* earthquake of my friend B's augury, which had been lying low and holding itself back during all the intervening months in order, on that lustrous April morning, to invade my room, and energize the more intensely and triumphantly. It came, moreover, directly to *me*. It stole in behind my back, and once inside the room, had me all to itself, and could manifest itself convincingly. Animus and intent were never more present in any human action, nor did any human activity ever more definitely point back to a living agent as its source and origin.

All whom I consulted on the point agreed as to this feature in their experience. "It expressed intention," "It was vicious," "It was bent on destruction," "It wanted to show its powers," or what not. To me, it wanted simply

to manifest the full meaning of its *name*. But what was this "It"? To some, apparently a vague demonic power; to me an individualized being, B's earthquake, namely.

One informant interpreted it as the end of the world and the beginning of the final judgment. This was a lady in a San Francisco Hotel, who did not think of its being an earthquake till after she had got into the street and some one had explained it to her. She told me that the theological interpretation had kept fear from her mind and made her take the shaking calmly. For "science," when the tensions of the earth's crust reach the breaking-point, and strata fall into an altered equilibrium, earthquake is simply the collective *name* of all the cracks and shakings and disturbances that happen. They *are* the earthquake. But for me *the* earthquake was the *cause* of the disturbances, and the perception of it as a living agent was irresistible. It had an overpowering dramatic convincingness.

I realize now better than ever how inevitable were men's earlier mythologic versions of such catastrophes, and how artificial and against the grain of our spontaneous perceiving are the later habits into which science educates us. It was simply impossible for untutored men to take earthquakes into their minds as anything but supernatural warnings or retributions.

Can this account fail to convince you how automatically the causes of felt passion get identified with the passion itself? They are continuous with it, so that they are sensed as being alive with its life rather than it with their force. Apply these observations now, not to an earthquake experienced by a great humanistic psychologist, but to such a recurrent natural phenomenon as, according to some writers, underlies the identity of the Jehovah of the Jews. This is the desert whirlwind, the sirocco. In Hebrew, the same word, *Ruach*, means spirit and wind and breath. The general empirical characteristics of strong wind are well known to you—it is sudden, capricious;

it does unexpected things, mostly damage. The wind bloweth where it listeth, tyrannically, with an unheeding force and utter irresponsibility. A wind blowing out of the desert carries terrific whirlpools of sand with it that add to its own sun-scorched impact a burning, killing drum-fire as of white-hot machine-gun bullets. Before such a wind, what can you do? You bow under its buffets, seeking what shelter you can, and if you come out alive, you may perhaps seek out a book and study out the scientific tale of the inwardness of this wind. With the help of the book you are able to integrate it with the other aspects of weather and subsume it under meteorological law. The wind is thus rendered for you a part of the orderly sequence of nature and you take no more thought regarding it.

What, however, was the wind to you when you were facing it, and seeking to make your lonely way against it? Could it be any less than Mr. James's earthquake, an angry spirit, striking at your vitals, seeking your life? The burning pain, the fear, the anger which it awakens in you as it whirls against you and you press against it, where do they begin and it end? They *are* it, driven to your heart. The wind is a living spirit, you say, invincible and harsh, jealous, avenging, like a consuming fire, flaming by night and like a cloud by day. You seem to recognize *will* in the whirlwind, will before which you must bow, that you must propitiate and obey, whose ill intent you must, in whatever way possible, avert, whose good offices you must, at whatever cost, secure and control.

What can you do?

Whatever you would otherwise do in a state of passion and fear—of that fear of the Lord which is the beginning of wisdom. You might grovel, make yourself as little, as trivial as possible, strip yourself for it of all size and greatness—reputation, possessions, clothes, cattle; sacrifice your

first-born to it, mutilate yourself. Any and all of these things you might do when the wind was blowing, and sooner or later, when you are doing one or another of them, the wind must subside. Can you fail to feel that the thing you have done is the thing the wind heeds? You consider this thing. You recall its minutiae, you treasure every posture, every gesture, every sound, in the exact sequence they came in. They are now a religious ritual, a patterned response to a situation controllable in no other way. You have attained to this sacred and precious pattern, experimentally, accidentally, by a method of trial and error. Your ritual is an instrument for the manipulation of a supernatural force—for the obviating of its own malice toward you and the directing of its power against whatever evil threatens you.

In the last analysis all rituals, however hit upon, are vindicated and survive through this method of rough trial and error. Feeling and use further sanctify them, and in the course of time they accumulate into a mysterious tradition which generation passes on to generation: first by imitation and technical apprenticeship, then by means of written records more and more refined.

At the outset, these techniques are neither natural nor supernatural, neither personal nor impersonal. Differences of that sort seem neither to have been felt nor made. They become efficacious when, as we shall see in a later chapter, attention has shifted from the deed to the doer. Of present moment is the fact that religious behaviour is the pattern into which an action falls and the expression of an emotion roused by some untoward event. It is that expression of feeling which for one reason or another is recognized as competent to control the event. As such it becomes itself the supernatural. But the supernatural only against the background of discovered,

orderly sequence which is nature. Within the setting provided by this background, religious behaviour appears as a skill in using words and tools that are especially adapted to manipulate and control the disorderly, the spontaneous, the elusive, the irregular, the fear-producing aspects of experience. These are now the seats and incarnations of the supernatural, the objective correlatives of the sacred rituals to which they are answerable.

To control and manipulate them, the ritual must reach them—if not directly, indirectly. Men discover early that often even the most tried and tested ritual pattern won't meet expectations. Rainmakers won't get rain, no matter how hard they try: victory makers won't secure victory no matter how intense the effort. The reaction is sometimes against the religious expert, sometimes against the ritual, sometimes against the refractory supernatural agency. But the feeling is generally that the agency cannot fail, that the fault lies in the technique or its user. He must be altered, the technique must be changed. How, and to what, you can tell only by a direct encounter with the supernatural agency. Face to face with it, you learn what is right and true—what is successful to do.

Hence, from early times, men have sought the face, the heart of the gods. They have gone toward it sometimes by means of the dance, sometimes by means of the trance. Fasting, self-torture, meditation, prayer, posturing, drugs, every manner of action has been used that might break down the normal forms of perception and enable men to make direct contact with the unseen. This contact is the essential religious experience. Once it is made, knowledge is renewed and vindicated; power is restored; bliss is secure. It becomes a starting-point for new religions, and for sectarian bifurcation and orthodox renewal in the old religions.

CHAPTER III

THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

I

RELIGIOUS behaviour, we now know, consists in the use of a varied collection of instruments—posture, movements, attitudes and actions of and upon the body, forms of speech, foods and drinks, fire, water, smokes and smells, and what not else that a ritual or liturgy may contain or avail itself of—for the purpose of directing and manipulating supernatural force so as to accomplish ends whose attainment is felt to be doubtful without the intervention of such forces. They are, as a rule, invoked only in the face of failure or in the fear that failure will result from whatever natural forces normally bring about the desired end. Their characterization as *supernatural* presupposes the natural and its inadequacy in the situation. Calling them up has every appearance of an automatic or reflex response to insuperable crisis. As William James's narrative of his experience during the San Francisco earthquake shows us, even the most knowing and civilized mind will apprehend such crises in supernatural terms and will need to reassure itself that they do fit into the organization of events which can be understood and adjusted to in terms of natural law.

Both the psychological work of James and the host of followers upon the path he blazed, and the researches of Freud and his schools have considerably lighted up the psychological mechanisms which are at work in religionistic response to crises felt as insuperable. There is, however, in terms of a prin-

ciple of distinction that James lays down in his "Varieties of Religious Experience," the possibility of a difference in essential nature between such an experience as St. Paul's vision on the road to Damascus, and Paul Blood's perceptions at the point of recovery from nitrous oxide anæsthesia. The one could easily be referred to a discharging lesion of the Pauline occipital cortex; the other might be referable to nothing but what the narrator recognized himself as cognizant of. James points out in the "Varieties" that an honestly empirical and thoroughgoing scientific method would start by accepting all such experiences at their face-value; by acknowledging the claims of their reporters, until proved false, to be trustworthy men and women telling as sincerely, as candidly, as completely as they are able, what they had encountered. So taken, the experiences could be studied without prejudice, their origins traced, their causes discerned or inferred, their functions and behaviour observed and judged, and their significance for the adventure of living evaluated. The "Varieties of Religious Experience" was a study due to so taking them. At least one reader learned from it that religious experiences appear as divisible into several classes. In some the supernatural seems to be the name for a state of mind induced in groups and individuals by a condition of crisis, and rendered at once objective by being automatically projected upon the condition. In others, the supernatural appears as an integral element or aspect of the outer world, stimulating response as does the rest of the world. In still others it appears as overlaid and blurred with attributions from the mentality of the reporter. Whatever its status among the things we call real, it is that which is assumed to act straight upon human nature and human situations only in the religious experience. And the religious experience, *mutatis mutandis*, is assumed to be the sole expe-

rience wherein supernatural force can be infallibly applied to resolve crisis, converting danger to security, misfortune to fortune, defeat to victory.

The manner of such a change of luck or destiny is not pre-implied. It is contingent. The components of the crisis and the accidents of surrounding circumstance make a difference. Only the direct action of the content of the experience on the personality of the experiencer seems to be infallible. To him it brings a tremendous enhancement of his vitality. He feels himself to have passed the boundary between what is he in himself and what is not he, out there. No locus any longer exists at which he can say the one begins and the other ends. In James's classic words: "He becomes conscious that (his) higher part is conterminous and continuous with a *more* of the same quality, which is operative in the universe outside of him, and which he can keep in working touch with, and in a fashion get on board of and save himself when all his lower being has gone to pieces in the wreck. . . . Spiritual strength really increases in the subject when he has them (religious experiences), a new life opens for him, and they seem to him a place of conflux where the forces of the two universes meet. . . ." He feels strong and alive with an alien strength that is yet his own. His state is blessed. The Hindus have a word, *satchitananda*, which designates the sense of well-being, power and certainty, that the religious experience at its optimum involves. In it, life and personality are renewed as water at a spring, or in St. Bernard's figure, as a drop of water in a cask of wine; new energy, new colour, new interest replace the broken thing that was. The very foundation feels renovated.

Religious experiences are, then, experiences, in many cases, of qualities in themselves so precious, so desirable, that the

residual world seems pale and flat and flavourless alongside. Once the state of such experience is attained, men find it impossible to dwell content in the routinal world of the daily life. Ordinary existence is thereafter often nothing more than a bleak resignation, a practical disillusion manifesting itself in complete indifference to the values and affairs of ordinary society, in constant searching and seeking and straining, by dint of much vigorous discipline of mind and body, to recover the ineffable state now lapsed. This is what is told of the behaviour of shamans, mystics, medicine men and philosophers alike. It is to be read in the biographies of Plato and Gautama, Plotinus, Origen: of Hindu Yogins, Christian saints and secular mystics. They erect their experiences into new philosophies or assimilate to them old ones, of which the experiences are the esoteric content, the magic touchstones whereby the gold of reality may be distinguished from the dross of appearances and huggled like a fluttering bird to the breast.

Tradition makes use of two characterizing words when speaking of the relation between the religionist and the supernatural force he establishes direct contact with in the religious experience. Both are Greek words and designate recurrent events in the religious behaviour of the ancient Greeks, events so standard, so characteristic of religion everywhere, that the words which name them have entered into the great tradition of the race as appreciative labels of the excellent and untoward in whatever happens to us. One of these words is *Ecstasy*. The other is *Enthusiasm*, more familiar in its Latin equivalent, *Inspiration*.

When your personality is in a state of ecstasy it is inside the supernatural. You are somehow yourself and not yourself. Your functions that maintain your identity are suspended; your body is often in a condition or a posture resem-

bling catatony or the hypnoidal trance. What you call your spirit seems out of the body, focussed upon or absorbed in that "more of the same" that James speaks of: living, moving, having its being in the "more," continuous with it in character, quality and potency. From *Ecstasy* you "return to Self." Mystics seeking personal salvation go into ecstasies.

In the state of *Enthusiasm* or *Inspiration* the supernatural is inside of you. The state of your body may be catatonic, but oftener than not it is active and engaged upon enterprises natural or unnatural, simple or of any degree of complexity. That to which the word *spirit* is commonly applied is not felt as disembodied: the sense of the bodily self may be present; but you feel as if you do not yourself possess a body. You feel it in the possession of the alien power, of the "Spirit of the Lord." It is the responsive vessel of the inflowing supernatural energy. What it performs comes not from itself, but "of the Father that sent me." It is working under *Inspiration*, and it is *Possessed*. In this condition what you identify as your own spirit is awake but you feel that you stand aside. You are aware of what is going on, but you have no share in it. You merely witness and assent; and sometimes refuse impotently. *Inspiration* "leaves you" or "fails you," and you are normal again. Prophets, of whom those of Israel are the most obvious example, are enthusiasts, possessed and inspired.

The varieties of religious experience fall easily into these two orders of Ecstasy and Inspiration, and sometimes a *tertium quid* in which the two seem to mingle. Their resemblance to the conditions the psychiatrist deals with is notorious. We have already seen why this resemblance need not detain us. Sanity is not an inherent attribute of character but a quality of its consequences. It is a social judgment and varies with the

conventions of the generations and the changing norm of success or failure in changing communities. It makes no deliverance about existence, as science must conceive it. That men might be driven insane by the encounter of some thing or event, or that they might need to be insane in order to encounter or perceive it at all, says nothing whatsoever about the objectivity of the thing or event in the external world—be it a cataclysm of nature, a social disaster, a personal tragedy or a supernatural agency. By whomsoever reported, religious experiences occur at times of just such crises as those enumerated above and they occur as somehow resolutions of them. When they have occurred, they are the starting-points for reformations of old cults and the initiation of new ones; for behaviour looking to personal salvation; for programs of social reconstruction. And so on. They are the initiatory centres of variation and novelty, ineluctably renovators and renewers of a failing or broken life.

II

Since the religious experience allows for such an expectation of desirable consequences and such a certainty of intrinsic allure, how could it be that men who have once known it or who have heard of it from those who know should not keep seeking it, should not keep trying to make a highway toward its attainment? Although the quality of the experience itself is beyond words, ineffable, so that ratiocination must ever be about it and about, and can never touch it, the ways to it are capable of anatomy and description, and can be set down to refresh one's own memory and to guide the steps of those who follow. Preliminaries and preparations, in their several steps and fixed order, are recorded; contingent signs are noted

whereby the ineffable presence itself gets signalized; the whole is laid out as a strict rite or technic which, if minutely followed, may lead one before the face of the supernatural.

The elements of the rite are those we have already discerned as frequent in religious behaviour: fasting, flagellation, and other forms of mortification of the flesh: set postures of the body, limbs, eyes, in concentration or "contemplation"; the constant repetition of set formulæ—from the monosyllabic *Om* to elaborate psalms or litanies. Dancing: The religious rite begins with dancing and from that beginning religious tradition has carried down certain standard and classic movements. There is not an ancient cult which lacks one or more characteristic dances. Greeks, Hebrews, Indians—Asiatic and American; Romans—pagan ancient and Catholic modern; Mohammedan Arabs, Orthodox Slavs—what one of the peoples and cults of the world lacks some form of dance whereby the Lord is brought into the midst of the company and communion of spirit is established and vindicated? Drugs: Soma is an immemorial drink of Indra and his worshippers, bringing the god into bodily presence: there is the wine of Dionysos, the peyote of the Indians of the North-American southwest, the nitrous oxide of Benjamin Paul Blood. Foodstuffs: Specially prepared cakes, handled in especial ways—like the wafer of the eucharist; the milk or blood or flesh of sheep or cattle or other animals important in the vital economy of this or that tribal aggregation or city. In these the supernatural is felt actually present by a perennial miracle of transubstantiation; their intake is actual enthusiasm, literal inspiration.

Whatever the ways to the religious experiences may be, their different patterns exercise the same general effect on the personality. Each in its own way serves to break down the normal processes of perception and to upset one's current working

equilibrium with one's environment. The continued use of the rite disintegrates established habits of response to the incoming stimuli from the world around. The senses cease to work together harmoniously and discriminatingly. Intelligence stops. Illusions of hearing or sight or touch appear, then hallucinations, then complete breakdown of sensory forces. Spatial and temporal orders become blurred, then indistinguishable. Eyes hear and ears see; sense-data formlessly interpenetrate in a world now without dimensions—that big booming, buzzing confusion of the new-born infant's world, who has yet by effortful trial and error to find its way about it. Then even such explicit distinctions as might be present in such a world drop out. Consciousness, as we normally think of consciousness, is gone. Yet feeling is not gone, nor awareness. But it is a feeling with hitherto unexperienced organs of apprehension in play, responsive to hitherto never-experienced stimuli whose impact, while it lasts, is of an ever-mounting endless climax. The *what* of this event can be pointed to, its attendant circumstances can be signalized, but it cannot itself be communicated or analyzed. In it, the supernatural is directly experienced. All that mystics report as going before, or identify as specific formal content of it, is classifiable as hallucinatory, as the activity of the senses not completely broken down, and shot through with all sorts of associative processes. The mystic or religious experience is when those have ceased to be; while they are, so far as the available information can tell us, it does not come; when it is, those have gone.

In the foregoing description I have incorporated my own findings as well as summed up what seems to be the common denominator in such authentic accounts of actual mystic experience that have come under my eye. My own findings derive

from two sources—one is the Yogic discipline, the other the nitrous oxide anæsthesia first suggested by Benjamin Paul Blood. My interest in the matter had been roused by the publication, nearly a quarter of a century ago, of James's "Varieties," already referred to. I read that classic study of religious experiences with concentration and reacted to it with great scepticism. I shared the feelings and the animus of Professor Leuba, and I set out to prove, by means of an *experimentum in corpore vile*, that the empirical ground for James's interpretation of the content of the religious experience was, to say the least, dubious. I had a hopeful precedent in James's own failure (described in a footnote somewhere—I don't remember whether in the "Varieties" or in "Some Hegelisms"—an essay in the "Will to Believe") to get anything out of the nitrous oxide anæsthesia except a farrago of nonsense. I tried the nitrous oxide and I did experience, as Blood did, in the interval between the recovery of consciousness and complete unconsciousness, presence, moving, ineffable, and beyond words to describe. Seven trials brought each what seems to be the same presence. With the Yogic discipline I had harder luck. There were no available Hindu teachers at that time in or about Cambridge, and I had to content myself with reading—German and French and English books mainly—I knew no Sanskrit. In 1904, as luck would have it, I met at Greenacre, a sort of spiritual Coney Island maintained in the riparian town of Eliot, Maine, an Indian ascetic, Ram Tirtha Swami. Ram had been a professor of mathematics in his native country. He was well-born and gently nurtured and had been well educated in Occidental no less than Indian studies. He was thoroughly familiar with Western philosophy and a master of both the vision and the practice of that of his own country—a Yogi. Under his tutelage I worked

into the Yogic discipline of mortification of the body, reflection and contemplation. It was long before I could attain a state of what some Hindu writer calls "luminous sleep" or anything even remotely like the post-anæsthetic interlude with nitrous oxide—and I submitted to many hardships. In fact, it was not until after I had encountered Mr. P. Ramanathan, then the Solicitor General of Ceylon, who had been invited to Greenacre, that I could manage the full mystic experience by means of the Yogic technique.

One swallow, or even two, does not make a summer, and I do not doubt that a strict scientific research would have required me to continue the endeavour in this and other ways. But I felt that the samples I had secured were representative enough, and their effect on my own mind was to confirm instead of to overthrow James's views. So far as I am concerned, I do not doubt that there is to be discerned, amid the muck, the perversity, the madness and error that bulk so large in these matters, a core of presence which comes close to being what we usually mean by the word *supernatural*.

What precisely this supernatural is, whether it can be accounted for and how, is another story.

Low, often very low, estate seems to be an almost inevitable preliminary and a constant accompaniment of the encounter with the supernatural. General uneasiness, unguessed inward conflict, deep suffering, overt danger looming inescapably, each serving to break down the normal habits of response to the world, provide an involuntary readiness for the religious experience. Voluntarily you must submit to and suffer a discipline or a stimulus which breaks you down in the manner already described. Only then do you have the religious experience. Before it takes place and while you are having it, you are or you have rendered yourself in some way a helpless object,

in some degree at the mercy of the world about you. After it has taken place—well, you carry on.

III

Let us now look at a few specific instances. The first I quote from Professor Rufus Jones's book, "The Fundamental Ends of Life":

I had a friend who went alone one day to consult a famous London doctor. My friend was very highly gifted and was at the time just beginning to reveal unusual power—leadership, etc. . . . The M.D. told him he was the victim of a subtle and baffling disease which would destroy his hearing and his sight and would eventually seriously affect his memory. He came down the stairs of the doctor's office and stood almost stunned on the curb of the street, realizing that all the large plans of his life had suddenly collapsed like a child's house of blocks. Suddenly as he stood there, waiting to decide which way to go, he felt as though he was enveloped by the invading love of God and filled with a sense of unutterable peace. There emerged within him a source of energy sufficient to turn his primary tendency to despair into a steady consciousness of hope and joy which lasted throughout his life and gave him extraordinary power and influence.

The second is from H. G. Wells's "First and Last Things":

At times in the silence of the night and in rare lonely moments—I came upon a sort of communion of myself and something great that is not myself. It is perhaps poverty of mind and language which obliges me to say that this universal scheme takes in the effect of a sympathetic Person—and my communion a quality of fearless worship. These moments happen, and they are the supreme fact of my religious life to me; they are the crown of my religious experience.

The third is from Wordsworth's "Tintern Abbey":

. . . And I have felt
 A presence that disturbs me with the joy
 Of elevated thoughts, a sense sublime
 Of something far more deeply interfused,
 Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
 And the round ocean and the living air,
 A motion and a spirit that impels
 All thinking things, all objects of all thoughts
 And rolls through all things.

The fourth is from James Russell Lowell's "Conversations":

I had a revelation last Friday evening. . . . Happening to say something of the presence of spirits of whom, as I said, I was often dimly aware, Mr. Putnam entered into an argument with me on spiritual matters. As I was speaking, the whole system seemed to rise up before me, like a vague destiny looming from the abyss. I never before felt the spirit of God so keenly in me, and around me. The whole room seemed to me full of God. The air seemed to waver to and fro with the presence of something I knew not what. I spoke with the calmness and clearness of a prophet.

The fifth is from a Taoist adept:¹

I imparted as though withholding: and in three days, for him, this sublunary state had ceased to exist, with all its paltry distinction of sovereign and subject, high and low, good and bad. When he had attained to this, I withheld again; and in seven days more, for him the external world had ceased to be. And so again for another nine days, when he became unconscious of his own existence. He became first etherealized, next possessed of perfect wisdom, then without past or present, and finally able to enter there where life and death are no

¹ Quoted by George Foote Moore in his "History of Religions," I, pp. 57-58.

more—where killing does not take away life, nor does prolongation of life add to the duration of existence. In that state he is ever in accord with the exigencies of his environment.

The sixth is from Paul Blood's "Pluriverse" and "Anæsthetic Revelation":

By the Anæsthetic Revelation I mean a certain survived condition (or uncondition), in which is the satisfaction of philosophy by an appreciation of the genius of being, which appreciation cannot be brought out of that condition into the normal sanity of sense—cannot be formally remembered, but remains informal, forgotten until we return to it.

"As here we find in trances, men
Forget the dream that happens then,
Until they fall in trance again."

Of this condition, although it may have been attained otherwise, I know only by the use of anæsthetic agents. After experiments ranging over nearly fourteen years I affirm—what any man may prove at will—that there is an invariable and reliable condition (or uncondition) ensuing about the instant of recall from anæsthetic stupor to sensible observation, or "coming to," in which the genius of being is revealed; but because it cannot be remembered in the normal condition it is lost altogether through the infrequency of anæsthetic treatment in any individual's case ordinarily, and buried, amid the hum of returning common sense, under that epitaph of all illumination: "This is a queer world." Yet I have warned others to expect this wonder on entering the anæsthetic slumber, and none so cautioned has failed to report of it in terms which assured me of its realization. I have spoken with various persons also who induce anæsthesia professionally (dentists, surgeons, etc.), who have observed that many patients at the moment of recall seem as having made a startling yet somehow matter-of-course

(and even grotesque) discovery in their own nature, and try to speak of it, but invariably fail in a lost mood of introspection. Of what astonishes them it is hard to give or receive intimation; but I think most persons who shall have tested it will accept this as the central point of the illumination: That sanity is not the basic quality of intelligence, but is a mere condition which is variable, and like the humming of a wheel, goes up or down the musical gamut according to a physical activity; and that only in sanity is formal or contrasting thought, while the naked life is realized only outside of sanity altogether; and it is the instant contrast of this "tasteless water of souls" with formal thought as we "come to," that leaves in the patient an astonishment that the awful mystery of life is at last but a homely and a common thing, and that aside from mere formality the majestic and the absurd are of equal dignity. The astonishment is aggravated as at a thing of course, missed by sanity in overstepping, as in too foreign a search, or with too eager an attention: as in finding one's spectacles on one's nose, or in making in the dark a step higher than the stair. My first experiences of this revelation had many varieties of emotion; but as a man grows calm and determined by experience in general, so am I now not only firm and familiar in this once weird condition, but triumphant—divine. To minds of sanguine imagination there will be a sadness in the tenor of the mystery, as if the keynote of the universe were low—for no poetry, no emotion known to the normal sanity of man can furnish a hint of its primeval prestige, and its all but appalling solemnity; but for such as have felt sadly the instability of temporal things there is a comfort of serenity and ancient peace; while for the resolved and imperious spirit there are majesty and supremacy unspeakable. Nor can it be long until all who enter the anæsthetic condition (and there are hundreds every secular day) will be taught to expect this revelation, and will date from its experience their initiation into the Secret of Life.

Any essay upon the anæsthetic (or presumptively any other) revelation, as proposing a detail of what it is or is

like, is immediately baffled by the consideration that its topic is and must be unique. It has no class, no relation to any comparable fact or theory whatsoever. Its best remembered impression is the sense of initiation, an into the immemorial, the inevitable, the time-out-of-mind, the something of fate or destiny which, in even justice, at least for once every sane consciousness should realize. . . .

Mystery drifts idly over the weird and solemn consciousness—"clearest of the clearest, surest of the surest, weirdest of the weirdest"—of an intimate and personal relation to the Inevitable, whose continuance is in and through its wondrous appreciation of its own precedence and consequent necessity.

I have tried often but cannot come nearer to the Anæsthetic Revelation. But what then? It is no fad or bantling of mine. On the contrary, as Sir William Ramsay noticed, many people have encountered it, and like Edmund Gurney have passed it as unthinkable in set terms—without which we can neither know nor remember. But the boasted progress of the race will be shamelessly inadequate if we have come to a time when the historical secret which philosophy has coveted is empirically accessible, only to be inconsequently neglected.

After this, our best (however unsatisfactory) pronouncement, the persistent reiteration, "What is your revelation?" or, "What is it about?" is in bad form—a kind of counting of the spoons. Knowing is the soul's all, whether in her birth or her bridal, her business or her vacation. Man fell for knowledge. Knowing is the excellence and the ecstasy of being; it is everything, to be—a constant gratulation over what is not, or is potentially or conjecturally. It is investiture in the purple, in the divine right, and it is sufficient in itself.

And now inexorable Time admonishes me to have done with this world. I am thankful at having seen the show; and although, after eighty-five years, the stars are flickering slightly, and the winds are something worn, I am still clear and confident in that religion of courage and content which cherishes neither regrets nor anticipations.

The seventh is from Xenas Clark, cited by William James in the "Varieties of Religious Experience":

It is the one sole and sufficient insight why (or not why, but how) the present is pushed on by the past, and sucked forward by the vacuity of the future. Its inevitableness defeats all attempts at stopping or accounting for it. It is all precedence and presupposition, and questioning is in regard to it forever too late. It is an initiation of the past. The real secret would be the formula by which the "now" keeps exfoliating out of itself, yet never escapes. What is it, indeed, that keeps existence exfoliating? The formal being of anything, the logical definition of it, is static. For mere logic every question contains its own answer—we simply fill the hole with the dirt we dug out. Why are twice two four? Because, in fact, four is twice two. Thus logic finds in life no propulsion, only a momentum. It goes because it is a-going. But the revelation adds: it goes because it is and was a-going. You walk, as it were, round yourself in the revelation. Ordinary philosophy is like a hound hunting his own trail. The more he hunts the farther he has to go, and his nose never catches up with his heels, because it is forever ahead of them. So the present is already a foregone conclusion, and I am ever too late to understand it. But at the moment of recovery from anæsthesia, just then, before starting on life, I catch, so to speak, a glimpse of my heels, a glimpse of the eternal process just in the act of starting. The truth is that we travel on a journey that was accomplished before we set out; and the real end of philosophy is accomplished, not when we arrive at, but when we remain in, our destination (being already there)—which may occur vicariously in this life when we cease our intellectual questioning. That is why there is a smile upon the face of the revelation, as we view it. It tells us that we are forever half a second too late—that's all. "You could kiss your own lips, and have all the fun yourself," it says, "if you only knew the trick. It would be perfectly easy if they would just stay there till you got round to them."

The Anæsthetic Revelation is the Initiation of Man into the Immemorial Mystery of the Open Secret of Being, revealed as the Inevitable Vortex of Continuity. Inevitable is the word. Its motive is inherent—it is what has to be. It is not for any love or hate, nor for joy nor sorrow, nor good nor ill. End, beginning, or purpose, it knows not of.

It affords no particular of the multiplicity and variety of things; but it fills appreciation of the historical and the sacred with a secular and intimately personal illumination of the nature and motive of existence, which then seems reminiscent—as if it should have appeared, or shall yet appear, to every participant thereof.

Although it is at first startling in its solemnity, it becomes directly such a matter of course—so old-fashioned, and so akin to proverbs, that it inspires exultation rather than fear, and a sense of safety, as identified with the aboriginal and the universal. But no words may express the imposing certainty of the patient that he is realizing the primordial, Adamic surprise of Life.

Repetition of the experience finds it ever the same, and as if it could not possibly be otherwise. The subject resumes his normal consciousness only to partially and fitfully remember its occurrence, and to try to formulate its baffling import, with only this consolatory afterthought: that he has known the oldest truth, and that he has done with human theories as to the origin, meaning, or destiny of the race. He is beyond instruction in "spiritual things."

IV

Wordsworth and Lowell illustrate what the mystics would call pre-mystical or part-mystical states. They do not describe how they feel but what they feel, and what they feel is the imminent dissolution of orderly presences of the visible world into some force prior and more strange. The mood of both is heightened, but also disquiet.

Each of the remaining citations in its way points a level

of disintegration, of helplessness and of need somehow relieved and satisfied. The sentimental insecurity of Mr. Wells's rare lonely moments in the silent night gets projected as the relatively superficial "sympathetic Person." The overwhelming disaster of the man faced with blindness gets transformed into a redirection and intensification of his energies for a lifetime. The complete anæsthesia of Blood emerges in a philosophy of life, "of courage and content that knows neither regrets nor anticipations." For Xenas Clark the anæsthesia emerges in the resolution of all problems by the revelation it is the preliminary to.

Resolution, adjustment, comes in each case through some sort of direct contact with a supernatural. The language which describes this supernatural is as diversified as the persons that use it. Whether the nature of this supernatural is also diverse cannot be said. The facts, in James's opinion, point that way.

There remains now to consider, somewhat more closely, the consequences of the religious experience. Does it function to redirect behaviour and modify habits? To establish and maintain as well as to initiate a new life? How great a span of time can its influence stretch over? How many individuals? How large a group?

We have already had occasion to observe the first effect of the experience in at least one individual. Professor Rufus Jones's friend found himself carried from a mood of defeat and a consciousness of failure into one of peace and energy leading to "extraordinary power and influence." His insecurity became security, his failure success. The nature of this "success" requires scrutiny. Usually it is the sort of thing conventionally meant by success—wealth, influence, station, honour and their appurtenances. But the social criteria, clearly, do not exhaust the situation. To some men—religious leaders like Sid-

dharmas, Lao Tze, Francis of Assisi, are conspicuous among them—success is measured by precisely the opposite criteria. The contrast is enough to show that the judgment of value is ultimately inward and private and must be made by a man himself of his own life. His inward assurance or his inward doubt are the only absolutes he can attain, and by these he knows himself and in their light presents himself to his community. The community may reject him, may lock him up in jail, send him to the next town and otherwise manifest sharp disagreement with his judgment of himself. Such applications of force may or may not modify the inward judgment, but they are applications of force, not comparisons of values. Force can destroy values; it cannot alter them.

Where force succeeds a question arises over which generations have argued. To cling to a private estimate or solipsistic vision to the point of execution, to die for it, is suicide. Such behaviour cannot be justified by its consequences, for it automatically puts an end to consequences. It is apparently in conflict with primary instincts and ultimate good sense. Question: Is such conduct madness or "spirituality"? Authorities divide. One set points to the similarity to madness; the other quote "He who loseth his life," etc. But the whole argument is irrelevant; it aims to measure incommensurables. If you find what other people regard as suicide the apex of your happiness or serenity, then—they regard it as suicide. How they regard it is an aspect of *their* needs and interests, not of yours. What alone signifies is how *you* regard it. If the consequence of your religious experience is a redirection of your life in ways that are to you ways of peace and pleasantness, you are successful regardless of what the community thinks. And there is a fair chance that if you leave a relevant

record at all, they may agree with you after you are dead and make of your record a sacred book.

Be that as it may, ultimate standards and valuations of the sort that are inevitable in real mysticism do not enter into the criteria of churches or other societies. They do not admit the use even of survival as a criterion, and that way lies anarchy and silence. For this reason churches can and do tolerate and use mystics that present an amenable vocabulary, but must not live by their vision. The vision churches live by is the one that allows comparatives; it is essentially the ideal type or objective at the time current in the community. The religious experience leads to success when it leads to conformity with this current standard in an enhanced degree. Such conformity is the real day-to-day content of the "highest social ideals" which in the views of the Modernist, Mr. Edward Scribner Ames, constitutes the essence of religion.

You can see it work in the operation of many evangelists upon any American community—of the Reverend Mr. William Sunday, for example, imported to preach the gospel of Jesus Christ and revive his religion in some striking Pennsylvania steel town. Then, if under the verbal bombardment of the evangelist you, a striker, be convicted of sin and go to the mourner's bench and experience grace and come forth clean and saved, you will be moved to give up your wicked industrial courses. You will become a 100 per cent American. You will abandon the sinful company of your fellow strikers; you will present yourself at the mill or mine to take a scab's job; you will tell all you know about the strike and you will attend prayer meetings on Wednesdays and sermons on Sundays, and never more drink, chew, swear, strike or kiss your wife. In a word, you will conform to the requirements of your boss who, in your heart of hearts, is your nearest incarnation and hence your

own ideal of power, refinement and success. The situation would be reversed if the scene were some Welsh mining town in which the miners' union ruled, and the evangelists converted the servants and lord of the local manor. Then the conversion would register in an enhancement and glorification of the Trades Union official and in enhanced conformity to the conventions of excellence prevailing in the local. More obviously, the drunkard refrains from drink, works steadily, saves money, is kind to his wife and children; the neurotic is enabled to form habits of integration and sustained activity. Whatever has been antisocial—antisocial in the specific, circumstantial sense limited to the locality in which the event develops—becomes social.

This phase of the consequences of the religious experience is routinal. Church organization provides for it and maintains a mechanism—the home missionary and the revivalist—to bring it about and thus to keep its home fires burning. It has not received the attention it deserves from the students of religion. Attention has been concentrated on the religious breaks in religious routine, where the experience leads to the formation of new religious societies and their successful vindications and establishment amid the older inimical sects.

The name of these that are born is, however, legion and only a few survive. Russia before the revolution had seen the rise of hundreds every year, until the revolution brought about a revolution in the Orthodox hierarchy itself. Scores are initiated annually in the United States, and in India and China they come and disappear like the *ephemeridæ*. The crises to which they are reactions are on the whole due to constant causes; frustration of major drives—particularly hunger; social oppression; loneliness and fear. Such causes will come to crisis in some one man or woman who will react

to the crisis in terms of an eccentric religious experience. Out of this experience he will speak with tongues. He will exhibit a revelation, like the Koran or Book of Mormon or Science and Health or the Book of Revelation of St. John the Divine, or the tablets of Abbas Effendi, or the various later writings of Count Leo Tolstoy. Maybe he will recover, perpetuate and elaborate a forgotten ritual, like the founders of modern Masonry, or the Mennonite Molokai of Russia; or he will invent one like the picaresque founders of the Ku Klux Klan or the initiators of any of the American fraternal orders. Before long he will gain a following—how great, how cohesive and how powerful will depend on the chronicity and the intensity of the crisis in the community, on the range and variety of the frustrations the individual undergoes, on the degree to which he feels powerless in the presence of the frustrating force. The individual's feeling of insecurity and helplessness might indeed be measured by the number, variety, and strength of such units of conflict and frustration in his environment; and his consequent endeavour to reach to a supernatural agency to save him or to accept the revelation of such an agency announced by another. Once he has accepted it, he is likely to cling to it loyally, as his sole instrument of salvation, through every hardship and sorrow, to the very grave. The story of dissenting sects, anywhere, hence, is a story of astounding fortitudes and martyrdoms. Every reformation has its masses of soldiers of the Lord, willingly self-immolated in defence of the faith. And reformations are, as we have seen, largely the stuff of which the history of religion is made, and its long life is rounded with a war.

The new revelations regularly prescribe, each according to its kind, a way of life. Such a way of life is felt by the revealer and accepted by his followers as the infallible technique of

salvation. It becomes the fundamental law of the community which they form with one another, and if the community establishes itself successfully, as for example, the Mormons did, or in quite another way, the Christian Scientists—it becomes the substance of still another orthodoxy which sooner or later some one will find insuperably obstructive and require the help of a supernatural to save him from. Content and specific program in such ways of life may often appear as ridiculously trivial; sometimes as momentous to civilization. But those to whom they are a revelation set their fates upon their truth and realization. Your immortal destiny may turn upon whether you wear buttons or hooks and eyes, ordinary garments or white robes or nothing at all. Or it may turn upon whether you accept Communist dogma and live in the Communist way as fully and completely as the Curia would like the faithful Catholic to accept the authority of the Roman hierarchy.

In the course of time the generation which heard the prophet and which experienced the revelation dies out. What has been to the ancestors a vision of new life, a living momentous option presented by God for the salvation of his chosen, becomes to their descendants an oppressive and irrational system of *mores*, an inflexible tyranny, rigidly shutting them out from a good life and the free world. Soon balked impulses and drives come to a new crisis, needing supernatural intervention for its resolution. Soon the crisis generates afresh a religious experience. Soon the religious experience makes a new prophet who propounds a new way of salvation revealed by God as the will of God.

Remembering the authenticity of past revelations, considering the exclusive claims to be true of each of competing revelations not all of which can be infallibly so at the same time, men are perplexed. The mere existence of the new revelation

negates the exclusive validity of the old; the coercions that the old operates on the new negate its claim to exclusive power. The conflict of one with the other casts doubt on both. Men feel called upon to exercise a choice between alternatives, not to acquiesce in the inevitable. Whichever they choose, the brightness of their salvation is dimmed by the shadow of the other fellows', which may be the true one, after all. Consequently, religion becomes a term interchangeable with belief. It stands out in sharp contrast to science where, comparatively, belief plays only a remote and secondary rôle.

Our next task is to see why then it is that religion is so much identified with belief.

CHAPTER IV

WHY RELIGION GETS IDENTIFIED AS BELIEF

I

UNFAILING testimony repeats that the religious experience is in itself the most delightful, and as a dynamic of conduct the most energizing, of our experiences. Once it comes to you, it possesses you; willy-nilly it has established itself as the goal of your heart's desire and the ineffable measure of value for all other experiences that make up your subsequent history. The content of the religious experience is ineffable and has no name, but its setting and effects are susceptible of analysis; its causes and its occasions can be remembered and passed on. A lore can be set up conversant with these, its surroundings, mapping them as they lead concentrically and convergently upon the ineffable core.

Those to whom this rare experience comes are few in number and may fall into two general groups. One of these groups is made up of the men and women to whom the intrinsic quality of the experience is so precious that they abandon the normal modes and aspirations of life to live dead to the world, alone or in small groups. These are the anchorites, hermits, monastics and cenobites, who make their dwelling places in deserts and on high mountains, and there endeavour solely the contemplation of God—the recovery of the religious experience.

In the other group are those men and women to whom the experience comes out of a social conflict and for whom it initiates and defines a programme for the resolution of the con-

flict. To this group belong the prophets of Israel and the leaders of many Christian sectaries in Russia—the Slavic Menonites, Molokai, Tolstoyans, for example; also the original Communist party itself. Heads of the medical or healing sects are properly classifiable in this group. The aim of all of them is to change the community, not abandon it. They condemn and seek to transform fundamental institutions of society; property, the family, war, healing—or they set up as the turning-point of salvation something to the uninitiate trivial: uncut hair, hooks and eyes instead of buttons, white robes, drinking milk only, eating only vegetables. But they do not reject the characteristic in social behaviour. They wish, out of the renovating impulsion of the religious experience, only to reform social behaviour.

The founders of neither of these groups make up, as yet, a professional class of experts or adepts in the art of establishing direct contact with the supernatural. They are renovators and renewers. They create the tradition they transmit, and are revered as the holy revealers of the sacred lore. Their heirs and successors need not repeat their direct contact with the supernatural. They are not so much the creators or renovators as the keepers and users of the mystery. They are experts by training, not inspiration; administrative officials, not innovators and renewers; they are the priesthoods of the world. To secure the attention to and reinforcement of the supernatural, if you cannot induce the religious experience in yourself, you must either be a priest and thus skilled to manipulate and control the supernatural without experiencing it directly, or you must employ a priest. You employ a priest to exercise his skill in your behalf at a price.

His skill, as we shall have many times occasion to observe, is ultimately some form of coercion, bribery, flattery, or per-

suasion. He makes an offering for you, in return for service to be rendered, and lays down a part of your payment in the form of sacrifice—be it nothing more tangible than a pledge of a humble and a contrite heart.

Now, the supernatural to which this sacrifice is offered is, as we have noted, the content of the immediate experience to very few of us. Our eyes do not see it: like Job, we know of it only by hearsay, and we take what we hear on credit. The evidence is largely indirect and circumstantial, as is the evidence for the existence and record of the far, far greater proportion of the things we talk about and even live by—the North Pole, the King of England, the precious metal that guarantees banknotes, our own brains and inward parts. We take the supernatural as we take these things, on credit and on authority. We trust that the priests and other mediators between the supernatural and us have directer access to it than we. We assume that they have, at least, direct command of the tools that work on it, and like the famous Cabotchnik¹ of the rhyme, do speak to God if not with God.

Somebody, somebody orthodox, must speak with him, if his will is to be known, and is to be done. But the speaking occurs, as we have seen, rarely, and seems in the case of orthodox religions to be accomplished once and for all, in a revelation made in the ancient past and never, or hardly ever, repeated. With the illumination of those dark meanings the religious professionals, the priests and doctors of the sects, are henceforth forever charged. Their interpretations are also mediations, and the revelation itself is thus also not known directly, but circumstantially and indirectly. No profane mind can

¹ Here is to good old Boston,
Home of the bean and the cod
Where Lowells speak only to Cabots
And Cabots speak only to God.

apprehend and truly envisage "the deposit of faith." Whatever it means can be known only on authority and must be elucidated only by experts trained for the purpose. The deposit of faith, like its depositor, can be believed, but cannot be known.

Belief or faith plays, notoriously, a leading rôle in religion. No institution of our civilization is so totally involved with it, though all require it; not science, not common sense, not industry, not government. Belief and religion are so intimately related that it is our religion and our religion only that we speak of as our "belief." In the Christian world, *believer* and *infidel* are categories of social classification, cachet of approval and brand of infamy.

Because belief thus stands out in religion it must not, however, be taken for its peculiar differential, its identifying idiosyncrasy. At bottom, belief is the foundation of the bulk of our lives, common and private. Our biographies transpire in a world so full of a number of things that we can be nothing less than unhappy as kings in the face of the perplexities that their multiplicity, their variety and the endless complication of their relationships confront us with. Thus no one can live simply and completely or carry his life along the high road of a single purpose. He is always willy-nilly drawn down bypaths of passions and events, of unexpected intentions and indirections. Only the rigid necessities of outer control hold him from matins till vespers to a single intent or clear purpose. His heart is a tumescent confusion of infinite detail, and he finds his way from next to next to the day's end with no little discomfort, breathlessness and uncertainty. He moves through crisis of feeling after crisis, in an adventure on the open safe way of his daily routine, whose very boredom brings its unexpected novelties.

Nor do our daily crises of feeling spring merely from our natures. They are functions of the things and events to which they are responses, and of which they are dynamic prolongations in us. Among those, some are as solid as the ancient earth beneath our feet, as inexorable as the timeclocks we punch, and the bosses we more or less obey. Others are like the subways, the elevated roads, the trains and taxis. We trust them, but they do fail us and not infrequently. Others seem to have the inveterate constancy of mathematical relations and the laws of nature—firmer to our heads than the earth to our feet. Others come to us with the instability of the things we read about in the daily prints, stock reports and weather forecasts, news out of Russia, eulogies of the president of the United States or of the Steel Trust, the adventures of the personalities that populate the comic strips. Just these few items from the daily life of any common city-dweller show the range of stability and elusiveness, solidity and thinness that the nearest and most recurrent items of our experience may exhibit.

But there are items, infrequent and remoter, which are, nevertheless, a portion of our inheritance and enter into the tradition which we ourselves carry on and pass to the children. Such are all the remembered figures and things and events of times past: the fathers and heroes we celebrate, the victories we congratulate ourselves on, the works of peace we glorify. On a hardly different level are such personalities as Santa Claus, the figures out of faërie, of poetry and literature: Hamlet, for example, Don Quixote, Faust, Gargantua, Don Juan, Zarathustra and the whole population of our literary tradition. They are there. We acknowledge their personalities, we discuss their characters, their achievements, their virtues and vices, the fate that hounds them or the fortune that crowns

them, precisely as we discuss our own. We take account of them as we take account of money, men, and houses. Yet—we recognize differences.

We recognize differences of tendency and force; differences in the directness, the constancy, the variety and elaboration of their power to make themselves felt, to impose recognition and acknowledgment. These differences are real and may coincide with the very existence of the things they characterize. Our recognition of them is, however, eventual. At the outset, any object that presents itself or is presented to our minds appears on the same level as everything else. Other things being equal, Santa Claus is no less real than Calvin Coolidge, William Jennings Bryan no solidier than Don Juan, when we first hear of them. In fact, on their respective records, Santa Claus is a far more potent force in history than Mr. Coolidge. Although his activity among us is seasonal and intermittent, he has functioned for a very long time; no mean proportion of our Christian economy is postulated upon his seasonal appearances, and his influence on our tempers is notoriously salutary, moving us toward charity and good-will. Yet so far as any one can ascertain, he has never slept in a bed like Mr. Coolidge, nor expressed pious sentiments about international peace, nor performed any of the various debatable deeds attributed to gentlemen in the White House. Indeed, to your small boy Santa Claus profoundly is more momentous and therefore real than any gentleman in the White House, and many circumstances are conceivable when he might be also to us.

Our attitude when we first hear of Santa Claus, then, is one of acceptance and assent. This is our attitude toward each and every thing that is first presented to our minds, unless we are already aware of something we believe in that it con-

tradicts. We are all by original nature trusting souls. We believe spontaneously, but we have to learn to doubt. Doubting is difficult even after we have learned it. This fact is at the foundation of the deceptions which individuals and societies practise on each other. We tend to believe all that we read in the newspapers even after we have learned that newspapers are what is called human, that is, that they make mistakes, often on purpose. Bringing our critical faculties to bear and actively challenging what is set down before our eyes is a form of behaviour difficult to learn and strenuous to sustain.

II

And so of all the contents of our experience. Each comes with a certain character and articulation, a nature whose claim is, to be recognized for what it seems to be, to be taken for what it is *known as*. We acknowledge that claim, as we did Dr. Cook's or Captain Peary's to having discovered the North Pole. Only after we have trusted and lived with them for a while do we begin to make differences, to distinguish in trust, to separate one off from the other as false and true, imaginary and real, fiction and fact. These are differences we make, not differences we find. At the outset we believed both Cook and Peary. Both might have discovered the North Pole, either might not. We took Cook in the light of Peary, Peary in the light of Cook, both in the light of various sciences, explorers and informations. Finally, we kept Peary and rejected Cook. Neither Cook's claims nor records were changed, in this process, only our attitude. We had begun by belief, and under the impact of challenge and competition against the thing we believed in, we fell into doubt and ended by disbelief. I say we—but there are still many individuals whom

the challenge and competition did not move; they still believe that Cook discovered the North Pole.

The distinction between Cook and Peary as discoverers of the North Pole is for our knowledge an eventual one, made *ambulando* and passed on after it was made to friends, to children, to acquaintances, and from them to ever widening circles of opinion.

All differentiations of validity happen similarly. First a thing or an event makes a claim on our trust. We grant the claim; we believe. Then comes another, making a rival claim, with the same right and the same force as the first; awakening, bar the first, the same assent. Now a conflict ensues; we doubt. First one, then the other, seems to make its claim good. Finally one is ruled out. It has lost the struggle for acknowledgment. The winner takes its place in the tradition of knowledge and truth as valid, as trustworthy. It wins social sanction. It no longer requires vindication. It is taken on credit like a champion who fights no more battles. It becomes a convention of opinion or doctrine, and until it is again challenged by a rival claimant or competitor, and defeated, stands infallible.

There are facts that have stood for three thousand years and then have been in three hundred turned into fictions. Such facts are the Ptolemaic system of astronomy, the Aristotelian physics, the mediæval zoology. Who now believes that the cosmos is a series of ten concentric spheres, with the earth in the centre, and the sun, the moon, the planets and the fixed stars set in crystalline chambers moving round it and making music as they go? Who now believes in the phoenix and unicorn and gryphon, or that a heavy mass will fall to the ground more quickly than a lighter one? In fact, fact and fiction are terms of status. They describe how an event stands in our

regard—not what it is, nor how it came to be. They change into one another and back again; Ptolemaic astronomy was fact until Copernican “degraded” it to fiction: now Copernican astronomy is in its turn menaced with a similar fate at the hands of the relativists; pre-Darwinian biology was fact until Darwinism set up overwhelming presumptions against it. Ecclesiastical history was fact until it was confronted by its secular rivals of modern times. The speculations and predictions of Roger Bacon were fictions until modernity made facts of them. Flying machines, the telephone, the radio, the telegraph, the phonograph, “around the world in 80 days”—they were all fictions until events made them into facts. Nothing is exempt from this change in status. It keeps recurring, and influences all our experiences. Any of them may serve in one situation as a fact, in another as fiction; which, depends on our needs in our struggle to keep going at the time and in the place; and on the context of the other experiences which make up the setting and supply the conditions for the judgment of fact or fiction.

And fact and fiction are themselves eventual, secondary categories. The distinction they imply established itself in our experience probably in this way:

Of the countless items that enter our attention, some come with undeniable intrinsic force. Their impact is strong; their presence endures, their constellated qualities persist together continuously through many chances and many changes. We may not like them. We may find them intensely disagreeable. We may wish and strive completely to excommunicate them from our world. But regardless of our wishes, they thrust themselves upon us and compel us to take account of them. If we do not heed them, we come to grief, ultimately to death.

Other items allow us a great deal more leeway. Their persistence may be as great as that of the first, but their organization is less impermeable. They are more plastic and complaisant. Although resistant, they may still be moulded to our will. These are stuffs of which we make the more substantial aspects of civilization—giving them humanistic forms and humane appropriateness.

Still other items are the precise opposite of the first. They may be the most precious, the most excellent and desirable objects in the whole of human experience. But they are volatile, ghostly and evanescent. They make no impact; their presence is instant; their constellated qualities are swiftly centripetal, so that their identities are elusive and their natures ambiguous. They enter the field of our attention like the others, but they do not stay in it. They seem too deficient in intrinsic force to hold place in the experimental chaos made up of infinite multitudes struggling for place. And as they are precious and desirable, and too fleeting and impotent to stay in our environment of themselves, we supply the staying power from our own hearts. What they seem to lack we contribute.

And that which we contribute is belief.

It is belief. And it speaks for our desires and our needs, not for the power of the objects we believe in. We believe also in the objects that impose themselves upon us by their inner force. But our belief in those objects is passive; it is acquiescence, not preference; while our belief in these ethereal and passing entities is active; preference, not acquiescence. Between passive acquiescence to active preference, there are innumerable intensities of belief, grading imperceptibly one into the other. Some degree of belief attaches to every item, whatever its character, that enters the field of our attention.

Call it real or imaginary, appearance or fact, its presence is at least acknowledged, and an attitude taken which is a response to its presence. This is as true of the entities that science deals with as of those belonging to religion. To each is attached some degree or intensity of belief. And science is crowded with observations and ideas that are as fully objects of active preference as any god or devil a religion worships. Yet it is for religion, not for science, that *belief* figures so often as a distinguishing mark.

Why?

III

When you say that you believe *God exists* or *two plus two are four* or *Santa Claus is real* or *wine is good* or *pleasure is wicked*, or *politicians are honest*, or *the present king of France has red hair*, or *Hamlet was mad* or *Ophelia was a flapper*, what is it you do in believing? How could you make your neighbour understand what your believing consists of? How could you demonstrate belief?

Look at any act of belief. Two components at once stand out—a subject or content, and an attitude. The subject or content may be simple or complex, and belong to any of the categories of stability and strength we have just considered. The important point to bear in mind is that its constitution can be analyzed and its behaviour described without reference to the attitude which it arouses. Not so with the attitude. That is the response to its object, and a function of it. In and by itself, it is only a generalized posture of the mind and body, a readiness to react, and significant alone as such. It gets concreteness and definition only in terms of the objects that activate it. In and by itself, it is, like Kant's concepts, empty; attached to an object, it becomes a specific "belief,"

a genuine psycho-physiological adjustment. Consider what philologists associate the word "belief" with. The German *glauben*; the Latin *libet*; the English *lief* and *love*; all terms that designate preference, pleasure, value, esteem. *Be* is intensive. To believe is to be-love, to hold dear, to have *liefer*, to prefer and cherish. To believe is a *selective* action. It implies the competition of a variety of stimuli for response, of a variety of objects for attention, of a variety of propositions for assent. It implies the presence and pressure of alternatives, and it takes place in a setting and against the background of alternatives.

For example, here is a gentleman who lives in the White House. You read about him in the public prints. You read that he is a paragon of wisdom and a purveyor of platitudes, a master of public economy and a president under whom public waste has run riot, a man of courage and initiative and one who, running away from a difficult situation, appropriates the credit of its solution after somebody else has solved it, a modest man and one skilled in reaping the profits of publicity—and so on *ad nauseam*. Each of these alternatives is presented to you with equal persuasiveness and cogency. Which will you accept? There is *ex hypothesi* nothing in the intrinsic power of any of them to impose it on you. You must choose. Your choice is a function of one or more of the innumerable qualities that make up your personality. It is a reaction of your whole personality, focussed at those qualities. It involves effort, the effort to shut off the influence of alternatives that equally press for assent, the effort to hold the preferred propositions in place against the alternatives' pressure. For as their pressure multiplies and grows in intensity, your belief must become more vigorous. You are fighting off *doubt*. Doubt is not, as is

commonly supposed, an opposite state to belief. The opposite of belief is disbelief, denial, rejection. Doubt is constituted by a *conflict in beliefs*, by the alternation of belief from now this object to now that. *Doubt* is a condition of uncertainty and struggle, of unstable equilibrium and non-adjustment to the setting which has aroused the vacillation of belief.

We stress belief usually against a setting of alternatives, and the emphasis we lay on believing is a measure of the power of the alternatives to shake us. Where belief is passive acquiescence, alternatives are lacking either—because, as is the usage of the Catholic church, they have been intentionally excluded from the field, or because they are simply not there, or because they are inert in respect to this particular content of belief. In such cases we call our beliefs, knowledge, regardless of what they are beliefs in.

Not the nature of what we know but our attitude toward it, as that is influenced by its setting, makes knowledge. Are 2 and 2 four? We know they are. We do not question. Yet are they always? Two pairs of drops of water make one drop, not four. Two drops of water and two drops of water falling on the ground make a spatter of scores of drops. *What* you count limits the operation of the rules of counting, and you tacitly ignore those specific and recurrent limitations when you *know* that two and two are four. They are inert with respect to those abstractions. Times may come, however, when they will not be inert. Then you would not *know* that two and two are four. You would believe they are. Non-Euclidean geometry, for example, has converted many Euclidean propositions from knowledge into beliefs. The dictum about parallel lines not meeting is the notorious instance. And the farther you move from simple abstractions, from the derivative ultimates of mathematics, physics and chemistry, toward the per-

ceptual stuffs of the daily life, the more frequent are the instances in which things, events, and ideas pass from belief into knowledge and back again.

IV

We may now bring these observations to bear upon the belief in the supernatural. The supernatural comes before the attention as does any other object in our experience. It presents itself always in a context of both supporting and competitive entities. Such a context surrounds it whether the presentation of the supernatural is direct or indirect. If it is direct, then there are the alternative versions of the religious experience offered by naturalistic psychologists, psychiatrists and others. If it is indirect, there are the alternative causal explanations of the same sequence of effects offered by commonsense and the sciences.

And there is the recurrent experience of direct failure. Somehow, the supernatural doesn't do the things we ask of it. Somehow, the tools we use to make it do those things seem not to work. Their achievements in the regular cycles of life are attributable to other, constant causes; their successes in crises seem intermittent, and the average of the many failures is as high as the feeling created by one success is strong and contagious. The meteorologist has a higher score than the rainmaker, the honest physician than the Christian Scientist. For this reason rainmaking is a religious ritual and meteorology a scientific inference, Christian Science is belief and medical science is knowledge. On the record of its appearances and manifestations, the supernatural belongs to that category of objects whose identities are elusive, that do not of their own force hold the place they instantly take in the field of our attention. The supernatural is tangential, not central to the dynamic units of

the daily life. At the same time, the inward allure of its merely instant appearance, the range and variety of changes it seems to be able to set going, the peculiar occasions of its appearance and the condition and manner of it, render it at once the supremest of valuable objects, both in itself and as a tool.

Precious unutterably, because of powers beyond any to please and to save, yet impotent to hold its place against the competition of perdurable alternatives, what can hold the supernatural close by in this world of our needs and fears, if not our *belief* in it? The intensity and persistence of our belief measure at once the supernatural's weakness, its desirability and our need. It becomes the norm for the institutional complex of religion itself; belief and religion become interchangeable terms. In the conjunction of attitude and object which makes belief, the attitude is in religion more substantial than the object. We *believe* in God; we *know* men hunger; we *believe* in the devil; we *know* war is evil; we *believe* in immortality, we *know* men are mortal.

Religion is the field *par excellence* of belief. The supernatural which is the distinguishing feature of this field is preferred from a mass of vigorous and aggressive competitors for strong attention and regard. Men have it liefer, they love it, they cling to it and add their strength to its own to keep it in place in the stream of their experience. That is, they believe in it, and they seek to vindicate belief by works.

We must now inquire what this vindication comes to.

CHAPTER V

WHAT RELIGIOUS BELIEF DOES

I

WE know that belief stands out in religion as in no other of the disciplines that make up our civilization. Belief stands out because the supernatural, its characteristic object, is at once the most precious and the most precarious of all the congeries of competing beings that compose the world we live in. The vivid persistence of belief, in spite of failure, in spite of disillusion, is one of the most pitiful of the manifestations of the human mind and one of the most heroic. Its root must be deep in our original natures, its justification must be traceable in the history of its works. For beliefs that survive cannot fail to have a survival value, and it is this value that we now seek to discern.

That it cannot pertain to the inward quality of the supernatural itself follows from the preliminaries and characteristics of the religious experience. The preliminaries are all, as we have seen, disruptive, unhealthy, non-sane. They may be purposely provided by the seeker after the supernatural, or they may come as blows of fate to an innocent victim or an intentional sinner. However they come, they break him down and render him helpless to function in a normal way in a normal world. The supernatural is directly encountered only under the condition of some such helplessness, and by means of organs not customarily active in perception. Help is not a content but a consequence of the encounter; the religionist is built up and

restored not *in*, but *through* the religious experience. Should he prefer the recovery or the perduration of the experience itself, he must persist in his helpless and broken-down state or continue to induce it. There are saints and sages whose practice this is, but they are few in number and their influence is small. To the bulk of mankind, professional religionists and laymen alike, the supernatural is more important for what it does than for what it is.

In the economy of human life the supernatural is primarily a tool. We use the Lord, far more than we enjoy him. His providence does not so much shape our ends as accomplish them. The language of the churches, with its formulæ of worship, adoration, ministry, prostration, has hidden this fact, perhaps most of all from the very ministers of religion who use the language. But it is of record, nevertheless, that we do not worship or exalt the gods for God's sake, but for our own. Time has seen several curious endeavours to rationalize away this inveterate experience. Some religionists have held that the supernatural is pleased and strengthened by the offerings of men, and orthodox Christianity tells a tale of how Jehovah, having arranged that his domicile should be depopulated by the expulsion to hell of a defeated army of angelic rebels under the leadership of Lucifer, prepared the cosmos with the earth at its centre to be peopled and dominated by man, whose children Jehovah might fight for with Satan in order to repopulate heaven, and to maintain the full strength of the heavenly choir. Many deep trends are projected in this legend, and its obvious burden is that the Lord created men to praise the Lord. And men do praise the Lord, but when without an ulterior purpose? Always, the praise of the Lord is accompanied with petitions for his bounty; never the one without the other.

The supernatural, then, must work, if it is to eat, even so ghostly a fare as praise. A god, a devil, a "stream of ideal tendency" or whatever else the supernatural is more concretely designated by, its surrogates, agents or emissaries must do things for us; assure us that food and clothing and shelter will not fail, that disease will pass and health continue, that the enemy will be defeated as he deserves, that our children will be many and will prosper; that, indeed, any purpose of ours whatsoever, however low, however mean,¹ shall gain full realization, and that every fear shall be dispelled. This is the function of the supernatural in human economy. It is a potential or actual servant in the house. Belief maintains it for the service it performs or owes.

Securing the service is, it cannot be too often repeated, a special art. Its fundamental patterns are nevertheless derived from the fundamental patterns of the relationships between man and man. Supplication, cajolery, threats, persuasion, promises, contractual undertakings, fill up the liturgical documents and ritual procedures of the cults. These and the various other aspects of give-and-take among men are the modes of making sure of service from the gods. The supernatural does not give something for nothing any more than the natural; also the grace of God is bought and paid for—not merely with the blood of the lamb, but with the lustihood of life; much is surrendered, that something may be saved.

The substance of this something presents itself in one protean form or another, as relief from insecurity, insurance of security; in a word, survival in the *struggle* to survive, or whatever it is that a life focusses its survival-values on. The upkeep of such values is the task of every religion, the most

¹ Cf. The prayer of Old Cenci, in Shelley's *The Cenci*, or the dispensations of indulgences, etc.

sophisticated and atheistic equally with the most naïve and godly. Mr. Bertrand Russell's "Free Man's Worship" so works no less than Monsignor Russell's romanist idolatry. Belief sustains both that both may so serve.

Let us look a little more closely at how they serve.

II

On the record the excellence of the supernatural is its power. It is able to accomplish the things which are usually accomplished by other causes when these other causes fail. It is the potent eternally-successful substitute for every cause that ever failed in the history of the world. It is the unfailing cause. The causes whose operation is the cosmos work according to what we are accustomed to call "natural law" or "divine design." Under this law or design events are assumed to follow in a necessary order, a predetermined sequence. Given a first item, the next one, and the next, and the next, are pre-ordained; the succession occurs in a definite inevitable way. If it rains, how can you not get wet? If there is a drouth, how shall you not suffer thirst, even die of thirst? Rain, and drouth, growth, decay, and the turning of the year, are aspects of established cycles of succession which work at once as causes and occasions of all our ways of life, of our ancient customs and our present habits. Oftener, however, the very establishment comes to a phase where custom breaks down, where habit does not carry us over, where some interest is threatened with extinction, some end with frustration.

We have already discussed such phases, in another connection, as crises. They are "normal," and there are steps which may be normally taken, to abort or dissolve them. We know what to do. A fire, for example, is a normal crisis. We meet it normally by calling out the fire department. The fire

department is organized for the express purpose of meeting the crisis of fire. Usually, it is successful. But sometimes the fire proves stronger than the heroism of the firemen and the water and chemicals they fight with. You are overcome with the need of another instrument to pit against the fire and extinguish it. You call upon the supernatural, on that which does not belong in the sequence of cause and effect that has been set going by the fire. It does not spontaneously interpose between one step of the sequence and the other. It must be moved to do so. Your invocation is an endeavour so to move it. You beseech its intervention. You tell it how powerful it is, how weak and helpless you, how mighty the fire. You offer it a gratitude, candles, more durable and extensive properties, alterations of your heart and habits, if only it will exert its power upon the natural sequence of change and abort and annul it, by putting out the fire the fire department can't put out.

Moreover, you are not perceptually in the presence of the power you address. Perceptually you are in the presence of a material surrogate or symbol which exists among events and affects and is affected by them. The symbol or incarnation may be a priest, like the Roman pontiff or the Dalai Lama, or other high priest or chief rabbi, or any of their lesser representatives. The symbol may be a king, like the Emperor of Japan, or Maharajah of Bengal, or the King of Siam or of England. Or the symbol may be an image like any one of the divine human or animal figures in wood and stone and paint that populate the religious world, or it may be hieroglyph or ideogram, like the cross, the pentacle, the ankh, the swastika; or it may be a thing without made form, like meteoric stones, crystals, bits of the true cross, sacred bones, rabbit's feet and all the other sugar and spice and everything nice

that charms and amulets are made of. Or the symbol may be a gesture, like the sign of the cross, or a word or phrase, that may range from a monosyllable, through a mystic name, to a Nicene Creed, an Augsburg Confession or a Thirty-nine Articles. These various items, in their kinds and degrees, provide the substantial presence of the supernatural. They are its media, habitations and enfleshments, the strategic points from which it invisibly displays its invisible forces. In the end, they not only house and incarnate the supernatural, they become the supernatural. Its vestiges adhere when itself has departed, and clothe the dwelling-places with somewhat of its power. Instead of surrogates, they are with little effort the thing itself.

This transformation is facilitated by the familiar process known as generalization. Symbols start their careers as vocal of some specific feeling or event occurring at a time, in a place and under determinate circumstances. They end by meaning something vaguely like that feeling or event at any time, in any place, and under whatever circumstances. The process is well-established in the behaviour of words, and the school of Freud have argued its existence with reference to the signifi-catory uses of water, fire, serpents, trees, rocks, crosses and the like. A powerful factor in the process is the extreme manageability of symbols, of verbal ones especially. They are easy to pack. You carry a word in your memory, a rabbit's foot in your pocket, a scapulary on your heart, wherever you go, and however. Your world changes, and you change; but this symbol is constantly with you, and by comparison, the same as when you started, an unchanging comfort against the changes and chances of your destiny. Even if your body stays at home in the old village, your heart has its history of adventures, its terrors and anxieties and battles, for whose ever-new impact the symbol provides the ever-trusty balm. From being

ruler over one thing, it thus becomes ruler over many. It is the most certainly unburied talent. It is the means by which you tune-in the supernatural wave into any company or situation, rendering it, there and then, audible, potent, meaningful, in the rabbit's foot, the prophet's rod, the wafer and wine of the eucharist, the ritual of the exorcist. From there it brings good, it averts evil. "I have seen the new moon over my right shoulder," you say, "I shall have luck this month." "I haven't had the grippe this winter. Oh, I must knock on wood." The concentrating influence upon fortune of your head's posture when seeing the new moon, the avertive and dispelling effect upon jealous misfortune of knocking on wood, seem to flow from these actions themselves. Something of the mood that they discharge and relieve seems to render them contagious. Some one starts it, then everybody's doing it, or must resist an inclination to.

This is further reinforced by the disposition we all have to acknowledge the claim of anything coming before our attention as valid until it is confronted by alternatives, and challenged, and contradicted. The confronting alternatives must be more than active, they must be insistent and aggressive. If they are not, your formula is, "I am not superstitious," or "I am not religious," *but*— For the menace of ill-health and the menace of misfortune are constant and pervasive; they are an aspect of the *struggle* which is life, and if assurance *may* come from seeing the new moon with the head turned to the right, and if the grippe *may* still be kept off by knocking on wood, why not so turn the head and so treat wood? The *will* to believe intervenes against the anyhow passive alternatives, and renders them the more inert. What easier way to ward off grippe in a world so wooden, as to

knock wood? What simpler method of lassoing fortune than the dextrous look at the new moon?

Superstition, magic, say you? Yes. But except that one requires the service of a religious expert and the other you can do yourself, how are these different from the sacrament—from communion, mass, baptism, benediction, malediction, the sign of the cross, or what established churchly ritual you choose? The established ritual is circumscribed by social inheritances, special interests, idiosyncrasies of pattern and formulation; it has no elasticity and is not viable; hence often requires intentional communication, the work of the missionary, to spread it. The unestablished one is free of these limitations of vested interests; it is spontaneously contagious because it is more instantly responsive to basic attractions and aversions and purges the feelings that go with them. Religious belief works largely through such fundamental contagions. It refers these contagions to power in some external object, and it installs such object in events to turn away evil, to bring in good.

Scholarship has named these modes of working with two names adopted from the primitives of the Pacific. One is *mana*. The other is *taboo*. Both were already highly generalized names when they were taken over, but their basic intent remains clear enough. *Mana* is the power and force of the supernatural, the hidden *élan* in a man or an animal, in plants and minerals, the vital force of the ancestors, the energies behind the heavens. It is the invisible duplication of the visible world. It is transferable and transmissible. You can take it in and give it out. Without any form or shape of itself, it assumes the figure of whatever incarnates it—it can be separated from its incarnation, but is more easily absorbed with it together. First, if you crave the *mana* of a man you eat

the man, if of a crystal, you swallow it. Your primary holy communion is this literal intake of *mana*. From intake to contact is a simple transition. *Mana* is contagious. By touching that which has *mana* you acquire *mana*. So you kiss the robes and rings of the priests and touch the garments of the saints; hands of the holy, laid on you, make you whole. The virtue spreads like oil and permeates whatever it touches like garlic.

Taboo is the avertive response to *mana*. The contact with *mana* must be correct. If there is any impropriety whatsoever in the manner of it, if there has been a ritual misstep or a sin of the heart, *mana* does not strengthen but slays. *Taboo* is the defence of *mana* against the unready, and by exfoliations that we need not here dwell on, it becomes the defence, by means of supernatural agencies, of anything any individual sufficiently powerful in himself or through community-organization, seeks to keep others from appropriating, using or handling. It sets off persons equally with things; divinity doth hedge kings, priests and politicians against many of the chances of fortune and strokes of justice that fall to us all of the commoner lot.

In short, *mana* is a name for the supernatural and its ways; *taboo* is a name for the control upon conserving it, correctly transmitting and using it. The two are the complementary aspects of the constant process of driving out evil and drawing in good which it is the business of religious belief to sustain and to facilitate.

III

For behaviour the *taboo* objects wherein *mana* resides are, first, the symbols and surrogates of the supernatural which tradition hands on and custom accepts; and second, those

which each age, in its turn, generates for itself. We set these objects against the vitals of our crises as we might set a gun at a burglar's head, and shoot down our difficulties with the supernatural; we dispel with them the darkness of the uncertain future as with an electric switch, flooding the gloom with the light of the supernatural; we erect them as bulwarks against tides of misfortunes. We close them like a door against the storm. We lay with them the foundations of our house of life to build our hopes upon. Why multiply the figures in which the literature of religion abounds to state the uses of the symbols of the supernatural? The summary datum is: we set them up at points of crises and instability as bases from which the supernatural can act to save our situations for us.

It doesn't matter who we are, or how we think, we all do it.

Here, for example, is Bertrand Russell. To him the world that science presents to our belief is purposeless and void of meaning; man is a joke and his achievement a predestined ruin. How then, shall he save his aspirations untarnished from the everlasting muck? By calling upon that in man which is supposed to distinguish him from Nature, and to distinguish him only; by drawing upon man's power of understanding nature and of judging her. The dignity of man is therein freed from the clash and dominion of the brute, non-human forces which are the world. Man can live in his ideals; he can bring them to bear upon the constant crisis which is life and save his integrity whole. "Brief and powerless is Man's life; on him and all his race the slow sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way; for man, condemned to-day to lose his dearest, to-morrow himself to pass through the gate of darkness, it remains only to cherish, ere

yet the blow falls, the lofty thoughts that ennoble his little day; disdaining the coward terrors of the slave of Fate, to worship at the shrine that his own hands have built; undismayed by the empire of chance, to preserve a mind free from the wanton tyranny that rules his outward life; proudly defiant of the irresistible forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation, to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world that his own ideals have fashioned despite the trampling march of unconscious power." That is, alone in the non-natural qualities of our humanity can we win security from the terror which Nature is. Against that, we look to powers resembling in quality if not in force the powers we designate as supernatural. More conventional belief adds force to quality.

And here is William James, at the age of twenty-seven, disciplined to the views and insights of science, and depressed to the point of suicide by the realization of the same facts that fill Russell with despair. His reaction is similar to Russell's, but the terms of it are more naïve and traditional, more solidly of a piece with the massive continuance of our aspiration. He was in Europe working hard at physiology when he was overcome one night, he writes, by "a horrible fear of my own existence." The image arose in his mind of a to him particularly obnoxious epileptic patient. "*That shape am I*, I felt potentially. . . . I became a mass of quivering fear. . . . I dreaded to be left alone. I remember wondering how other people could live, how I myself had ever lived, so unconscious of that pit of insecurity beneath the surface of life. . . . I have always thought that this experience of melancholia of mind had a religious bearing. . . . I mean that the fear was so invasive and powerful that, if I had not clung to Scripture-texts like *The eternal God is my refuge*, etc., *I am the Resur-*

rection and the Life, etc., I think I should have grown really insane."

Russell generalizes a type of experience that James reports as it took place. What was an event in James's life is paralleled by a *weltanschauung* in Russell's. Both endure and overcome an intolerable strain of living by an act of *belief*. The thing believed in is, for each, a thing tangential to the customary courses of existence, their clashes and upheavals. Russell's saviour is defined and conceived as actual, but its status is admittedly precarious and its actuality temporary; it is far more like a symbol than a force. James's saviour is all symbol. At this time, we know, James had not found how the supernatural could intervene in the course of nature; the mechanics of causation provided, so far as he was aware, the sole forms of efficacy the world contained. Saving energy was somehow inherent in the formulary symbols themselves; *pro tanto*, they *were* the supernatural. They instigated or evoked belief in what they themselves were not, and the attitude, in turn, worked transformingly upon the residual personality, lifting up, saving. . . .

If any one here declares that this lifting is by the lifter's own bootstraps, I shall not dispute him. I shall only point out that the bootstraps are not in fact attached to the shoes the lifter stands in, but to the symbols he turns to, and that these symbols are not his dream, but come to him out of the immemorial social inheritance of his race, and perhaps—who shall say?—beyond. It may be that it is only the belief which energizes the saviour into the act of salvation, it may be that more than the inertia of mere being does flow from the saving nature, and through its symbol vitalizes personality into belief. Here, it is clear enough, is a paradox. The power of the utterly impotent system of ideals renders an unendurable uni-

verse endurable for Mr. Russell; mere verbal formulæ drawn out of the religious tradition save Mr. James. What is presently pertinent in the paradox is the fact that it sets forth in both cases active belief, gripping its object in a recalcitrant and terrible situation and thereby reordering that situation and effecting some manner of salvation.

James and Mr. Russell present cases, one of extremely personal and one of extremely rationalized forms of this activity of belief. But in its degrees and permutations this activity is a recurrent moment in the lives of all of us. For, regardless of how we see the world, we *feel* it most generally and continuously as aggregated confusion, unstable, insecure, challenging, and our social customs and personal habits make a path through it like some lumbering country wagon through the motor traffic in Detroit.

Seeing the world is all too often a safeguard against the feel of it, whether we see it as Mr. Russell or as William James. It consists in installing the saving symbol upon which belief is projected at the point where the crisis is deepest and our terror greatest. That point then becomes the pass through which march the forces of salvation, the bridge for the supernatural into Nature. The alienity of the world is then warmed by intimacy and the waves of insecurity have been restrained by the oil of salvation. Although you are a stranger here and heaven is your home, earth has become immensely more tolerable as even a mere lodging for the night of your life. It is not for nothing that the dark ages of civilization are the same as the religious.

IV

Belief projects its object into all the dark places, into all the holes of knowledge and leaks of power. It scouts the

borders and reconnoitres the hinterlands of our affairs. Whenever our specialized technological information is deficient, belief makes up the deficiency with the supernatural. It fills therewith the gaps in what science knows about man and the world. It defines therewith whatever we are unable to define by means of the sensible and observable sequences of events. So it transforms the blind areas of experience into the light of logic, providing, by means of the supernatural, reasons for whatever has not of itself revealed its reason yet, explanations for whatever we experience whose undiscerned cause still troubles us. Ever it peoples the Beyond with powers concordant to our hearts. In the course of time, it generalizes its imputations into systems which, as worked over by custom, memory, tradition and personal genius make up the stuff of our social heritage of myth, theologies, creeds, and religious philosophies.

These generalized systems enter into the constitution of the religious life as objects of belief on their own account. The generations pass them on, modifying and refining them. Their logical intent and their ponderable makeup becomes a specific and unambiguous religious environment in which men live and move and have their being. Their totalities attach to and are implied in every specific religious symbol (this crucifix, that idol; bread, wine or water) and in every concrete religious act as its full meaning, as the ultimate total of the "deposit of faith."

In this form the systems evoke two dominant modes of response. One is to take them as a rule of living. Being reduplications of the whole of life in terms of the supernatural, the force most potent in establishing the fortunes of our story, they are seized upon by belief as maps of destiny, as guides to the happy ultimate termination of the anxious adventure which is existence. They become programmes of permanent

behaviour which, if followed, end in everlasting rewards; if not, in disaster. They provide or are assumed to provide for every contingency experience recalls or imagination anticipates. The minute elaboration of such provisions may be seen in the purificatory prescriptions of the Brahmin caste and the orthodox Judaistic cult. Diet and lustration are alike provided for, and casuistry establishes as of critical importance any number of distinctions whose differences are to seek.

The other response is to use these systematic elaborations of beliefs as an evasion of life, as a compensation against it—a compensation particularly against those characteristic crises which, men learn at last, nothing seems able directly to overcome, not even the supernatural.

Overruling among crises of this kind is death. Although its total validity seems to have been long undiscerned by our ancestors, the fear of it as an event and a fact, the terror of those remembered ones whose flesh had actually undergone the event, stand out in the mentality of most present primitive races and in the records of bygone ones. Against both the event and the horror of death systems of religious belief provide a compensation. They do not destroy them, but they deny the reality of the one and minimize the intensity of the other. So far as any modern brought up in the atmosphere of science is concerned, death happens, and that is the beginning and end of the story. When we are, as Lucretius told us long ago, death is not; when death is, we are not. In the context of systematized religious belief, however, such is not the case. The event we call death separates the *we* of us from the body it inhabits, but it does not annihilate the *we*. When we are most systematic religion tells us, death is not, and when death is, we are just the same. When death is, incorruption simply puts off corruption, an imponderable soul leaves

a ponderable body which decays when it is left into the dust it was assembled from. To the imponderable soul is imputed immortality. As I have shown in another connection²—this imputation is the imputation of a negation. A negation must acknowledge that which it negates in order to negate it. *Immortality* is meaningless without mortality. The event, the experience, the fact from which immortality derives is death. *Immortality* is *not*-death, and what *not*-death is nobody knows, although anybody knows what death is. The idea of immortality has no positive content, then. All it does is to assert that death—which inevitably happens—does, somehow, not happen at all. That is what renders the idea of immortality a compensatory ideal. It is a contradiction of experience, not a description. Systematic religious belief starting, then, with the compensatory assumption that death has not happened though it has, projects a continuation of life in regions outside of experience by imaginatively elaborating data derived from experience. It infallibly maps out a destiny for the personality which remains alive although it has died. This prevision is believed and made a basis of behaviour here and now. It forms conduct in modes assumed to assure any person who adopts them a happy life and to avert a tortured one after he is dead. Compensatory systems centring about otherworlds and otherlife also work as programmes of living, but they turn attention away from the stuffs of this life upon which its goodness rests, and lead to that neglect of the real for which religious ages are conspicuous.

Other insuperable difficulties or deficiencies or crises are met in a similar way. Sometimes they are minimized: their evil is assimilated to an overwhelming unseen good: "our finite

² Essay on "Value and Existence in Art, Religion, and Philosophy," in the volume on "Creative Intelligence," by John Dewey and others.

minds," we say, "cannot grasp the infinite unseen purpose"; or "thy will, not mine, be done." The sensible deficiency of experience is extinguished by the imaginary perfection of belief, as St. Bernard's drop of water would be actually transformed into wine, when drowned in his cask. Sometimes the deficiencies are denied: "sickness is mortal error, it does not exist; only health exists." Sometimes they are envisaged as the indispensable conditions for the being of the desirable: "blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth." Finally, they are all, because of their imputed consequences in the otherworld, transformed into the virtues of this: poverty, humility, hardship, suffering, deformity are attributes of saintliness.

So human belief overrides human weaknesses, mitigates their asperities, and renders a life of which they are integers somewhat sweeter and more endurable, enabling it to continue as such. What it thus effects is still compensation, and nothing more.

For the persistent disturbances of feeling which signalize the existence of these insuperable crises are drained of their energies through the beliefs that thus work them over. Thereby we are enabled, however, only to endure the evils; not to control, not to abolish them. They remain, in fact, what they were, and the emotional energies which might otherwise have been applied to the substantial transformation of the disturbances are used up in explaining the disturbances away. No residue is left for reform. It is a significant trait of history that the times and nations most distinguished for piety are also most distinguished for backwardness. Czarist Russia and contemporary Spain are near examples, but illustrations may be drawn from any part of the world; the Southern States of the United States of America, for instance. Everywhere the scope and intensity of belief in the supernatural seem to be

directly proportional to the misery and weakness of the believer. One compensates for the other. In compensating it restores in a way the vital equilibrium of the group or the individual, and maintains it. But in so doing it renders difficult and unlikely that mastery of natural forces which would enable an integration of energies as against their equilibrium by compensation. The compensatory mechanism delays and obstructs science and in many cases shuts it out altogether. And this consequence of religious belief is an organic implication of its positive functions.

CHAPTER VI

RELIGION BEFORE THE GODS WERE MADE

I

RELIGIOUS belief is belief in the supernatural. The trait that most distinguishes the supernatural from the natural is its saving power. Belief cleaves to the supernatural because it may be called in to do the work which Nature fails to do. Supremely desirable as it is in itself, the supernatural is still more precious for what it can accomplish, and even the most sophisticated and disillusioned societies are disposed to treat belief in it with the consideration due its imputed powers. Men protect belief in the supernatural from the harsh and combative treatment that other beliefs receive. They guard this belief tenderly. Strong feelings attach to it that are easily roused. Challenge, dispute, denial, however candid and honestly meant, give quick offence, and must therefore never be set up against religious belief, which is traditionally defended with an ardour, a passion that rarely attach to beliefs about government, property, the rights of capital and labour, sex and the family, or theorems and laws of mathematics and the sciences. In these other and similar domains of thought tolerance means the free development, confrontation, clash, and interaccommodation of beliefs. In the domain of belief in the supernatural, tolerance means enduring belief heedless of differences, by withdrawing and repressing differences. Freedom of speech and of press and discussion which means generally restraint of all interference in the amicable threshing out of conflicting

opinions, means, with respect to religious beliefs, refraining from talking, writing or discussing candidly at all. In every society belief in the supernatural is privileged belief, and there accrue to it all the advantages and disadvantages of privilege.

Now the content of this privileged belief has a nature the constituents of which are ambiguous and have not so far shown themselves susceptible of being taken out and laid down for analysis. The religious experience, in which they are reported to be directly present, makes in and of itself no deliverance. You can name the event, but you can not discern in it any structure or organization of parts, nor any parts. There is nothing you can compare it to or measure it by. It is ineffable and the rest is silence.

But mystics and religionists are not silent. On the contrary, they become, having passed through a religious experience, voluble. Without analyzing or otherwise illuminating the supernatural object, which seems as opaque as the sunlight—you can see with it but you cannot see into or through it—they make attributions and make inferences. Mostly, the attributions and inferences come not out of the perceptual *this* of the supernatural itself; but out of the context and setting in which the experience of it takes place. And these need not be religious at all in the usual acceptation of that word. The experience might occur under conditions provided and established by any of the arts and sciences, by politics, by philosophy. Attributions of character and inferences regarding its nature would then be drawn from the materials at hand in such secular environments. The connection between the experience of the supernatural and the institution of religion may, it follows, as easily be an accidental as a necessary one. It may have occurred by chance, and have been confirmed by habituation and limited by custom to the particular context we call religious.

If this should turn out to be the conclusion the record points to, the institution of the church can easily be no better than it should and the experience of the supernatural still be a valid experience. Meanwhile, tradition and the testimony of the mystics both attribute to the supernatural a nature of a piece with our own emotional tensions. They declare it is congruous and continuous with these, a "more like ourselves" and that the tensions are the channels it works through. This is the minimum. The rest is pattern drawn from the context, and varies with time and place and circumstances. The core of continuous stuff to be discerned under the many names, through all the variations, is this "more of the same quality." How and in what setting it is encountered seems to have no influence on what is ultimately recognized. The method may be that of a whirling dervish, a leaping shaman, a peyote-eating Indian, a drug-breathing Paul Blood, a posturing Yogin, a Tennyson, repeating his own name,¹ or a Bergson working into an intuition² of his *élan vital*; the result is a recognition that there is present this "more of the same quality." The certainty that it is this is equalled only by its ineffability. The "same quality" it is a "more" of seems, however, indeterminate. That it presents one or another aspect of the stream of our personality is itself a matter of inference, an attribution, a judgment which refers the experience to an identifying and standardizing entity

¹ "I have never had any revelations through anæsthetics, but a kind of waking trance—this for lack of a better word—I have frequently had, quite up from boyhood, when I have been all alone. This has come upon me through repeating my own name to myself silently, till all at once, as it were out of the intensity of the consciousness of individuality, individuality itself seemed to dissolve and fade away into boundless being, and this not a confused state, but the clearest, the surest of the sure, utterly beyond words—where death were an almost laughable impossibility—the loss of personality (if so it were) seeming no extinction, but the only true life."—From a letter to Benjamin Paul Blood, dated May 7, 1874, Isle of Wight.

² "Introduction à la Métaphysique."

outside it. This entity is, in a sense, the only one continuously present amid the discontinuous and changing settings of the experience. It is the feeling of "the stream of consciousness." To designate the supernatural by it is still inference. And why make an inference in such terms and not in others? Why say of the supernatural "more of the same quality," "stream of ideal tendency," "consciousness," "angel," "devil," "god"? Why not say "water," "fire," "earth," "energy," "electricity," "force"?

Are we restrained from the alternative judgments and attributions by anything more than the fact that we must be where our experience is when we have an experience? That public custom and personal habituation have established and are maintaining this way of handling experiences of the supernatural? Since value is a relation between ourselves and what is valuable, being our feeling about the thing we judge, it is implicit in every act of recognition and judgment. For this reason it is a matter of course that we should assimilate the thing to its value and dissolve its independence in our need and the satisfaction of it so that we see the thing's existence as a product or aspect of our appreciation. The Great Tradition both in religion and in philosophy identifies the sense with the content of preference, with the result that the stuff of the world is described finally as the stuff of our own felt being, as "consciousness," "spirit," "soul," or more articulately and concretely "god." This is how, in principle, the supernatural gets to be identified as "God."

As an explicit and overt event, however, the identification comes late in the history of religions. The ancient gods are relatively modern. Their station in the evolution of religious instruments in the struggle of man to live is from the beginning dubious and transitional. Their own record is the record

of an intensely competitive aggregation of divine personalities, replacing one another as servants in the house of man according to his needs and their ability or failure in his service. Many cults of the latter day dispense with them, and research has uncovered a wide, deep-reaching phase of religious life where the supernatural is, but there are no gods yet.

II

Although this supernatural turns out to be, ultimately, the indefinable causal agency of the religious experience, it does not begin so. At first it is felt but not recognized as this ultimate stuff. Its history in human affairs is the history of a multiplication, concretion and abstraction of its forms, and it is a natural history.

The forms of the supernatural are derived automatically and simply from the basic not-to-be-questioned relationships between men and women and children, the animals they hunt and domesticate, the plants they see importance in. The forms are grounded on the critical situations these relationships seem to regularly bring on.

Here is a family: father, mother and children of both sexes. Certain things can hardly be prevented from happening to their emotions toward each other. For many years of a child's life, until, in fact, it gains its strength and can stand as a physical peer of its parents, it is their inferior and knows this is so. Beside their strength it is powerless. It is dependent upon them for nourishment, for protection against harm, for the satisfaction of its most central needs. The child is dependent on the mother more than on the father. During infancy, it is in close physical contact with her. Growing in her body before birth, it is nourished and warmed by it after. Her moods, her health, the tone of her responses to this or that

object in the environment (fear of thunder, for example), are communicated by something like tactual contagion, or near it, to her infant. In addition, she awakens in her male child, if the "new" psychology is to be trusted, general non-specific responses of male to female.

The inferiority to the father and the dependence on him are of an opposite order. The father is a force outside the circle of mother and child. He enters that circle at will, breaking the *rapport* and turning the attention of the mother from the child to himself. He is the punishing power, called in by the mother from the outside when she threatens to or does "tell father." Father exacts obedience and coerces behaviour from the forms it might spontaneously take to the forms he seems arbitrarily to impose. He deprives the child of the goods it possesses or craves. If the child protests, he hurts and frightens it. His rule, indeed, is the rule of fear. The birth of the child, so far as his relation to the mother goes, is the coming of a rival, particularly if the child is a male child. However great the prospective advantages are from the addition to the family, they mitigate but do not abolish the present conflict, which comes to crisis at puberty and is conserved symbolically and obviated by the initiation ceremonies of the tribe. In those ceremonies the initiate is killed and resurrected. Every father in some degree initiates the conflict, even though he be the acme of culture and the beau ideal of psychoanalytic good sense. If he is like most fathers, of limited culture and untutored feelings, he will register his paternity as I have said. His sentiment will be a complex one, inasmuch as his rival will be no alien peer, but his own "flesh and blood," his property, inferior and dependent at one and the same time. If the rival is a daughter, the sense of rivalry will be mitigated by influences of sexual differences.

Because of this, the growing daughter may, in the course of time, develop an opposition to her mother based upon the same grounds as the son's opposition to his father.

Such rivalries are extended and multiplied as the number of the children increases. The first child is deprived by the coming of the next of the full attention of the nourishing, all-protecting mother. The emotions that go with the loss are turned upon its cause. Family quarrels are proverbial; they make explicit many of the attitudes which wont and use and tradition have repressed and rendered implicit. Family sentiments are chords of delicately-balanced attractions and aversions, running the entire gamut of emotions from love and hate to fear and joy.

Some of the aspects of familial relationships are apparent in the habits of any mammalian family, particularly among the carnivora. The ferocity of a dam toward the father of her pups, the behaviour of she-wolves and cats during motherhood are well known. And the blood-rivalry of the males of all species for the favour of the females and for the leadership of the herd are themes of saga and legend. Among men, the complications of contact in the struggle of the human group for survival have covered up these spontaneous trends of our animal nature; the condition of civilized existence early modifies, displaces, directs or transforms them. But the trends are explicit in infancy and childhood; and story, myth and fairy tale that belong to the infancy of the race exhibit them with their nakedness hardly less covered. Psychoanalysis, indeed, borrows some of its most characteristic categories and terms from the most familiar of these mythologies, the Greek: thus Oedipus complex, Narcissism, Electra complex—these are names out of Hellenic myth for reputed common mechanisms of the human mind.

Here is a typical tale of family feeling unfolded in the conduct of a holy family.

Gaia, who is mother Earth, had a son Ouranos to whom she bore a son, Kronos. Kronos, at the instigation of his mother, separated his father from her and castrated him. Married to his sister, Cybele, he begot the Olympian Gods. These he ate up, one after the other, lest they serve him as he served Ouranos. One, however, Zeus, Gaia saved from her husband's maw. Zeus finally killed Kronos, and, married to his sister Hera, became king of the Gods on Olympus.

The world of faërie is full of such episodes in which long-forgotten events may or may not be recorded, but in which dark feelings are constantly brought to light. Harsh fathers or cruel stepmothers, jealous elder brothers and sisters, insignificant younglings turning into heroes and similar dramatizations of feelings that family life keeps automatically arousing, populate the faërie world. No wonder that an early commandment is to *honour thy father and mother*; that the *pater potestas*, so naturally absolute when the infant is inferior and dependent, is safeguarded by innumerable taboos against the time when the tables are turned and the father has become old, weak, dependent and inferior.

Far more than now, father-power during the childhood of the race can have been perhaps the most fearful and overwhelming fact of impressionable years of infancy. The fear of it enters into the sentiments of youth and maturity. It affects adversely the rivalry with the father. It embitters successful rivalry and it survives the death of the father in so far as the father is deemed to die. But he does not die. He lives within the grave and can leave it at will to work his will upon you—his usually evil will.

III

Does this sound as if we were back in the sphere of belief and the will thereto? We are not. The father, alive after he is dead, is an empirical observation. He is literally encountered and perceived and he is literally assumed to be the same in character and conduct as when alive in the body. Dead, he is more or less permanently disembodied; alive he can and does leave his body from time to time. This fact exercises much influence upon the discernment of the supernatural and the development of religion as the conflict of the generations. It is a fact which, however, recent literature, in its eager psychologizing, quite ignores.

For the father, the ancestor, like all men, is perceptually double, and to no drunken eye. Since, to begin with, he has a shadow. Do you remember that tale of Chamisso about Peter Schlemiel? Peter Schlemiel is the man who sold his shadow and lost his soul. He went about with a body that cast no shadow, and a soul committed to hell. The tale is an old one among Christians but its variants are to be found among the heathen and pagan fables of the world. The Christian version suggests a distinction between the soul and the shadow. It is late. In earlier forms the soul *is* the shadow. Consider the shadow: its substantiality, its mobility—now no larger than the ground your feet cover, now immensely long, now nothing at all; climbing trees and walls, taking crooked shapes and straight; not to be stepped on or over. It goes where you go, and reaches where you can't. Its powers are different and unusual. Anthropologists tell us that among a good many tribes in Africa and in Asia the word for "soul" means "shadow" first. A man's soul as his shadow and its antics is something everybody can see and talk about.

So can they also his reflection in the water. Bend over a stream or a pool to drink and your image will be bending forward to meet your pursed lips. Move this way or that, it will move correspondingly. Put your hand out to grasp it, you grasp only water as in grasping your shadow you grasp only earth. Insubstantial and of variable shape like a shadow, the reflection is colourful like yourself. What can it be, as it moves with your motions, except yourself? Otherwise, how did it get into that stream, into that pool? If not inside you, where is it when it isn't there looking at you out of the water? If your visible shadow is your double, your visible image is even more so. Both are open to public as well as personal observation.

Not so with the last and most exciting mode of insubstantial existence; this Double—your own, your father's, anybody's—is the one you see in dreams. The dream-double is open only to private observation. But it is free from your body. That is at rest on the floor of your cave, your hut, your tent, while the double is out on strange and fearful adventures in unknown lands—adventures of *Œdipus*, maybe, or of *Zeus* among other doubles: your father, the fathers of the tribe, the familiar animals that belong to your economy and the stranger ones that inhabit only dreamland. Dreamland is another land, and alone the Double can live in it. He enters and leaves it only during sleep.

Sometimes the strain of the adventure in Dreamland brings him back presto to the body. You wake up. You feel disturbed. Your breath comes hard and fast. Can it be that there is no connection between your breath and your double? Any change in your fortune is a sensible change in your breath, any mood or sentiment is noticeably marked by a change in the rapidity and depth of your breathing. Breathing is some-

thing very obviously you can't do without. Even the sleeping breathe—bodies that don't breathe are dead. You can feel breath—its warmth, its moisture, its impact, as you see shadows, reflections and dream images. You can feel breath come and go. Often you smell it, sometimes you hear it and occasionally you see it. Among many peoples, the Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans among them, the word for breath and the word for soul is the same word.

How the shadow, the reflection in the waters, the dream-figure and the breath were interpenetrated and identified, and the emergent compound defined and believed in as the soul, is simple enough to infer. Are they not all attached to the same body, do they not look the same and do they not vary with the same breath? Sometimes the different items persist alongside their united formation. The Egyptians, for example, distinguished between the *ka* which was the image; the *khu* which was the dream-figure, the *khaybet*, the shadow, and the *ba*, the breath. Their symbol for the *ka* was a human form following the bodily figure it belongs to; their symbol for the *khu* is a crested bird; for the *ba* a bird with the head of a man. They also added to the collection the *ran*, or name of a man.

The ancient world was overwhelmingly impressed with the peculiar identity and behaviour of names. Names were like the breath, only more specific and formed. The sound of them was so often suggestive of the things they were applied to, so like images in waters and dreams. Names seemed to combine the separate qualities of the shadow, the dream and water images, the breath. They were the unity of the multiple personality. To know them was to have power over the person whose essence they expressed. Ancient religious literature records many devices for the concealment of the name or

for its discovery; Gods and men often have secret names that their reality inheres in and which are *taboo*.

When it was that mankind finally compounded the perennial experiences of his many aspects into a permanent dualism is difficult to guess. That it was very early in the history of human self-realization and of the growth of self-consciousness, remains of the Old Stone Age, the drawings of the caves of Altamira, the pillars of Stonehenge, the rituals and ideas of African religions and the complexities of the religions of ancient civilizations all attest. Nor is mankind alone realized as dual. Animals and the natural scene, the starry heavens and the features of the earth with their shadows, figuring no less than men in dreams and reflections, also have their doubles among the shades, and possess the strange powers that seem to pertain to the shades. The shades compose thus a world of their own, contingent on the solider world of the daily life, impinging on it in various ways, customary and miraculous, both; but miraculous conspicuously, because capable of observed actions which the fleshly tenement never can perform. The growth of cities, the accumulation of wisdom from long experience, modifies and transforms many items of this original dualism, refines many others. Religious orthodoxy and traditional theology and philosophy are rationalizations and dialectic elaborations of it. It is an early constituent of commonsense, of obstinate fixity, and none of the transformations of science can quite dislodge it.

IV

Family relations are complicated not merely with shadows but with animals and perhaps with plants.³ Animals appear

³ See Frazer; "The Golden Bough," Chapter I. The King of the Wood, . . . Even in the time of Pliny a noble Roman used thus to treat (as a

to figure in human behaviour in almost as many ways as men. It is an interesting point in the controversy over evolution that the sharp differentiation between men and the animals comes into the record as a *made* differentiation, not a spontaneous one. In earliest times, as we have before had occasion to observe, mankind accepted on a level with itself whatever called upon its attention. The unbroken arc of action from stimulus to response was a continuum of form and kind. The human notion of the human race as a variety of existence separate and distinct from the residual world seems to have taken shape very slowly, and not quite successfully established itself anywhere except among the men of Europe. Such widespread beliefs as the transmigration of souls and the divinity of animals witness the inveteracy of the earlier feeling of kinship with all that surrounds the race. In India it so limits men's freedom of action that it often causes famine and more often death; since farmers will not kill the fowl and vermin that eat the planted seed or the feral beasts that eat the human young. "Uncle" Tiger and "Brother" Crow must be spared!

This feeling is preserved in *totemism*, but must have antedated it by millennia. For the totem systems of the world exhibit an elaborate structure, a refinement of detail, that could not have taken less than ages to grow up and to crystallize. In the totemic brotherhoods and the explanations of them that their members have given there are discernible comprehensive rationalizations, endeavours to account to oneself dialectically for practices that the fathers have immemorially handed down. The originals of these practices had to happen before custom could fix them and tradition carry them. Intimacy between men and animals must have been an observation of conduct

wife) a great oak. . . . The custom of physically marrying men and women to trees is still practised in India and other parts of the East.

and experience before it could have been extended into a matter of belief and ritual. Many cults like the Judaism of the Covenant set religious taboos upon cohabitation with the beasts and penalize it severely. They establish a presumption that it occurred and occurred commonly. Myths of intercourse and marriage between daughters of men and gods in the form of animals are frequent, and these animals are not always tame. Frequent also are legends of animal mothers and nurses of men.

That sexual as well as other intimacies are likely to have occurred before the domestication of animals is improbable, although even the most primitive hunters appear to have domesticated the dog, and the taming of wild beasts other than those depended on for food is a frequent practice of primitive hunters. It must be remembered that the range of their diet is as extensive as their existence is insecure, and may, as among the Australians, include ordure and vermin. Of the last, the remains of paleolithic man show no trace, naturally. The remains are of reindeer, stag, roe, horses, great-headed ponies, mammoths, cave-bears, aurochs, and man. Dynamic outlines of the forms of some of these animals are observable on mammoth bones. Remains of early neolithic man, heaped middens of shells of oysters, mussels, and periwinkles, contain bones of the stag, roe, wild boar, wolf, fox, bear, lynx, marten, hedgehog, beaver, seal and cat; of the herring, eel and cod. Only in the fully developed neolithic period do the remains of our present domesticated animals appear—of cattle, goats, sheep, dogs, horses, pigs. Cohabitation with animals as interdicted by divine law and the implicated emotions would most readily have ensued during the herding stage. But it might have happened among hunters at such times when pubescent youths courting the mother and sisters of their group, ran away

in terror before the wrath of the father and were constrained to take what mates chance might provide. What can be eaten can be loved, particularly when the organism is set, love is ready and its natural object is withheld.

Hunger and sexuality may thus both converge to identify the animal with the father. For food, when it is no longer to be had at the mother's breast, comes at the hand of the father. He is the mighty hunter. He brings home the dead beast. Wearing its skin, he looks like the beast. Its flesh is *mana*, for are you not made strong when you have been weak, by eating? And swift when you have been slow? Where could the strength have come from if not from that thing outside which you take in? Whence the swiftness? That which you eat *is* you when you have eaten it. How then shall you not be that? Its lack is a pain and a terror to you. Its presence is a challenge. You feel toward it as you feel toward the father. You placate and propitiate, and you hunt and kill. You are yourself by its sufferance, you are it by your dependence on it. And it comes first into your ken at the hands of the father. How can it not be the father then?

The especial animal your tribe depends on becomes through some such reflex of illation as this, the first progenitor of the clan, its avatar and totem. The women of the totem are prohibited to the men of the same totem and all the elaborations exfoliate which anthropologists and archæologists have made familiar. The members of the species become brothers and sisters of the totem group. Hunting and eating them becomes involved in elaborate purificatory and expiatory rites. For, of course, the animals have doubles also, that must be kept propitious and kindly and moved at once to excuse their slaughter and to plentifully permit it. These doubles are identified with your own. As you become a keeper of their

flesh in death, they are keepers of your soul in life, and to kill them, without ritually making ready, becomes to commit suicide.

In time, the totemic significance spreads to plants and minerals. How, I am unable to guess, unless it be by the same logic of illation that identifies man with what he eats: *Mann ist was mann ist*.

V

Power or *mana*, such as resides in the body of the mother, the actions of the father, the stuff and savour of animal and vegetable food, the glitter and texture of stones, is then primarily power to satisfy hunger—hunger for food or hunger for a mate, or any other hunger which obstruction, conflict and frustration may produce. Hunger is the original pattern of all crises man suffers; satiety is the original of all salvations. Sins are aspects of hunger, grace is the ultimate nourishment. To possess and to guarantee the services of nourishing power is the vocation of the generations. Now this power is not solid. It is the shadow, the reflection, the dream image, the breath, the name. It belongs to another world and only sojourns in this one. Left to itself, it goes from man to man, or man to animal or animal to man, in an eternal cycle of re-incarnations. Left to itself it goes maliciously, it goes fearfully, like the living father. It must be held in check. The evil it can do must be averted; its power for good must be applied. This cannot be accomplished unless it is corralled, unless it is given a habitation, a body to incarnate it, as Ulysses gave the shade of Achilles a body from the ditch of sacrificial blood. You must bottle up the double, if you are to conserve and direct its forces.

So you provide it with habitations. The very simplest of habitations may be such crystals as attracted the attention of

the Australian blackfellows by their glitter or any bright or strangely-shaped object. Objects of this kind are usually classed among fetiches. More complicated in significance and manipulation are the *dolmen*, *menhir*, and *cromlechs* of the north, the *asherahs* and *mazzebahs* of Syria and Palestine. These are great stones arranged sometimes in rows, sometimes in circles, sometimes as tables; sometimes they stand alone. Frequently, they are untrimmed, sometimes the roughest and sketchiest shapings may be inferred; sometimes their character is unmistakable. They are all derivative of the male and female sex organs. The *asherah* is known to be the Syrian aspect of the *yoni-lingam*, the penis erect in the female vulva; the *mazzebah* is the erect penis. The probability that *dolmens*, *menhir* and *cromlechs* have a similar origin is very high. The unaccountable behaviour of the male organ of reproduction, the excitement of erection and the relaxation of detumescence must very early have impressed the minds of men as an event extraordinary and magical. In the beginning of articulate memory, it must have retained something of the seasonal dæmonic drive typical of sex-life among wild animals. The rise of the excitement must have been regarded as the coming of an alien force, an inspiration taking possession of the personality and filling it with power and passion. Only eventually could its bearing on fertility have been inferred—birth for long is of the mother only—but the excitement was enough. The somatic focus of the excitement and its female correlate cannot fail to become objects of intense interest; their forms, the forms where naturally the dynamic shades would take up their habitations. The phallus therefore recurs very generally as the ground plan of a great variety of symbols whose first meaning is enhanced or eternal life, and whose second meaning is fertility. It is directly reproduced in stone and other hard media as *asherah*,

mazzebah, *cphod*, *teraphim*; it figures in meal-cake in various Greek rituals; the crosses of the Christians, the *ankhs* of the Egyptians are adaptations of it. In architecture it reappears in the pattern of the pyramids and churches. Its animal analogue is the Serpent.

The receptacles or bases of operations for and upon the shades is from this point on elaborated architecturally and symbolically *ad lib.*, and with the growing sophistication reduced and simplified again, until they have become no more than the bits of paper with which the Chinese annually summon their ancestors for the propitiatory feast, by writing their names. This feast corresponds to the ancient Greek Anthesteria, when the jars holding the ashes of the ancestors are opened, their ghosts are summoned, feasted and swept out in preparation for their reappearance in the new births of the year.

That the personality or identity of the fathers, the totems, is not so important as their functions and powers, may be gathered from the prevalence of the phallus as their symbol or habitation. Except for the nearest forebears, that personality, with no image made or kept, is soon forgotten. The dead become an anonymous horde, a composite unity from whom you derive and to whom you return. What they are is negligible beside what they can do. Function, behaviour, looms indeed so large that any tool becomes a supernatural focus. Ancient Rome, China and India are populated with supernatural powers that are not divine persons, not gods, but necessary or desirable performances. The tools and process of farming, healing, warfare, are treated as the seats of supernatural forces enabling the actions that these perform. Agni is the sacrificial fire; soma is the sacrificial libation; these, because they are, receive sacrifices. Ploughs, spears, lances, medication are similarly dealt with.

Nor is this inwardness of power limited to functions. Cities and lands have it, and the divinity that dominates them is without a name or form. You hear, not of Ammon or Ka or Osiris, but of the "he" of Thebes, the "he" of Abydos, the "he" of appeasement or warfare. These "hes" are the *mana* of the land, its productivity and defensive power.

VI

Manipulating the *mana* of the ancestors, of the animals, and of vegetation, to avert evil and to secure good by the control of the shades of past and present beings, the shades which *are mana*, is the practice of religion before the gods are created. It is a practice concentrated in great degree in the fertility rituals which make up so much of early religious behaviour. These rituals may vary from the elaborate imitation of the coming of the food supply such as is practised by the Australian totem group, to the elaborate prayer that is made by a European liberal Christian. They all depend upon an efflux of *mana*. Sometimes, as in the Greek Thesmophoriæ, this is effected by women carrying a cake shaped as a phallus; by the slaughter of a pregnant sow and the scattering of the morcellated flesh over the fields. Sometimes it is effected as in the Roman fertility ritual of Tellus, by the tearing of the fœtus from the womb of a pregnant cow and its burning by the chief vestal. Sometimes it is effected by leaping and dancing; sometimes by having pregnant women do the ploughing and sowing. The forms are numerous, and whatever the form, the deed, not the doer's the thing.

For it is the precision of the ritual that puts the supernatural cause to work. With the action goes some sort of wording, some liturgy, some chant. The two together make up the

ceremony. In the beginning, words are few and thin; it is the action that is thick. Recent excavations in Egypt have dramatically shown again how thick. The *ka* of Tutankhamen had builded for it a royal house. The perishable body of flesh was prepared to endure forever as its habitation that it could continue to live in at will. All the furnishings of life were lavishly provided for it in death: food, clothing, weapons, pets. All are there, solidly. Had Tut been a Chinese prince, his *ka* would be no less real and necessitous; but, a shadow, it would be provided for with shadowy goods. Not food, but the appearance or the name of food would have been provided him; not clothing nor weapons, but the pictures and names of them. The elaborate Egyptian action in three dimensions would have been condensed to a Chinese ideogram in two. The upkeep of his spiritual life would cost symbols, not the things themselves.

VII

This, if you please, spiritualization of the technique of controlling supernatural causes is an aspect of the evolution of every ritual that is allowed to evolve. Action, beginning as the elaborated manipulation of realities in themselves, or as the minute imitation of realities, becomes condensed, shortened, hieroglyphic, conventional, abstract,—who would trace the sign of the cross to the actual laying on of a stone or wheaten phallus that the potency therein domiciled might be by contact transferred to the receiver? The accompanying wording grows in importance. The fact of the original action is communicated as the meaning of the elaborated verbal formulary. Finally the words dislocate the action and take its place.

For example: some African rainmaker might during a drouth undertake after proper penance and purgation to make rain. He might fill a gourd with water, climb the highest tree he knows, and then shake the gourd so that the water it holds will fall upon earth like rain. While carrying out this action he might be saying: "Behold, as water pours from this gourd I hold in my hand, so rain shall pour from the gourd of heaven. Let the crops and the people and cattle all be blessed by the rain falling from the gourd of heaven." In the course of time, he may stop climbing the tree and simply make movements and take a posture suggestive of that act; he may give up the gourd and the water, and make measured gestures symbolic of pouring and sprinkling. These movements may start as precise and exact imitations, but they cannot help ending as unintelligible shorthand. The action is now accessory to the words, not the words to the action.

But when this happens, the speaker necessarily stands out. In speech, personality counts; in action, precisely because action is a use of impersonal materials, it doesn't. The rainmaker, the corn-leaper, the first performer in any ritual, begins to stand out when the action is purely symbolic and words are required to clarify deeds. The man or the woman operating on supernatural causes cannot fail to figure as of, at least, equal importance with those causes, as the same with them, as master over them. This is the point at which the gods come in.

CHAPTER VII

MAKING GODS

I

"BEGIN," Pascal advises somewhere, "by taking holy water, and you will end by being a believer." "Works," he would say, in the language of the professionals, "lead to faith." The faith they lead to is not, however, the faith they require for their performance. That faith is implicit in the execution of works, while the faith they lead to is not implicit but contingent. The latter is added to works to justify them; in other words, to rationalize them. What beliefs you come to by taking holy water are a rationalization of taking holy water. You *could* take holy water without them; you do, in fact. But however coercive the act may be to your feelings, it is too weak to stand by itself to your mind. From the various enclaves of the social order where holy water is not taken come challenges to justify the taking. If you are at all a sensitive and alert member of your community, you cannot disregard these challenges. You produce explanations. These explanations are the faith your taking holy water in a society of sceptics ends in. They are the myths, saga, legend, theology and metaphysics of the religious tradition. Their function is to protect an ancient sacred ritual, hitherto unquestioned, against the challenge of a later time or more sophisticated order. They are characteristic of the mind of polities or families or tribes, and are conversant not with forces but symbols. The symbols are, first, persons, then abstractions or ideas. They become important by the shift of interest from the deed to the *deber*,

from the action to the word. Deed and word are used to explain the practice. The explanation is the making of the gods. Like all explanations, it consists in an attribution of causes; in this case, in the attribution of personality to the supernatural, the definition of the supernatural by impersonation.

When such a definition began is conjectural. The event belongs to prehistory. It is a consequence of the discovery of humanity by mankind and the growing consciousness of a human nature to be contrasted with the natural world. How intimate and warm the communion was with the natural world we have already considered; and how coercive the need was to make it kind and not fearful. This need is no less in play toward the making of the gods, but the modes and mechanics of its expression have become immensely complicated. The simple pastoral and agricultural economies of prehistory have been succeeded by polities of complicated economic structure, with slaves and freemen, poor men and rich, rulers and vanquished, workers and soldiers. There has been, if the internal evidence of the rituals, the myths and the theologies can be trusted, a change in the status of woman. The gods ensue upon a patriarchal order. Their biographies, their ways and their polities are variant projections of this order upon the unseen, expressing the rivalry of the sexes and the war of the classes that underlay it. The familiar story of the slow evolution of Jahweh from a phallic focus of supernatural force to a tribal divinity of desert nomads and then to a universal providence directing the affairs of nature and the courses of history is fairly typical. I say "fairly" because the personification of Jahweh was prematurely arrested. The simoom out of the desert, operating from a stone in the ark, was endowed with kindly preferences and a bias for social justice without at the same time receiving definite lineaments and

somatic articulateness, in spite of the almost irresistible contagion from the Baalim, his rivals. Jahweh is more primitive than Bel or Zeus or Osiris or Mithra or Krishna. The Jews never completed his impersonation. That was accomplished by the Christians who, in God-the-Father, made Jahweh the peer and alternative of any of the head divinities of the great cults of Roman imperial civilization.

However, this is anticipating the story, which is how the gods came to be. Their characters, I said, their natures and activities reflect the civilization that uses them. Such use is not direct any more than was the ritual wherein the powers of the supernatural were set to influencing the course of nature. The agrarian community cannot any longer of their own right and need choose from among their own number the person or persons who shall lead them in the propitious manipulations of the supernatural. Reaching the gods is best accomplished through professional experts in such manipulations, and the experts have become a special and highly differentiated class in the community. Besides these experts—the shamans, medicine-men, sibyls, augurs, prophets, priests, whose one and only function is tending and working the gods—we find others who are close to the supernatural because of their power and station. Such are heads of families, of states, of armies; such are persons whose peculiarities of behaviour lead the community to attribute to them special competency in getting at the supernatural. Still others—women, young men, children—who are important neither for knowledge nor station, acquire merit and religious sanctity through being chosen to serve as tools in the manipulation of the supernatural. Such are the women and girls officiating in the spring and harvest festivals, the men serving as placatory offerings, as sacrifices, as *pharmakoi* or scapegoats, and many others.

Long before the gods came these persons were the doers of the rite. The *sacra* wherein the supernatural takes its station and whence it does its work are carried in *their* hands and put in use by *their* movements. Words and action were *their* words and *their* action. If help comes, why should not they be its source? If evil is averted, why not by their salvation? That continuity between stimulus and response, that sympathy between agent, medium and effect, which keeps man long a wave in Nature's tide, holds all the more intensely between chosen consecrated personalities, set apart from their fellows, and before their eyes on a sacred occasion *compelling the supernatural*; driving out evil, placating wrath, bringing in good. Such personalities are prototypes and models of the gods. Their anonymized identities are the stuff of the august dignities of heaven. Their forgotten and generalized biographies are the life stories of the divinities.

Regard the personages of any pantheon as the history of religion parades them. They came, first of all, as the dramatic inwardness of the to-hunger-and-sense-outstanding enclaves of Nature. There are the gods of the heavens which astronomers photograph with telescopes and cameras and measure with calculus and algebra: the space of the over-arching sky itself, the sun, the moon, the planets, the fixed stars. Their beams pour visibly down to our beings, warm us and light us, rain influence to which our hearts respond with feelings that link us to their cause. The changing face of the heavenly scene cannot but be remembered, watched with anxiety, anticipated with placatory or expiating ritual. Brightening and dimming of the stars, phases of the sun and moon, their movements over the vault of heaven, solstices and eclipses are noted, set down, offset or reinforced by the application of the supernatural, regularly. Every cult has its cal-

endar, with its fasts and feasts, its days sacred to the heavenly hosts and the surmounting of the crises their courses make for men.

Intercalated and largely coincident with these holy days are the feasts and fasts and sacred days of earth; the "days and works" of Hesiod's phrase, the crises that come with the turn of the seasons, the times of ploughing and sowing and harvesting, dead winter and reborn spring, summer teeming and ripe autumn, and whatever these mean in crops and flocks and children to the peoples of the Earth, their mother. . . .

And there are the startling and dark aspects of earth's own face: the crises of weather, mountains reaching to the sky, rivers overflowing and drying, grotesque darkness of forests, caves unpenetrated by light, the far ocean, the arbitrary winds . . . Whatever is dark, sudden, unknown or hard to be known, whatever startles or shocks and makes afraid, is the seat of power supernatural in itself or amenable to the supernatural. In China all these phases of earth are worshipped as divinities; their doubles, their spirits, are gods of the state religion. . . .

II

The standpoint from which these aspects of the visible world is regarded is, as we have already many times noted, that of the phases in the life cycle of the race itself—birth and puberty and parenthood and death; childhood and maidenhood and youth and maternity; the toil and tasks of the farmer on the land, the craftsman and merchant in the town, the sailor on the sea; the woman in the field; the rule of the family, of the state. The changing relations between these units, their constant needs and varying desires, become the social ground-plans of the pantheons of the world. In the making of the gods they supply the first material.

The second is the underworld of shadow, reflection, dream-figure and breath; the clouds of anonymous dead, depersonalized because disembodied, men and animals of the underworld, shades waiting their turns to re-emerge upon the surface of the earth and resume the articulate relationships of the earthly life that Sheol and Hades and Pandora's Box know not of. They are the impatient, dangerous seed of new life. As the corn and vine come up out of the earth so they out of the body of the mother. You see the vegetation cycle—corn and grape and olive, dropping to the ground in the ripe autumn; lying inert and barren beneath the ground through the cold, dead winter; rising uncertainly up into the free air again in the green spring, forming, ripening—to remembered shapes and savours and satisfactions in the hot summer. Later you facilitate and direct this sequence by your husbandry—this ever-returning round of the same precious things from air to earth to air again. Why should it be otherwise with beasts and men? They, too, grow upon the earth in the beginning, walking and working upon it, and fall to it in the end. Their season is longer, and their ways are more mysterious, than those of the corn and the grape—they must pass through the woman—but theirs also is the same completed circle. What can their seed be if not their quick, sly doubles? Where can they live if not in the soil where they lie and whence their food once sprang? They are danger and renewal both. They are dynamic of divinity. Raised by an effective ritual out of earth to live upon it as men and women, some, the chieftains and leaders of the tribes, are for cause remembered when their bodies are laid in earth again. Their identities are preserved and their powers enhanced. They become the ancestral guardians and protectors of their descendants. First from their tombs they counsel and guide. Then their doubles are translated. No

longer now they dwell beneath the earth; their abode is the heavens above. They are now the spirits of their respective habitations—heroes, demigods, gods, divine law-givers, founders of the state, the arts, the sciences.

Behind the bright divinities of the heavens, then, are the dim figures of the earthly leaders, the mighty men of the race, the fire bringers, the tool makers, the singers, the hunters and the fighters. They have been detached from the generality of the animal life in which they shared, but vestiges of that earlier intimacy continue to hang about them. The lion of Herakles, the serpent of Esculapius, the bull of Zeus and Mithra and Ashur, the goat of Pan, the ram of Osiris, are vestigial in this sense. We see in them what remains of the totem in a man's world whose establishment the totem itself perhaps would signalize.

And behind this man's world, formed by imagination and projected by feeling upon the heavens as from a dark lantern, we discern another dimmer world whose vestiges lie deeper and whose significance is more profound. In that young world the rôle of the male in the making of children is dubious, perhaps altogether unguessed; society is founded on the mother; relationships are defined with her as a centre, and the affairs and functions of living are derivatives of her biological rôle. Heroes and demigods, significantly, oftener than not own a divine ancestry—on the distaff side; the more ancient they, the more likely the ancestry is to be on the distaff side. Women are the conspicuous prototypes of *beneficent* divinity. Their lives coincide broadly with the rhythms of the earth from whose womb all things spring. They are the protagonists in the fundamental fertility rituals—the ritual of the wine-spirit as well as of the corn-spirit. Their service is determined by nature, not invention. Maids they are, then mothers; virgin

mothers, tenders of the earth, breeders of her fruits, bearers and rearers of children. The standing of the men who beget these children there can only be guessed at. Known "matriarchies" provide no analogies: they are too infected from surrounding societies of another order; and in myth or legend there is nothing to give clear indication. An analogy may be drawn from the lives of the animals. Animal mothers defend their young against their mates and submit to mating with the strongest among competing males. There are aspects of ancient religious behaviour which might justify such an analogy and its implications.

For motherhood has an indeterminate range. Women are not merely mothers of men. Sympathetic emotion assimilates them to the earth—"mothers of all wild things." Euripides makes his female worshippers of Dionysus suckle the young of wolves and deer. In certain cults, that of Jahweh not excepted, priestesses are temple prostitutes: any man may have access to them as part of the performance of his due rites to god or goddess. And motherhood is not an instant in the female. There is a period of sterility when the mother is a maid, when she is barren like the earth in winter. She is then but a daughter; or herself not yet quick. Ancient myth represents this aspect of life of woman and the cycle of the seasons in such a tale as that of Ceres and Persephone, Demeter and Koré. Persephone or Koré, you will recall, must spend part of the year always underground, where she is queen of the dead. And the dead, it must not be forgotten, are at the same time the unborn. Demeter or Ceres is the corn-mother, the queen of tilth. She also is the mother of the dead—they are called Demeter's people—but of the living even more. Demeter is Koré fertile at last, bringing the dead year to life again, the dead souls to new birth. She is an

alien in the council of the gods where Zeus rules and the myth must needs naturalize her there. She antedates the council. In life and function she is the concretion of the countless women, themselves maids and mothers, who in forgotten times performed the ritual that was to make the earth plentifully bring forth. Hades, male god of wealth and the underworld, appears in the light of Demeter as a projection of the masculine displacement of woman's rule. Myth tells how he seized Koré and took her beneath with him and married her; how her mother demanded her return; how the return was allowed but was limited to only part of the year because Persephone ate a pomegranate seed. Hades is the male pretender to the underworld dominion of Demeter. What, however, he acquires is hell—not dead souls destined to rebirth, but eternal death. He is the sign of a much later society than that which made Demeter and her many impersonations of Earth the woman, mother and maid at once.

In this later society woman has fallen into an inferior position. Its order is patriarchal. No one knows how it came about or why. War and migration are undoubtedly influences; any change in the economy of the horde which would render the activities of the male more important and honourable than those of the female might turn the trick. The point is that the trick is turned. The supremacy of the male is established as a political form. But again, items of ancient myth and religious behaviour signify the transition. Emphasis shifts from Mother and Maid to Mother and Child. Birth, not fertility, is signalized; "unto us a child is born; unto us a son is given"; "Brimo," the hierophant announces at the Eleusinian mysteries, "has borne a child Brimos." This child grows up and becomes the husband of his mother, like the Roman Liber, son and spouse of his mother, Libera. Some-

times the god can do this only by killing his equally divine father. Sometimes his father must kill him. Sometimes the father abdicates when the son is born. Sometimes, as the famous heresiarch Sabellius urged of Christ, the son is his own father. In many cases the conflicts are the conflicts between kings and their successors. Now it is the life and power of the king which is sympathetically bound up with the fertility of the land. The mother, who is the arch-symbol of fertility, has fallen into the background; but the struggle for the succession is a struggle for the favour of the mother such as might take place in the society where women are dominant.

In such a society, the loser is at once a scapegoat and a sacrifice, and because of the weakness of youth, youth is often the loser. Him women mourn. He is Adonis, Osiris, Attis, Dionysus, Serapis. . . .

III

Power, rather than love, is what these conflicts between kings and kings' sons turn on. Fatherhood as a basis of descent and inheritance is still dim. The men want possession of the children; they desire dominion over them free from the protective interference of the mother. *Couvade* is a well-known practice in establishing the desired proprietorship. Zeus's parturition of Athene, who is of her own autogenous lineage the *Koré* or Maid of Athens and far more ancient than Zeus, her father, is the mythmaker's symbol of the same aspiration. Finally the vindication and establishment of paternity is signaled by a sacred marriage. In Athens the temples of Dionysus used to have a bridal chamber where, at the turn of the year, the queen Archon would go through the rite of a sacred marriage to a bull, the living symbol of Dionysus. From this

sacred marriage the Christian sacrament of holy wedlock descends.

The rite signifies that the power of fertility has passed in outlook and conduct quite from women to men. Paternity has been realized and its rights established and acknowledged. Birth and plenty are now of the male. Dionysus has replaced Koré. To the rite of Mother and Maid, such as was performed at ploughing and sowing and harvest by girls and women, are added the rites of the Son. It is now the young men, the Kouroi or young initiates who, led by the Megistos Kouros, dance the dithyramb, and with their leaps and postures make certain the coming of the vivid spring. The mystery is now of Dionysus not of the Great Mother. That enacts the crises in the life of man—birth and marriage and death and resurrection—and projects them upon Nature.

I say, "enacts." I mean literally "enacts." All rituals are enacted. All rituals are identifications through imitative movements, through appropriate dress, through sounds made and attitudes taken, of the participant with the divine original whose saving power the participant thus realizes. He may realize it for himself alone; or he may realize it and by the contagion of emotion communicate it to an onlooking fellowship, a congregation. What cannot be imitated in person—a new-born child, for example, like Dionysus Liknites or Jesus-in-the-manger—is symbolized. Now imitative action, under conditions of tension such as the conditions always are of solemn religious ceremonials, generates strong emotion. It is a dance, whose figures trace "far-off divine events." As the movement accelerates, feeling heightens. In ritualistically seeking the god, you lose yourself. You are possessed: the spirit, as Christian evangelists say, is upon you. Your feeling may be God-is-in-you and you-are-in-God, or it may actu-

ally generate for you the vision of the figure that your dance patterns. You remember how during the very beginning of the Great War, British soldiers, hard-pressed at Mons, saw angels fighting on their side; how the Greeks saw at Marathon the gigantic figures of the Olympian gods doing battle for them. . . . Such ecstasy of despair as brings visible gods to your succour in battle may bring them also through desire and hope in religion. You not only feel your God. You see him. You are him. In the intensity of mood during the enactment of a ritual, priest and god, chieftain and god, medicine man and god, blur in your sight. How can you, yourself possessed, say which is which? The actor *is* the supernatural force made flesh and walking on earth.

When the ritual is finished, some vestige of divinity sticks to its enactor. Divinity doth hedge a king, and priests are doctors of it. The things they do transform the thing they are. They are instruments, and they become hypostatized. Hypostasis of the instrument is an inveterate habit of our nature; we are always making idols of our tools. It is easy enough to see why. A purpose is a discarnate and variable thing. It is realized intermittently and its realization cannot endure. Satiety is a purpose, but we lapse constantly from satiety to hunger and require constantly to feed if we are to be satisfied. Food is a tool. It can be assembled and kept constantly at hand to meet the contingencies of hunger. To be an effective tool, food must not spoil, nor be exhausted, nor lose savour. So we turn our attention on the conservation of food. We seek to render it everlasting and intact. We surround it with safeguards, we insure it in every possible way. We "preserve" it. Preserving it, we make a god of it. In trying to make it fit always to be eaten we make it impossible ever to eat. We have transformed it from an instru-

ment to an end, from a tool to an idol; we have hypostatized it. For the nature of an instrument is, not to be used merely, but to be used up. You cannot effectively work an instrument without using it up. Yet the more efficacious the instrument, the more highly it is regarded; the more highly it is regarded, the stronger the tendency to refrain from using it, to keep it "on the shelf" intact.

The workings of this tendency are particularly noticeable in the processes of the religious life. It is a large factor in the notorious "conservatism" of religion. Religious functionaries, the rituals they celebrate, the instruments they celebrate with, are—instruments. They are instruments whose operation renders supernatural force available for human uses. Unlike these invisible and untouchable forces, they are immediately and continually present. We can see them, touch them, derive solid comfort from them so solidly there. Automatically, hence, they become more estimable in our regard than the supernatural they are designed to control. Young men and women sent to their death to insure good crops; *pharmakoi* destined to slaughter to cleanse the city of disease, surrogates prepared to take the punishment due for sin or injustice; kings, priests, medicine men, all become more important than the ends they serve. Death takes their bodies, but their doubles continue and are reborn and to these is due the honour that first pertained to the end which their work is assumed to accomplish. In them the dynamic rite crystallizes into a set figure; an instrument has become an idol, a god has been made.

IV

The word "idol" should be taken literally. It is the image which gives permanent embodiment to the dream, the reflec-

tion, the breath, the shadow, the supernatural. It is a made thing. Its making is the definite agency, the validating event in the making of the gods. Deity owes its personal existence in no small degree to the artists in earths and words.

Consider Jahweh. Cruel god of a horde of nomadic invaders settling in a land of farmers, he had his images, ranging in elaboration from an uncut *mazzebah* or *asherah*, to a golden bull. He was plural by place and tribe and function. What did the prophetic movement do with his sacred powers? It identified his *taboos* with a written constitution. It made his worship blasphemous anywhere but in the temple in Jerusalem. It challenged, though it could not overthrow, his imaging in figures of metal and stone as pillar, as bull, as serpent. It did so not merely in speaking but in writing. Prophetic writings became sacred things. They established in enduring form the prescriptions and rites of Jahweh. They gave his political unity an advantage over the natural pluralism of tribe and locality. They assimilated to his original powers the powers of the Canaanite *baalim* of fertility. They rendered him omniscient. They estopped him from continuing to figure as a phallus, a serpent, a bull, and prevented him from becoming a man. He retained thus the primary indefiniteness, the impersonality of the supernatural and acquired the purposiveness of a human passion. Without the arresting force of the sacred word, this could not have happened. The word set a limit to the natural changes Jahweh could undergo, while the lack of other than verbal imagery kept his being flexible and adjustive.

Consider the Olympians. Miss Jane Harrison and Mr. Gilbert Murray have written beautifully and profoundly about them. Patriarchal mountain gods of conquering northmen, embodying perhaps eponymous heroes of the tribe, the rituals

of the agricultural economy of the autochthonoi are assimilated to their worship. Zeus, "the well-attested sky and rain god of the Aryan race," becomes Zeus Meilichios, and Zeus this, and Zeus that. His brothers and his children—Poseidon, Hades, Apollo, Athena, Dionysus, Hermes—become identified with especial domains of earth and sky and water, and worshipped as the ancestral and guardian divinities of particular localities and races. Maid and Son of fertility are assimilated to them; Zeus, in one account, marries Demeter and begets Dionysus, in another it is Persephone he marries; the rites designed to make the earth bring forth become forms of worship of these lords of heaven. Ghosts have been transformed into gods. Again, without the artist the transformation would have been dubious. Homer and Hesiod, Herodotus tells us, made the generation of these gods and gave them their names and distinguished their provinces and functions, and assigned them visible form and character. Plato does not like them or their behaviour. They kill, steal, and lie; they drink and philander; their conduct is the conduct of the chieftains of an invading army living off the land. Thus, as Nietzsche recognized, they are splendid. The vase-painter gives their adventures visible form and pattern; the architect and the dramatist, the metal worker, the painter, the sculptor all co-operate to fix them as a type of somatic excellence possible to men and women, designating their especial character by their vocational attributes, and sometimes by the ancient totemic beasts of field and grave whose *mana* they incarnated—by the bull, the goat, the sheep, the serpent, the owl. Their beginnings, like Jehovah's, are upright stones, called herms; the Pelasgian equivalents of the phallic *mazzebahs* and *ash-erahs*. These, the *points d'appui* of supernatural force, appear first with only the phallic tracings. In the course of time

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heads, shoulders, arms, torsos are added. Whole figures are finally shaped, and impersonal power has become a personality. And it has become an enduring personality, no longer dependent on uncertain memory or flesh that dies. Its body is lasting pigment, imperishable stone; itself is the glorious immortal that had been once the miserable dead pressing to be born again.

Perhaps as simple and interesting an example of the making of a god as any is the case of the Hindu god Soma. Soma is a very powerful god; he is described as in many respects far more mighty than any of his teeming fellows in that metropolitan area of celestial beings, India: mightier even than Indra or Brahma or Shiva or Kali or Krishna.

Now it happens that Soma is the name of a powerful beverage, a distillation of very hard liquor which the Brahmins make from the leaves of a certain mountain plant whose name is Soma. Soma is a drink that they partake of both convivially and in solemn ritual. They mix it sometimes with milk and mush and sometimes they take it neat. However they take it, it has a godlike kick. It is a drink not alone for the elect on earth; it is the immortal beverage of the Perfect Ones in heaven. Especially is it the beverage of the tawny war-god Indra and of his fighting company. Indra, like his cousins of Olympus and Valhalla, feasts mightily and drinks unendingly. Bullocks and Soma! When the afflatus of Soma permeates him, that is, when he is utterly drunk, he is omnipotent. He establishes the sun and the moon in their courses, he opens up the waters and he draws them back; he makes the grass to grow and the flocks to multiply, he drives back death and brings victory. He does whatever is needful to keep the world going. But he must have inexhaustible Soma to do it.

You will find in the ninth book of the Vedas one hundred and fourteen hymns devoted to Soma and its power; they tell the tale of Soma's great deeds. Mighty is Soma, the strength-giver of men and gods, therefore the God of gods, their maker and sustainer!

The tale tells itself. The deification of Soma is direct and simple. It follows by a naïve inevitable logic. It requires no higher criticism to light it up and render it plausible. The hypostatizing mechanism works without complications; the tool is transformed to an idol without rationalization; the labourer receiving the hire he is worthy of, lives in desuetude upon its usury. There is a parallel in Dionysus, but a parallel, as the disciples of Dr. Freud would say, "overdetermined." Dionysus is, like Soma, the drunkenness, the possession, the inspiration that is the force of wine and beer. His worship, as Miss Jane Harrison has shown, is a deification of a jag, the idolization of a drunk.

v

The gods then were made by the convergence and reaction upon one another of these influences: the natural scene, the supernatural forces, the ritual, the participants in the ritual, the ruling social order, the constraint to hypostatize the instrument and the poets and builders and artists. Once made, the order and conduct of the gods' divine being were pointed upon the affairs of men, and from their images in shrine and temple they modified such affairs according to their own interests and men's prayers. By means of their images and earthly habitations they became permanent constituents of the cultural setting of civilized men.

That civilized men should react to them critically as well as piously was inevitable: the modes in which the gods affected

life were too changeful and mutually contradictory. Among the Greeks, for example, there was already in Xenophanes' time an adverse judgment on their form of being, and by Plato's, their morality is under condemnation. Endeavours, more or less successful, are made to reform them, from Plato's day to Sallustius'. Zoroastrians and Chinese and Christians make similar endeavours.

What is regarded as evil is separated away from divinity, as scum from pure metal, and is denied reality,¹ or concentrated into another essence, all evil, the living Devil. The good gods and the bad devils are fashioned in the same way, and by convergence of the same forces. Angry ghosts of slain fathers or murdered sons, placated and driven out by primitive rites at sowing and harvest time, become fused with their exploiting rulers by conquered peoples; with the sullen resistance of the conquered, by the conquerors. Animal totemic traits and signs, carriers and instruments of power in the gods, become symbols of bestiality, malice and brutishness in the devils. Harpies and furies and sphinxes and sirens and gorgons and satyrs and centaurs are the graphic presentment of these transformations, which project social conflicts, class-rivalries, personal jealousies and national hatreds. By their coming, the Olympians degraded the ancestral and totemic shades and the living force of nature into an eternal underworld of evil, the sharp antithesis of the ethereal glory of the Jovian heavens. By its coming, Christianity degraded the high Olympians into demons, spirits of eternal evil incarnate, reinvested them with the tail and hoofs and horns that they had dropped, and banished them into a more horrible hell than Hades to serve under Satan till Christ come again. By its coming Zoroastrianism degraded

¹ Compare the abandonment of the harsher dogmas like infant damnation and the denaturing of Satan among modern Christians.

the old gods into the hordes of Ahriman, the eternal enemy and opponent of the pure, true and good Mazda, who took over all their beneficent functions. By its coming Socialism aims to degrade the gods and saints of Christianity and all religions into forces of evil and malice, while economic determinism takes over their providence in man's behalf. The Devil with all his animal attributes, remains a man of parts, and, *mutando mutandi*, might be Jehovah himself. . . .

We are in the presence, before the mutations here described, of what Nietzsche calls transvaluation of values. The *power* of the gods and the devils is the same power. It is embodiment and effect that vary, and these vary according to the class-relations and private passions in play. "Why," Friday asks Robinson Crusoe, "God no kill the devil?" Because, the answer is, Man the maker of both god and devil, needs him to ease his life. The Devil is the attributive source of all that man finds in himself to condemn and to eject from his own nature. He is the concretion of every force that violates a *taboo*, that obstructs a satisfaction, or that for any other reason awakens our hatred and jealousy. The Devil is the device by means of which our feelings of aversion and impulses to hurt and destroy are rendered acceptable to a society otherwise rejecting them. You can hate the Devil with perfect propriety, but you cannot hate your neighbour with perfect propriety; the Devil is the double of whatever aspect of your neighbour's being that you hate or envy. Satan's existence moralizes your indignation and enables you to endure yourself. Ultimately the Devil is the apotheosis of "passing the buck." Says Adam, "The woman tempted me," and it is an accepted opinion that the temptation did not originate with her. The origin was the serpent, Satan, who is Original Sin itself. Through Satan's means man sins, and not by his own fault. Satan is the tool

by which Original Sin is projected beyond human nature into the structure of the universe. Satan is the eternal scapegoat, who without expiating, carries away the sins of the world. He is made as God the Son was made, and for the same reason.

VI

Not knowingly were the first gods made. The forces that go to their composition worked unconsciously and men encountered their gods without realizing that they had fashioned them. Very early, however, priests and seers became aware of their own share in what it was their profession to perform. If the godhead was in them during trance and vision, so that priest was god and god was priest, priestly power was in godhead through ritual, which compels divinity to act according to the priestly will. Many, like Empedocles, claimed divinity for themselves. Others, like the Brahmins, claimed to be masters of the heavenly powers whom they could compel with their art. Still others knew they could and did make gods.

Making gods changed from spontaneous social process into a premeditated public policy, a civil power exercised by the heads of states, and rationalized by a claim of divine nature or divine descent, or both; usually, both. The Athenians decreed divine honours to Demetrius Poliorcetes and his father Antigonus. The Pharaohs of Egypt, the kings of Greece and Rome, the emperors of China and Japan, are divinely born and divinely descended. Rulers in Asia and India are described as divine, like the Chinese "son of heaven." Living gods are as plentiful over the Central Asian steppes as Fords in Kansas, and the Lama of Thibet is the incarnate high God himself. Alexander, the Seleucidæ, the Ptolemies, Augustus, either deified themselves and their relatives by proclamation or were deified, and were worshipped at many altars.

Their successors to this day, in Central Europe, claim to rule at least by "divine right."

Nor is the god-making function of states limited to claiming and proclaiming divinity. In China, before the republic, the head of the State maintained a celestial civil service. As late as 1906 he admitted Confucius to the State pantheon, and regularly he promoted and demoted divinities according to a merit system of works and days. His analogue in the West is the Roman Catholic Church which succeeded to the god-making powers of Emperor and Senate of Rome. The canonization of a saint, as of Joan of Arc, is the making of a minor God; the attributive redefinition of a major God, with the concomitant ordination of new festivals, new rites, new prayers, is the addition of another divinity to the higher pantheon. So God's mother, Mary, was finally admitted to this pantheon with the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, under the pressure of the universal worship of the Great Mother in the form of Isis, Cybele, Demeter, Diana, Aphrodite. Later, Joseph, her spouse, was added and at various times and on various occasions new attributes, functions, and symbols complicate the pantheon. Such are, for example, "the immaculate conception" of the virgin, "the sacred heart," and so on. Currently God-the-Son has been established in a new rôle and function, a new festival has been ordained for this with appropriate rites and celebration. Thus a new god enters the Roman Catholic pantheon. This God is "Christ the King." He is so established by the encyclical of Pope Pius XI, dated December 11, 1925. Says the Pope:

We ordained that the most important event, the sixteen hundredth anniversary of the Nicene Council, should be joyfully celebrated, and We commemorated it in the Vatican Basilica since that Council approved and pro-

posed as an article of Catholic faith that the Only Begotten Son is one in substance with the Father, and also inserted in its formula of faith or Symbol, "of whose Kingdom there will be no end," thus affirming the royal dignity of Christ.

Since, therefore, this Holy Year has given an opportunity for illustrating the Kingdom of Christ, We believe We shall be doing something entirely in keeping with Our Apostolical charge if, in answer to the prayers of very many of the faithful, addressed to Us either by individuals, or by groups, We should close the Holy Year by introducing into the ecclesiastical liturgy a special feast of Our Lord Jesus Christ as King.

Then, after an elaborate marshalling of reasons why Christ is to be worshipped as king, follows the ordination of the festival:

Very properly, therefore, you will agree that the Christian people, led by a divine instinct, wish to restore to this Jesus, Whom impious men were unwilling to receive when He came unto His own, all His royal rights, leading Him as they do from the silence and hiddenness of the sacred temples throughout the streets of the cities after the manner of one who is triumphant.

Therefore, to complete the design which We have mentioned, the Holy Year now closing affords the most favourable opportunity, since the most benign God, either by increased gifts of His grace or by new impulses to aspire for the better gifts, has confirmed the minds of the Faithful in their progress on the right way after the celestial good which surpasses all understanding. Whether, therefore, We consider the petitions addressed to Us, or record what has happened during the great Jubilee, there is every reason why We should at length appoint the day, earnestly desired by all, on which We decide Christ is to be worshipped as King of the whole human race by a proper and special feast.

For this Year, as we said in the beginning, this divine King, truly wonderful in His Saints, with a new array of

His soldiers raised to the heavenly honours, has been gloriously magnified; this Year also, by the unusual exposition of objects, and to some extent of the labours, it has been possible for all to admire the victories won by the heralds of the Gospel in spreading His kingdom; this Year, finally, by the solemn anniversary of the Nicene Council, We have commemorated the establishment of the truth that the Incarnate Word is consubstantial with the Father, and on this rests as on its foundation the empire of the same Christ over all peoples.

Therefore, by Our Apostolic authority, We institute the Feast of Our Lord Jesus Christ as King every year and in all the world on the last Sunday of the month of October, that is, the one just preceding the celebration of all the saints. We command also that on that day each year be renewed the dedication of the human race to the most Sacred Heart of Jesus which our predecessor Pius X, of holy memory, ordered to be repeated each year. For this year only We wish that this be done on the 31st of this month, on which day We Ourselves with Pontifical ritual will celebrate Mass in honor of Christ the King, ordaining that this same consecration be made in Our presence.

We believe We cannot close the Holy Year better, or more fittingly, nor give a greater expression of Our gratitude to Christ the Immortal King of ages, interpreting in this the grateful wishes also of the whole Catholic world for the benefits conferred upon Us during this holy time of the Church and upon the whole Catholic body.

Nor is there any reason, Venerable Brethren, why We should dwell long or in detail on the cause for decreeing a feast of Christ the King distinct from those others in which there is some intimation and celebration of His royal dignity. Suffice it to remark that although in all the feasts of Our Lord the material object, as it is called, be Christ, the formal object is altogether distinct from the royal power and title of Christ. Our reason for designating Sunday is that not only the clergy may pay their observances by celebrating Mass and reading the office, but that the people also, free from their usual occupations, may in the spirit of holy joy, obedience and service give their noble testimony to Christ.

The last Sunday of October, when the liturgical year is near its close, has seemed to Us more suitable than other days for this celebration. For thus it will happen that the mysteries of the life of Jesus Christ commemorated during the year will be completed and fulfilled by the sacred solemnity of Christ as King, and, before celebrating the glory of all the saints, the glory of Him Who triumphs in all the saints and elect will be preached and emphasized.

Let this, therefore, Venerable Brethren, be your task, let this be your share: to see that on stated days before this annual celebration sermons be preached to the people in every parish informing and instructing them accurately on the nature, manner and importance of the subject, so that they may arrange and conform their lives in such a manner as to be worthy of giving faithful and zealous tribute to the empire of the divine King.

Then follows a summary of the advantages which are expected to flow from the worship of King Christ:

May it please you, Venerable Brethren, in concluding these letters to set forth briefly what advantages We hope for and promise Ourselves from this public worship of Christ as King, both for the Church, for every society and for the good of all the Faithful. By paying these honours to the principality of Our Lord, we must call to mind that the Church, constituted as it is a perfect society by Christ, with a natural right, which it cannot relinquish, of demanding full liberty and immunity from the civil power in performing the duties divinely committed to it of teaching, ruling and leading to eternal happiness all those who are of Christ's Kingdom, cannot be dependent on any foreign power.

Nay, more, commonwealths should also give similar liberty to orders and congregations of religious of both sexes, who, since they are the most powerful auxiliaries of the Pastors of the Church in promoting and establishing the Kingdom of Christ, their principal labour, and in overcoming the threefold concupiscence of the world by

their religious vows, and by the profession of a more perfect life, so that the holiness which the divine Founder commended as a distinguishing mark of the Church may with increased splendour forever day by day stand out luminously before the eyes of all.

The very celebration of this festal day annually throughout the world will remind states that they, like private individuals, are bound as magistrates and rulers by the duty to worship and obey Christ publicly. It will recall to them the thought of that last judgment in which Christ, not only rejected from public affairs but also contemptuously neglected and ignored, will most severely avenge such injustice, since His royal dignity requires that every commonwealth conform to the divine commandments and Christian principles in making laws, in determining rights and in training the minds of the young to sound doctrine and moral integrity.

Besides, it is marvelous how much strength and virtue the Christian Faithful will derive from the consideration of these things in fashioning their souls after the model of a genuine Christian life. If to Christ the Lord is given all power in Heaven and on earth, if mortal men bought by His Most Precious Blood are subject to His sway by a certain new title, if, finally, this power embraces all human nature, it is clear that nothing in us is exempt from such an empire.

He must, therefore, reign in the mind of man, and man, with perfect submission, should assent firmly and constantly to revealed truth and all the doctrines of Christ. He must reign in the will, which should obey divine laws and precept. He must reign in the soul, which, denying its natural appetites, should love God above all things and adhere to Him alone. He must reign in the body and in its members, which as instruments, or, to use the words of the Apostle Paul, as "arms of justice unto God" (Romans vi., 13), should serve for the interior holiness of souls. If all these things be thoroughly laid open and proposed for the consideration of the Faithful, they will be more easily led to the most perfect things.

May it be, Venerable Brethren, that those who are not

of the faith may come to desire and accept the sweet yoke of Christ for their salvation, and that all of us who in the merciful designs of God are of the household may act not reluctantly but earnestly, lovingly and holily. By our life conformed to the laws of the divine kingdom, may we bring forth joyfully a harvest of fruits and, as good and faithful servants of Christ, become, in His celestial kingdom, partakers of everlasting blessedness and glory.

Let this wish and prayer of Ours for you, Venerable Brethren, be a token of Our paternal charity on the approach of the Nativity of Our Lord Jesus Christ, and, as a means of obtaining Divine blessings, accept the Apostolical Benediction which We lovingly impart to you, Venerable Brethren, and to your clergy and people.

Given at Rome at St. Peter's on the eleventh day of the month of December in the Holy Year 1925, the fourth of Our Pontificate.²

We have encountered functional divinity before. Christ as Saviour is not the same as Christ as King. Each of the functions of a god is a differentiated personification, as differentiated at least as the figures of the Christian trinity whose persons may not be confused any more than their substance may be divided. Each function expresses an especial and self-sufficient relationship between the worshipper and the divinity, a new activity designed to meet a new crisis. The summary of the advantages expected from the addition of this new god to the Catholic pantheon renders the nature of the crisis clear enough. In principle it is the old battle which church has waged against state in defence of its privileged status. Concretely, it is the conflict which as a sequel of the Great War was precipitated upon the church in Russia, in Central Europe, in Italy, in France, in the United States,

² These quotations are from a translation which appeared in the New York *World* at the time the Encyclical was issued.

in Mexico. The festival and worship of *King* Christ is the declaration of the hierarchy to the mass of the Catholics that it will not freely relinquish its privileges and its power, nor its claim to the supreme allegiance of mankind.

Here again,³ a god is made by convergence and reaction upon one another of the social scene, the practice of hypostasis, the ordainers of a ritual and the artists and craftsmen through whom the God is embodied.

The process is perennial. . . .

³ The Protestant parallel to the ordination of Christ as King is the ordination of Christ as Business Man in a book called "The Man Nobody Knows," a best-seller in the United States. Had this personality of Christ a hierarchy to establish it—

CHAPTER VIII

GODLESS RELIGIONS

I

RELIGION survives the gods it makes. As the worship of the gods supervenes upon a cultus in which there are yet no gods, so a cultus that rejects the gods supervenes upon the worship of gods. The connection between these three modes of religious behaviour is not simple. One does not replace the other in a straight line of succession. One branches from the other without destroying it. The three modes are contemporary as well as successive, and may exist at the same time in the same person. We all know men and women of liberal mind and kindly feelings, members of rationalist clubs, ethical culture societies, who "are not superstitious, but"—must touch wood when they tell of their good health; who "don't believe in the Jehovah of the Bible and the priests but"—would rather not take his name in vain. Such persons when pushed insist that their religion is the "ethical religion" or the "rationalist religion" and that only, that the gods are outgrown myths and symbols, that touching wood is just a habit; their vote would be for godless religion, and they would insist that it *is* religion though godless; indeed, all the more religion, because godless. Recall Mr. Bernard Shaw's account of an *experimentum crucis* in a gathering where such people were. Mr. Shaw writes in the Preface to "Back to Methuselah":

One evening in 1878 or thereabouts, I, being then in my earliest twenties, was at a bachelor party of young

men of the professional class in the house of a doctor in the Kensingtonian quarter of London. They fell to talking about religious revivals; and an anecdote was related of a man who, having incautiously scoffed at the mission of Messrs. Moody and Sankey, a then famous firm of American evangelists, was subsequently carried home on a shutter, slain by divine vengeance as a blasphemer. A timid minority, without quite venturing to question the truth of the incident—for they naturally did not care to run the risk of going home on shutters themselves—nevertheless shewed a certain disposition to cavil at those who exulted in it; and something approaching to an argument began. At last it was alleged by the most evangelical of the disputants that Charles Bradlaugh, the most formidable atheist on the Secularist platform, had taken out his watch publicly and challenged the Almighty to strike him dead in five minutes if he really existed and disapproved of atheism. The leader of the cavillers, with great heat, repudiated this as a gross calumny, declaring that Bradlaugh had repeatedly and indignantly contradicted it, and implying that the atheist champion was far too pious a man to commit such a blasphemy. This exquisite confusion of ideas roused my sense of comedy. It was clear to me that the challenge attributed to Charles Bradlaugh was a scientific experiment of a quite simple, straightforward, and proper kind to ascertain whether the expression of atheistic opinions really did involve any personal risk. It was certainly the method taught in the Bible, Elijah having confuted the prophets of Baal in precisely that way, with every circumstance of bitter mockery of their god when he failed to send down fire from heaven. Accordingly I said that if the question at issue were whether the penalty of questioning the theology of Messrs. Moody and Sankey was to be struck dead on the spot by an incensed deity, nothing could effect a more convincing settlement of it than the very obvious experiment attributed to Mr. Bradlaugh, and that consequently if he had not tried it, he ought to have tried it. The omission, I added, was one which could easily be remedied there and then, as I happened to share Mr. Bradlaugh's

views as to the absurdity of the belief in these violent interferences with the order of nature by a short-tempered and thin-skinned supernatural deity. Therefore—and at that point I took out my watch.

The effect was electrical. Neither sceptics nor devotees were prepared to abide the result of the experiment. In vain did I urge the pious to trust in the accuracy of their deity's aim with a thunderbolt, and the justice of his discrimination between the innocent and the guilty. In vain did I appeal to the sceptics to accept the logical outcome of their scepticism: it soon appeared that when thunderbolts were in question there were no sceptics. Our host, seeing that his guests would vanish precipitately if the impious challenge were uttered, leaving him alone with a solitary infidel under sentence of extermination in five minutes, interposed and forbade the experiment, pleading at the same time for a change of subject. I of course complied, but could not refrain from remarking that though the dreadful words had not been uttered, yet, as the thought had been formulated in my mind, it was very doubtful whether the consequence could be averted by sealing my lips. However, the rest appeared to feel that the game would be played according to the rules, and it mattered very little what I thought so long as I said nothing. Only the leader of the evangelical party, I thought, was a little preoccupied until five minutes had elapsed and the weather was still calm.

Historically, godless religions need not reject the being of the gods. Godless religions need only reject the power of the gods. The teaching of Epicurus is a godless religion; Buddhism used to be a godless religion. Both admit that gods exist, but both refuse to them the competency and status of supernatural causes, or even of mere vehicles of supernatural force. To the Epicureans, gods were celestial beings made of a finer clay than men and troubling themselves with nothing save their own happiness. So they were to the Buddhists. Under Karma like the rest of us, the gods were yet pos-

sessed of superior and less limited bodies, were swifter and surer in movement, and lived longer and more pleasantly. Toward the world their relation was like that of the Epicurean divinities: they had not created it, and could neither destroy it nor interfere with it. Both religions set above the gods a "nature" or "law" that made them and would, in the fulness of time, destroy them. In this law lay the power of the supernatural which is salvation. Confucianism, which is an extraordinarily tensile system of abstractions revered as a way of life, makes more of the gods than either Buddhism or Epicureanism, since it admits them on the level of custom, but holds the same essential attitude toward them. Taoism, which shares with Buddhism and Confucianism the religious allegiance of the teeming hundred millions of China, rejected the gods as illusions. Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism are acknowledged religions of the Far East; the first beginning in India, the other two being indigenous to China. Epicureanism is not acknowledged as a religion; it is a way of life formulated in the Hellenistic West. Between it and its eastern compeers there is not only the contrast of tone, attitude, doctrine, programme, there is a gulf of years (the Oriental religions antedate Epicureanism by many centuries), and there is an ironic contrast in power and influence. Epicureans were ever a handful while Buddhists, Taoists and Confucians had ever their uncountable myriads; Epicureans were confined to the intellectual classes, and soon lapsed from the foreground of religious thought and practice; the Oriental religions grew constantly in the number of communicants; they became churches, with organized rituals, complex hierarchies and much property—and they made on their own account new gods. Epicureanism stayed godless and impotent. Taoism, Buddhism and Confucianism remain as powerful to-day as they

ever were, but it is long since they have been godless, longer since their doctrine was pure.

II

The contemporary Occidental parallels for their first intentions are Positivism and Socialism. Socialism, as morcellated into sects as any of the great Oriental godless religions, is the most powerful and influential of the Occidental ones. Positivism owns the allegiance of a small body of followers in Europe and America. In addition to these greater godless Occidental cults, there are smaller ones made up of various sects of anarchists, rationalists, ethical culturists, atheists. I call all these groups cults because they are conscious of their dangers and needs and have positive beliefs as to what will satisfy and save them; because they are organized groups, that meet regularly to hear and expound the saving gospels and to pronounce their appropriate liturgies. There are other groups, not less conscious of their needs and dangers, and of their saving beliefs. But they are not organized into societies; they do not meet primarily for the purpose of hearing and benefiting by the saving gospel; they do not formally realize a religious intent. These groups are composed of the people who speak or write of "the religion of Beauty," "the religion of science," "the religion of humanity"; of the great masses in whom the emotions that used to attach to the gods have been transferred to the State, its instruments and symbols,¹ whose religion is "patriotism"; of the selected individuals to whom for

¹ How overruling this godless religion becomes may be seen in the subjoined quotation from an appointed official of the greatest American municipality. Note the hierophantic tone of the language, note the unconscious deification of an American chief magistrate, a member and tool of "the Ohio gang," whose weak will, weaker intellect and dubious public

a generation "Evolution," especially as "creative evolution," has become the infallible saving force from the ills flesh is heir to. The vogue of Bergson's weakest book—it was a best-seller when it first appeared and is still going strong—in which he celebrates the saving power of evolution by means of the appreciating attribution "creative," testifies to the number and urge of these individuals, of whom the late Samuel Butler and the vivid Mr. Bernard Shaw are among the most distinguished.

Mr. Shaw counts Nietzsche as a forerunner of this cult and the "Superman" as the projection of a self-realizing goal of the "will-to-power," or "life-force," which alone can save the self from itself. The human world has gone smash, Mr. Shaw declares, in that passionate Preface to "Back to Methu-

morality contributed considerably to the aggravation of the scandals which exalted his administration high above others.

Mr. George J. Ryan, President of the Board of Education of the City of New York, laments the passing of Warren G. Harding, President of the United States of America.

"On the 3d of August our beloved Republic was plunged into the horror of a most harrowing woe through the startling demise of our revered President, Warren G. Harding. It will not suffice for the Board of Education to merely join with the Nation in the common expression of profound grief. The schools of New York City have inscribed indelibly on the hearts of its citizens the creed of inspired patriotism. Our schools have edified each child of our municipality with the belief that he is his country; utters the voice of his country, pulses with its heart, vibrates with its aims and is inspired with its ideals.

"To our children the Chief Executive of the Nation has always been the personality of the Republic. He robed the invisible body of the state, made it actual and instilled an abiding faith in the reality. It is our duty as leaders of the school system to firmly intrench that sanctified reverence of our departed President. It is our part to cherish his memory with a halo of love. It is our responsibility to give unity to the sentiment of commiseration in our children.

"In order that the members of this board may take the leadership in actuating a befitting pathos at the loss of our extolled President, we may to-day set aside our temporal affairs arranged for this meeting and indulge in its place those spiritual contemplations that are the only palliative of an irrevocable loss to the world."

selah," through the weight of the difficulties it has made for itself. Present-day man can't solve the problems of his own civilization. He is under the obsession of a false teaching—whose *fons et origo* is Darwin—that "improvement can come only through a senseless accident" and is wiped out by some other equally "senseless accident." The doctrine that man is helpless keeps him from trying to help himself. It is vicious teaching, an error as science, a stupidity as morals. "The will to do anything," Mr. Shaw declares, "can and does at a certain pitch and intensity set up by the conviction of its necessity, create and organize new tissue to do it with." And this is the cardinal doctrine of Creative Evolution—"the genuinely scientific religion for which all wise men are now anxiously looking." This is the whole revelation of the religion of the twentieth century. The religion is young yet. Its vitalist teaching has no circumstantially elaborated ideology and no adequate imagery that shall pass it on to the expectant public. At hand so far is only "the Superman," provided by Nietzsche, re-envisioned by Mr. Shaw in his play *Man and Superman*. More images are required; life calls upon the artist for a new vitalist art. "Back to Methuselah" is Mr. Shaw's answer, in the fulness of his years, to this call: "I now find myself inspired to make a second legend of Creative Evolution without distraction and embellishments. My sands are running out; the exuberance of 1901 has aged into the garrulity of 1920; and the war has had a stern intimation that the matter is not one to be trifled with. I abandon the legend of Don Juan with its erotic associations, and go back to the legend of the Garden of Eden. I exploit the eternal interest of the philosopher's stone which enables men to live forever. I am not, I hope, under more illusion than is humanly inevitable as to the crudity of this my beginning of a Bible

for Creative Evolution. I am doing the best I can at my age. My powers are waning; but so much the better for those who found me unbearably brilliant when I was in my prime. It is my hope that a hundred apter and more elegant parables by younger hands will soon leave mine as far behind as the religious pictures of the fifteenth century left behind the first attempts of the early Christians at iconography. In that hope I withdraw and ring up the curtain."

I rather suspect that the destiny of the Shavian contribution to "the Bible of Creative Evolution" rests with a lucky turn of one of Mr. Darwin's senseless accidents. Mr. Shaw makes use of the word "God." But the God he uses has none of the attributes we customarily designate divinity by, even the divinity of the pantheist. It is "life-force" and nothing more. Turn now to the religion of a comrade of Mr. Shaw's, who rejects not only the "God" of tradition, but the very word. I refer once more to Mr. Bertrand Russell, a man of as profound an essential piety as Mr. Shaw, who far far more than the latter would seem free from the taint, if it be a taint, of any belief in the supernatural whatsoever. Mr. Russell may be said to accept the causal efficacy of the "senseless accidents" of Darwinism. Professional religionists would call him an atheist. He takes his stand on the methods and conclusions of the sciences of nature and man. No philosophy can stand that rejects them, and they show, he argues, that man is an incident in a world which wasn't made for him; he is born, he suffers, he dies. What salvation is there for man in such a world? "How," Mr. Russell asks in "A Free Man's Worship," "in such an alien and inhuman world, can so powerless a creature as Man preserve his aspirations untarnished? A strange mystery it is that Nature, omnipotent but blind, in the revolutions of her secular hurryings through the abysses

of space, has brought forth at last a child, subject still to her power, but gifted with sight, with knowledge of good and evil, with the capacity of judging all the works of his unthinking Mother. In spite of Death, the mask and seal of the parental control, Man is yet free, during his brief years, to examine, to criticize, to know, and in imagination to create. To him alone in the world with which he is acquainted, this freedom belongs; and in this lies his superiority to the resistless forces that control his outward life . . . in thought, in aspiration, we are free, free from our fellowmen, free from the petty planet on which our bodies impotently crawl, free even, while we live, from the tyranny of death. Let us learn, then, that energy of faith which enables us to live constantly in the vision of the good; and let us descend in action, into the world of fact with that vision always before us. . . . Freedom comes only to those who no longer ask of life that it shall yield them any of these personal goods that are subject to the mutations of Time. . . . To take into the inmost shrine of the soul the irresistible forces whose puppets we seem to be—Death and change, the irrevocableness of the past, the powerlessness of man before the blind hurry of the universe from vanity to vanity—to feel these things and know them is to conquer them. . . . The past . . . its beauty . . . to a soul which has conquered Fate . . . is the key of religion. . . . To abandon the struggle for private happiness, to expel all eagerness of temporary desire, to burn with passion for eternal things—this is emancipation, and this is the free man's worship."

Notice what this eloquent and moving thinker has done here. Behold, he bids us, the inexorable chain of causation that binds us to the wheel of misfortune. Look upon the march of events that we cannot alter, that bring us in the end

to death. No philosophy which denies this observation can stand. Yet, proclaims our prophet, by the power of thought within us we are able to overcome the unconquerable and to resist the irresistible, to break the bonds that bind us and stand free. Could the supernatural do more, under the circumstances? Can the power of thought be less than supernatural to accomplish this? Our prophet himself calls it a mystery and to us, onlooking, can it appear less than a miracle? What else has ever brought us salvation from that from which, under Nature, we could not be saved? Here is the cosmic crisis wherein we find ourselves from birth to death. Mr. Russell regrets the end of life. He seems quite disturbed about the termination which is death, even as he is deeply moved by the insecurity and the fatuity of the daily round which is existence. Now let us ponder the question—How, in principle, power and function, is the might of thought different from the shadow and the dream-image and the reflection and the breath that incarnate the supernatural, and that as gods own a similar omnicompetency for salvation?

III

What Mr. Russell does in this paragraph or two, each of the sophisticated godless religions—all those that have looked upon the gods and then have passed them by and left them behind—does in its own way. The Positivists and the Taoists and Confucians, the Socialists and Anarchists and the other *ists*, make use of the same mechanism. Each confronts a crisis. The crisis may reside in the insuperable quality of the intellectual position that honesty of conviction imposes upon a reluctant heart. The crisis may be due to the intolerable hardships that the social structure compels masses of men to suffer. The crisis may be due to the bitter conflict of em-

battled inward impulses all of which cannot be realized at the same time. The godless religion is sophisticated and reflective. It is disillusioned. It begins by evaluating the situation. It judges, as Mr. Russell does, and it condemns. It rejects ends and instruments. It withdraws from the social structure. It turns its back on the business of living. All is pain and evil. Hearken to the Buddhists: "Birth is suffering, age is suffering, illness is suffering, death is suffering; contact with what we dislike is suffering, separation from what we like is suffering, failure to attain what we crave is suffering—in brief, all that makes bodily existence is suffering."

And listen to Chauang Tzu, a Taoist philosopher of the third and fourth centuries B.C.: "But what is a pure man? The pure men of old acted without calculation, not seeking to secure results. They laid no plans. Therefore, failing, they had no cause for regret; succeeding, no cause for congratulation. And thus they could scale heights without fear; enter water without becoming wet, and fire without feeling hot. The pure men of old slept without dreams, and waked without anxiety. They ate without discrimination, breathing deep breaths. . . . What they cared for could be reduced to One, and what they did not care for to One also. That which was One was One, and that which was not One was likewise One. . . . The pure men of old did not know what it was to love life or to hate death. . . . They did not forget whence it was that they had sprung, neither did they seek to hasten to return thither." They just were.

Withdrawal similarly distinguishes Jainism, Sankhya, Buddhism and many other atheistic faiths. Rejecting the life of Man as it is, the godless religion formulates a programme of new life which men come together to carry out. The programme is omnicompetent to save from the crisis, to save

now, and to save forever. The Way, whether it be just Tao, or the Eightfold Path of Buddha or the withdrawal of the soul into itself of Sankhya, possesses the *mana* that is characteristic of the supernatural. It is the supernatural. That is why these religions, which begin by rejecting the gods and build an initial way of salvation without them, *are* religions.

To some cults, the rejection of the gods is itself the salvation. Every so often we hear associations of atheists who preach a millennium to be attained by means of the universal conviction of atheism. Belief in the gods, they say, divides men, makes them mean, narrow, clannish, hypocritical; keeps them ignorant of the truth and unjust to one another; causes war and disaster. Convince men that the gods do not exist and you set them free of the dominion of fear and the domination of priests. You enable them to correct the evils that beset them and to undertake the pursuit of positive goods. Lucretius wrote passionately of the salvation that is possible through the lifting of fear of the gods; the Hindu Carvakas described the Vedas as rubbish; atheists of our own time, like the members of the British Rationalist Press Association, are moved by as intense a conviction. Their faith in the saving power of godlessness constitutes a religion. The destruction of the belief in God is endowed by this faith with the redemptive omnicompetence that distinguishes the supernatural from other kinds of cause.

IV

Most of the modern godless religions are not however so simple. Their infidelity is the obverse of positive faith. They reject the gods because they accept something else that unawares or knowingly they hold to be more powerful than the gods to accomplish the ever precious and ever dubious end.

Positivism, Ethical Culture, Socialism, are godless religions of this kind. Auguste Comte's "religion of humanity" is fixed in character by a set of philosophic and technological postulates which cannot be accepted without rejecting the gods. Accepting the postulates is salvation. Thereby feelings that used to attach to the gods as the guarantors of security are transferred to the Positivist principles and its symbols. Piety, awe, reverence and adoration are now the due of the machinery of Positivism and to it belongs the omniscience that was aforetime the gods'. These once mighty vehicles of supernatural force have now been degraded from their high estate to the precivilized level of myth and abstraction. Their *mana* endures, nevertheless, and their work gets done. Positivism is a new engine, but with an ancient drive.

Ethical Culture presents the same basic anatomy. But it retains more of the traditional essence in its doctrine and rejects more in its practice. The "Moral Law" which for it replaces the gods, impersonal and atheistic though its intent be, retains some of the deities' affectional flavour. One senses it as perhaps the last distillation and whiff of personality but most certainly of personality. In its view, myths, theologies and the like recapitulate the moral insight of the race and provide the material for the education of the young through the stages of growing up. The gods are rejected, but not condemned, nor is a pantheon of exalted men set up for reverence against them. The Moral Law is of the kinship of the gods and a recognized vehicle for supernatural force. Where it had been a secondary instrument of salvation—the "will" of the gods—it is made a primary one, authoritative in its own right, and the gods are conceived not as secondary but as incident to its workings. As they used to be, now it is salvation. Obedience to its mandate makes heaven on earth; disregard

makes the hellish earth we know. Constant effort, constant attention, here and now, can realize the Moral Law for us and, realizing, save us.

This "ethical religion" is the religion of very small congregations of the well-to-do in great cities in the United States, England and one or two continental countries. Dr. Felix Adler, its founder, was a rabbi who could not go the Judaism he had been trained to profess nor the secularism he had not been trained for. His most effective adherents, the leaders of his various congregations, are often clerically-trained, former clergymen in the same case as their head. His communicants appear to be largely recruited from Jews and to have some parallel to the Adlerian conflict in their own lives. Like some of the more mystical but more secularized Quakers, they make up a small body of high-minded, liberally-disposed citizens of their respective communities, given to the serious consideration of social problems and the performance of good works, exercising an influence altogether disproportionate to their numbers in civic affairs and social reforms, and remaining utterly without effect on the dominant religious tradition. In that domain they are consequences rather than causes.

The reason, if there be a reason, is that they stand in the religious world at the point of exhaustion of the tradition before it passes over into frank Socialism. Ethical Culture is the last faint breath of the Holy Ghost. In Anarchism and Socialism, on the other hand, the tradition has passed definitely over into its opposite. Gods, priests, churches, become integers of evil in the heavy burden civilization lays upon the masses of men. They are episodes in the inexorable unfolding of a conflict that must culminate in a catastrophe. This conflict is nothing disorderly. Its sequences are the expression of a metaphysical principle—the principle of economic deter-

minism in society and material determination in history. Under this principle, mankind is ever divided into two classes—bourgeois, capitalists who possess and control the tools and materials whereby men get their sustenance out of the earth, and proletarians, workers who possess only their children and control only the strength of their hands. Between these two classes there goes on an eternal class-struggle. History is the unfolding of this struggle: the process by which the rich grow ever richer and the poor grow ever poorer and more miserable. But poverty and pain are not the eternal lot of the poor. The wealth of the world is the work of their hands. Did they but know it, they could take back what they have made and live forever in brotherhood and happiness. To know it is their salvation. More and more they must become class-conscious, until the workmen of all the world are united against their exploiters. Then there will take place the Social Revolution. The present order will be overthrown. There will be no rich nor poor. There will be only a great community, where all will work alike and alike enjoy the common fruits of their work in amity and happiness.

If this millennial state is conceived of as one in which all association is voluntary and spontaneous and each person exists primarily in and for himself alone, the religion is called Anarchism. If the millennial state is conceived of as a complex organization of society which by the necessity of its nature possesses and uses the tools of production for the benefit of all, and of which by the same necessity each person is an organic part that derives his character from his relation to the whole, the religion is called Socialism or Communism. Each form of this faith has its prophets and seers, its sacred texts, its liturgies, its hymns, its schools, its heresies and its sects. Each attributes to its doctrine and programme the omnicompetence,

the salvational power that had been the essential thing in the gods. Each, in establishing its doctrine, rejects the gods as vehicles of supernatural force, each denies supernatural force elsewhere, each, in effect, asserts supernatural force in its own *dory*. For the one unmistakable differentia of the supernatural, let us always remember, is its infallible power to resolve crises which the powers of nature have failed to resolve. And this is the infallible power that is claimed for these schemes of salvation. It is the belief that they are possessed of this power, the belief in their omnicompetence to save, that in the first instance makes them religions.

v

Like a good many vehicles of the supernatural, traditional and untraditional, godless religions are not born as religions; some achieve that status, some have it thrust upon them. Intention is here more or less indifferent. Distress will clutch at anything for relief, and when it reaches the pervasiveness or the intensity or both, which is the characteristic preliminary to the religious reaction, it will fix on any image or formula or liturgical system that time and place and occasion throw into the foreground. This is why "science," in the eyes of convention now and ever anti-religious by nature and behaviour, can become an object of religious belief. This is how there came to be religions of "humanity," of "beauty," of "health," of "vegetarianism," of "antivivisection" and all their tribe. The founders of Socialism and Anarchism and the like did not know that they were the founders of religions. They figured in their own minds as destroyers of religion. But their formulations of the perennial human crises provided a happy destiny for men to love, a present evil for them to hate and a rule of behaviour and belief that should inaugurate the

one and exterminate the other. Functionally God and the Devil and the Law of God are as operative in Socialism and Anarchism as in the orthodoxies that as a rule go by the name of religion. And Socialism and Anarchism envisage forces and adjust a life with regard to them that the religious tradition could not have anticipated and possesses no means to meet. Their programmes become thus precious instruments undergoing hypostasis. One doctrine, one way, of many possible alternatives, becomes right doctrine, right way. An orthodoxy sets itself up. The tool is defunctionated into an idol. *Das Kapital* becomes a bible, every letter sacred and immutable, every meaning ambiguous. Karl Marx becomes a prophet, on the way to deity. Lenin becomes a great saint of the church. A school of priestly interpreters grows up in whose keeping is the definition of true doctrine. Sects and heresies, of course, become instant and aggressive. A canonical calendar emerges, with its high festivals, like May Day, saints' days, and so on.

The process is even clearer in the "religion of patriotism," for much in that is of ancient tradition; much foreordained. We have already noted the easy deification of even a personage like the late Mr. Harding just because he had been the head of the government, and we know that the sanctity of officials is of a piece with the divinity that had hedged shamans, medicine men and kings since neolithic days. "The flag" has become holier than the "cross" and the suggestion of an affront to it gives rise to passion that only religions can parallel for unreasonableness and intensity. But the process of hypostasis in which godless religions are tangled up is manifest nowhere so neatly as in the deification of the written constitution of the United States of America. The origins and motives of that constitution are matters of common knowledge. They are not presumably things buried in remote

antiquity and overlaid with the mysteries of divine lawgivers uttering the voice of God. Yet that is what they are by way of becoming. Supreme Court decisions refer to the divine inspiration of "the Fathers," to their provident wisdom and the like. The articulate and vocal sections of the possessing public announce that every word of the document is holy; that in it "the Fathers" received the deposit of political faith, infallible, inalterable, everlasting, that no impious voice may question, no heretical hand seek to change. Yet it was the same wise fathers who had risked their heads and pockets to declare that governments were tools, and to be changed when they failed to work, and who described the constitution they made (for their own very private advantage, as well as the public good) as a tool, and provided for its alteration. The elevation of an instrument of government into a palladium of property is as clear a case of hypostasis of the instrument as appears among godless religions.

The modern instances have, of course, their peers in antiquity. Buddhism and Taoism, Jainism and Epicureanism and Confucianism have their well-known sacred scriptures, and what is more, have brought to birth divinities out of their very godlessness. To Lucretius, Epicurus is nothing if not a god, and the divinity of Siddhartha the Buddha, of Confucius, of Lao-Tze, however rationalized, is supreme among their following. For their masses of worshippers they have become environed with a populous pantheon, recruited, like Jehovah's, from the cults their teachings rejected and combated. Whether such a pantheon will appear in the case of Socialism is problematical in a world dominated by science and machine industry. Comte, following the example set by the Catholic Church into which he was born, tried to make one, with hardly any effect; he prepared a saints' calendar

of the birthdays of the "benefactors of humanity," with appropriate feasts and rituals. On the other hand, that Marx and Lenin are, in Russia at least, more specific divine personalities than the rather abstract "Fathers" in the United States any one can see who is familiar with the current literature of Socialism and American patriotism.

To conclude: There can be, there are, religions without gods. In such religions the objects of worship are usually programmes of personal reformation or social change which are believed to have the power once and for all to establish man in security and happiness in this, his world. That is, they are infallible and omniscient; they have the quality which characterizes the supernatural. This supernatural in its traditional embodiments they nevertheless reject, denying to the gods power or existence or both. At the same time, they generate their own sacred canons, their orthodoxies, their prophets, their priests, their professional interpreters, and their rituals; and in the course of time, often very speedily, their own divinities.

CHAPTER IX

CHURCHES

I

RELIGION is older than the gods and survives them; the gods are older than their churches and die with them. In the history of religions, churches are secondary and derivative. Religion comes first as a family or clan or personal endeavour to win the services of supernatural force in situations not otherwise controllable. Out of this endeavour a priestly caste comes into being and the gods are born. The recognized existence of specialists in the manipulation of the gods becomes the point of departure for a new system of relationships, a new mode of association between men and gods. This new system constitutes a church. It is a separate and distinct institution of society. It has its own traditions, its own learning and its own scheme of education for transmitting its knowledge and training its generations of experts. It has its own household and its own household economy. It bears the same relation to the rest of the community as any other institution seeking to live and to grow in and with the complex striving disorder of works and beliefs we call civilization.

Since the Protestant Reformation in Europe, churches have multiplied and their importance has decreased. The reformation was itself postulated on the principle that the relation between a man and his gods—or at least their revealed word—was primary and direct. It repudiated the well-known doc-

trine of Roman Catholicism that only through the mediation of a church, *i.e.*, through the intervention of professional mediators, of a priesthood, can a man establish communication with his gods. Indeed, the essential of Modernist thought is the view that a man's religion is a matter of his private conscience, and nobody's business besides. Nevertheless, the institutional habit is so deeply ingrained in the social inheritance of the moderns that a religion without an institutional setting is difficult to conceive. A private conscience becomes, in religion, a public revelation, and if it has no church to sustain it, it will make one for itself.

So far as religion exercises a recognizable modifying influence upon society, it does so through the medium of churches. Let us, then, inspect the general structure of the church, and get a view of its anatomy.

On first appearance the institution, however small and poor the example may be, looks pretty complicated.

The first thing that presents itself to the attention is certain properties, land and buildings, inevitably. In each cult, the buildings have a certain preordained and set form. Their appearance to the eye, outside, embodies age-old religious symbols, governing their architectural organization, such as the cruciform ground-plan and the spires of the Christian houses of worship, or the layout of the temple of Jehovah in Jerusalem, and the temples of the gods of Greek and other pagans. Inside, the arrangement is first such as considerations of astronomy and meteorology might require: the shrine must, for example, be set against the east wall; the high point must be under this constellation or that. Secondly, the arrangement is such as will facilitate the execution of the priestly ritual; it is functionally co-ordinated with the ritual. On the whole and in the long run, you will know a house of worship

when you see one. In the rare cases where its exterior is not revealing, its interior cannot be mistaken. A public building for the manipulation of the supernatural as a rule bears its character unmistakably on its face.

The upkeep of land and buildings, together with the other costs of maintaining the ecclesiastical institutions, are met, of course, through membership fees, pew rents, gifts, donations, contributions and the many other familiar and acknowledged sources of income of the churches—we shall advert to those in due time—but one that comes rarely under the public eye, at least in the United States, consists of landed possessions and endowments. The aggregated wealth of the Roman Catholic Church compares very favourably with the possessions of more than one European state; national established churches, like the Church of England, often have holdings that make them wealthier proprietors than the Crown; the property of Trinity Parish in New York City, brought to notoriety by the uncovering of the horror and degradation of some of its tenement holdings whence flowed treasure for the glory of the Saviour of mankind, compares favourably with large State possessions. Wherever in the civilized world a church is found, there possessions accrue to it that add to its “spiritual” power the force and influence which wealth has everywhere. Buddhist temples, Jewish synagogues, Mohammedan mosques, the Brahmin dervals, Mazdan shrines, pagodas of the Chinese or the organization of which they are parts, figure as corporate property-holders. The property may be very little, as it so often is among dissenting Christian sects—the Methodist and Baptist congregations, for example, of the hill-folk of Tennessee—but property they do have and do aim to hold and to get.

To the possessions of churches certain privileges pertain

that do not attach to secular properties. Church buildings are holy. They are sacred precincts upon whose handling rest definite *taboos*. These *taboos* in varying degrees and manners extend to church lands and church securities. Church lands often are sacred precincts, too. The sanctities begin with graveyards.

Graveyards are the earliest and most primitive holy places. Before all things they are sacred in their own right; very often they are attached to the churches, and the same feeling of fear and reverence that the dead evoke are extended to the house and lands which are associated with their last resting-place. Indeed, the potency of the fact of death and the memory of the dead in religious emotion is amply demonstrated in the story of the modern graveyard. In our own time burial has been exclusively a religious exercise, carried out in consecrated ground, ground to which were attached religious shrines and divine domiciles. Steadily during the last quarter of a century, burial has become more and more a business enterprise, conducted by individual laymen or lay corporations. These offer you, through the public prints, "choice burial lots at reasonable rates." The lots have no connection with the churches. The eternal freeholds they offer are cheaper than the temporal tenements of your daily habitation. They offer you moreover the guaranteed care of your grave. The whole matter is a secular enterprise which illustrates as aptly as anything Modernism can provide the transformation which the modern way of life is working upon old sanctities. There will be occasion to come back to this theme. The point at present is the fact that to the graveyard which was holy before there were churches, holiness is later imputed because of its connection with churches that derived their sanctity from it; yet when business enterprise once more detaches the graveyard from

the church—it retains its sacred character, and continues to be treated with a different kind of respect from that accorded to centres of political interest, like the capitol in Washington or centres of financial interest, like the bank of the house of Morgan, in New York. This is because the graveyard implies if it does not reveal the presence of supernatural force, or of the power to manipulate supernatural force; ecclesiastical power, in short.

By a sort of emotional contagion, this *mana* extends to all known church properties, and the privileged status it endows them with extends under the law to all unknown ones. The known ones other than graveyards, are health-restoring and child-giving agencies. These often are older than the churches which hold title to them; they were there first, and the churches have grown up around them, and attained primacy over them. Such are ancient healing springs or wells; such are localities sacred through their places in the biographies of gods and saints, to see and touch which is healing and renewing. All such places are sacred property. From them, too, a sanctity spreads to neighbouring lands. Anything which a church acquires gets religious potency by contagion.

Though nearly all such properties are now corporate, the ancient world knew many ones privately owned and managed. A priest could establish himself at an old shrine or set up a new one, to practise his profession, as nowadays a physician or a Christian Science healer might take over an old practice or set up a new one. Christian Science, in its beginnings, the Zionite cult in the Zion City of John Alexander Dowie during his lifetime, the church of Father André, the miraculous healer of Montreal, Canada, are modern parallels that come to mind. But such parallels are observable only in the case of dissident and new-fangled revelations, and even those,

when they succeed and feel themselves respectably established, become, like the Christian Science properties, corporate. In the modern world, and to a great degree in the ancient and mediæval worlds, ownership of religious properties is vested either in a corporation which is the church itself, or in the State. Independent ecclesiastical establishments, like the Roman Catholic Church, entrust the keeping and administration of their properties to the high officials of the hierarchy, the bishops and the like; evangelical sects invest ownership in the congregation, administration in a board or vestry. The State is the formal owner of the church properties in England, but possession by usage is so integral a part of the tradition of ownership of these properties that "disestablishment" may be possible only as an item of a more general social revolution. It is the Church which looks after the properties, rents them, repairs them, develops them, assigns livings and so on. The holder of the properties of the Mormon Church is the Council of Elders or Apostles, a self-perpetuating administrative group, with economic interests—say, in beet sugar—that require a lobby in Washington, the membership of one of the Elders in the United States Senate.

II

Next to the "real" properties of churches come those which have formal and obvious ecclesiastical functions: the tools used in the celebration of the church rites—like sacred books, such as scrolls of the law, Bibles, psalters, hymnals, missals, prayer books; like musical instruments, such as ram's horns, trumpets, harps, organs, tom-toms, and the whole range of percussion and wind instruments; like ecclesiastical vestments, such as the robe, the frock, the surplice, the cassock, the eileton,

the chasuble, the cape, the stole, the cowl, the mitre, the biretta; ecclesiastical tools like the cross, the crozier, the monstrance, the candles, the beads, the font, the holy water, the holy oil, the pyx, the prayer-wheel, the prayer-shawl, the phylacteries, the incense, the holy relics; ecclesiastical food and drink, like the consecrated wafers and sacramental wines, the fermented milk, the clarified butter, the soma juice, the unleavened bread; the first-fruits; the church's symbols and figures of the gods—the carved and painted images to which worship is directed, and altars from and upon which the worship is conducted.

These and many other liturgical tools constitute what is usually called "personal" property. However their ownership be formally defined, their use and upkeep and the collection of the income therefrom accruing, like that of the "real" church property, is in the hands of a class of professionals who, by virtue of that fact, are the effective owners of these stuffs.

Perhaps no item in the history of religions is so important as the development of this class. From the point of view of the efficacy of religious association and the power of ecclesiastical property, the priesthoods are the churches. The authority over the one and the power from the other are vested in them. Continuity and unity of doctrine are established through their training; solidarity of craft through the detachment of their hearts and minds from equal allegiance to other competing social institutions. Custom, and nowadays custom far more than vocation, renders them a caste apart. They are the protagonists of the elusive and invisible half of that original duality of body and shadow-reflection-dream-image-breath-name which condenses into "soul" and grows in power and personality into "God." They are the

spokesmen and manipulators of this Otherworld and its denizens, and some of its *mana* adheres to them. This is as true to-day as it ever was. Regardless of his status among the orthodox or heterodox, the professional religionist is enveloped in an otherworldly aura. He is not quite like other men, even to Mr. Mencken. He may be a theological lone wolf, a single voice crying in the wilderness like Mr. John Haynes Holmes or Mr. S. S. Wise, or he may be a member of the Federal Council of Churches like Mr. Harry Ward, or he may be a disciplined and dutiful member of his corporation like the Reverend Cardinal Bishop James O'Connell of the diocese of Massachusetts, or Senator Reed Smoot of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. One may disagree utterly with what other clergymen are saying and doing and how and why. Another may be required to discharge his professional duties without any discretion whatsoever in what he says or does. Both wear in the public eye some of the holiness that is inherent in the sacred beings they are supposed to be able to manipulate and for whom they are supposed to be able to speak.

Below these full professionals in their ranks and dignities are the lower orders of ecclesiastical organization, from curate and choir-master to sexton, in the Christian churches, and with relatively corresponding grades and different titles in other religions. To them also accrues some vestige of sanctity from their contact with things sacred. They differ from the true priests and ministers in that they are accessories and of themselves make no direct approach to the supernatural. Often they require no training at all, but assume their functions under guidance and carry them on by habit.

True priests or ministers, on the other hand, not infre-

quently need a very complicated and elaborate training, which may be begun at puberty and continued for years before ordination. Whatever the cult—Asiatic or European—the subject matters of the priest's education fall into the same general classes. The educational scheme of the most liberal theological school of the West differs by principle in no essential from the most hide-bound conventionalized orthodoxy of the East. Roman Catholic and Japanese Buddhist, Indian Brahmin and United States Reformed Judaist, British Unitarian and Mohammedan Traditionalist—they are all taught their sacred scriptures, and the ancient sacred languages such scriptures were composed in; they are taught the traditional authoritative commentaries and rationalizations; the established defences of their respective only true faiths against misbelievers, and the arts and crafts of the priestly profession. Difference between liberal and orthodox instruction is not difference in subject matter. The liberal schools deal with it critically, in the light of new knowledge in other fields, in the light of the changeful and changing interests of the community. The orthodox schools deal with it submissively and transmit it as nearly as possible intact to their neophytes. Orthodox Oriental schools of religion tend to be of uniformly the same high standing; the reform or liberal schools, with their unassimilated Modernist methods and intellectual background, are the dubious ones. In Europe and America, it is the other way round—the more orthodox, the less adequate. American theological schools are on very various levels indeed of intellectual competency. Some are nothing more than extremely naïve and illiterate Bible Schools; they require of the candidate for the ministry nothing more than a knowledge of the Bible in the mode they hold authoritative. Others,

like the theological schools attached to the great private universities—Harvard, Yale, Chicago, or such unattached schools as Union—require the broadest kind of currently acceptable education and would not undertake to train a candidate for the ministry without it. Training for the Catholic priesthood, though long and hard, assimilates rather to that of the Protestant Bible Schools than to that of the great university seminaries. Training for even the orthodox rabbinate, on the other hand, assimilates definitely and explicitly to the requirements of the University seminaries, or follows Oriental standards.

However trained, professional religionists are at one regarding the especial dignity and worth of their calling. They, particularly the great uneducated majority among them, confirm the public sense that they are a caste apart; insist on it, in fact. "Over and above the priesthood of each member of the Christian Church," declares Mr. Baverstock,¹ "there is a priesthood, properly so called, which is given to a special class, in its plenitude to bishops, in a lesser degree to priests, and exclusively conferred upon these two orders alone. It involves a grant of illumination and divine power. It is a special gift of God, bestowed upon men called to this office and consecrated to it by a peculiar gift, for 'no man taketh the honour unto himself,' as we find in Hebrews 5:4."

"The preacher," says Scarborough,² "is God's biggest man in God's biggest task. . . ." "Did you ever think your battle is against God when you oppose your child's entrance into Christ's glorious service? . . . Do you stand in your husband's way as God clearly leads? Can you face God at the

¹ A. H. Baverstock: "The Christian Priesthood."

² Scarborough: "Recruits for World Conquest."

Judgment with the awful charge of keeping your husband out of the ministry?"

As for their calling, here is how the Reverend Mr. Bounds valued it.³ "Preaching is heaven's distillation in answer to prayer. It cuts, suffuses, percolates, soothes. It carries the Word like dynamite, like sugar, like salt. It makes the word an arraigner, a revealer, opening the heart and the purse as gently, yet as irresistibly as the Spring opens the leaves. . . . It is not the gift of genius. No eloquence can woo it; no industry can win it. It is heaven's knighthood given to the chosen. It is God's signet set to his messenger!"

I set down a statement so extreme as to be ridiculous, yet its very exaggeration illustrates the basic feeling of the priestly caste toward its vocation more completely than any circumspect and sophisticated pronouncements could. To the masses of the communicants and to the masses of the priesthood their vocation does single the ministers out as no other vocation singles out its practitioners. Some unique transformation of their consciousness and character is believed to take place—is not the belief itself enough to create the unmistakable difference of the gentlemen of the cloth from the rest of us? Whatever this difference be, it is the consequence of some unique election; of response, as they say, to a "call." The "call" in Europe and America is assumed to be an indispensable preliminary to entering the priestly profession. But one of its peculiarities is the fact that it doesn't seem strong enough by itself to evoke its appropriate response. Theological schools of every cult and sect omit no available bait to get young men to train for the priestly professions. Where law schools, medical schools, schools of engineering, charge considerable tuition fees, divinity schools not only offer free

³ Bounds: "Prayer and the Preacher."

tuition but provide, through scholarships and otherwise, living expenses and pocket-money. The status of the divinity student is made to carry with it various privileges, such as do not accrue to students for other vocations.

Now whether a priestly neophyte has a "call" or not, is a minor matter. The forces that determine his choice are hardly different from those that would have set him to choose another way of making his living. The unremarked influences of his infancy and childhood, the agencies that have set him emotionally and intellectually, and have determined his attitudes of approach and withdrawal, expression and compensation, come first in the order of importance. They establish the pattern and the tonal values of his whole subsequent life, absorbing into their channels all the winnings of his education and later social experience. Experience and contacts at puberty exercise a large influence. Alternatives are considered, if they are present. The final choice has, as a rule, been made deliberately after a survey and weighing of such alternatives—medicine, the law, engineering, etc. The effective motives for the choice are often not conscious. But how can they be unaffected by the knowledge that learning to be a priest usually costs nothing, that indeed it very often brings one an income by way of subventions, scholarships, and incidental jobs, and more often than not, a rise in social status and prestige? Nor can the ease and security of the priestly life be without influence. The profession of the church calls for no great physical or intellectual exertion. It is exercised always under advantageous conditions. Except in the foreign missionary fields, it calls for no risks of life, limb or income. It exempts its practitioner from the usual charges upon the maintenance of communal institutions, and entitles him to various emoluments and honoraria from baptisms, masses,

penances, circumcisions, confirmations, weddings, funerals, and other solemnities and celebrations in the lives of his flock. Like the soldier, he is distinguished from the rest of the community by his dress and his expression; and like the policeman's, his status is one of authority over the rest of the community. By virtue of his professional fitness to manipulate the supernatural, he tends to exercise infallible judgment and censorship over every matter, intellectual or social or esthetic or economic, that comes before the public attention. His sermons tend to take the form of apostolic pronouncements, communicating the preferences of God.

With this God, his mediations follow an established routine. His prayers pass on the desires of his congregants to the divinity; his sermons transmit the predilections of the divinity to his congregants. To his ministration of the due rites at the normal crises of the individual's life-cycle, from birth to death, and at the turn of the seasons—Easter, Christmas, Thanksgiving—are added those required by drouth and disease, by war, shipwrecks, business depressions, earthquakes and so on. The solicitude of the living for the dead provides another occasion for manifold professional activity, and the more orthodox and traditional the cult, the more manifold the activity—and the more profitable.

III

Let no one think any innuendo in the term "profitable." To exercise their ministry, the ministers of God must live, and to live, they must eat. In the prosecution of some infinite purpose which my finite mind cannot presume to fathom, the Lord in his infinite wisdom has not seen fit to ordain that his ministers shall be nourished and sustained by the eucharist they

administer, even though that be his mystic ever-living flesh and his mystic ever-living blood. The priesthood must live from the exercise of their profession, and they must lay by something for an old age which comes to them no less than to other men. Two sources of income seem to have been established for them. One is the certain endowment of the church, the sums that are paid in as interest and rent on properties, as subventions from the state, as set fees for regular and standard performance of regular and standard rites. Such fixed incomes accrue to established and orthodox churches like the various state-endowed temples in China, India, Japan, and the Moslem world, the Catholic Churches, the Church of England, and so on. Their parallel in evangelical churches is income from property and pew rents. The other source of income is the less certain payments for special services in unexpected crises—for remission from sins or crime, for exorcisms, for prayers to overcome sickness, to recover from losses, to make safe journeys, to make successful undertakings, to take years of purgatory from the allotment of a soul, and so on. In addition there are the "free-will offerings," from Peter's pence to maintain the Curia to Calvinists' quarters to maintain Presbyterian missionaries in China; income from special festivals, like the Catholic Holy Year, the Eucharistic Congresses and the like; donations, church suppers, ministers' surprise parties and the other devices for increasing ministerial incomes in poor evangelical cures.

These direct sources of income are reinforced by customary exemptions and by reductions under the law. These are aspects of the "privilege of clergy." Clerical privilege is of long standing and arises out of complicated motives. It derives partly from the vestige of divinity that anciently adheres to

the prophet and medicine man, partly from the benefactions of the civil power of ancient states. But its strong root is the power of the ecclesiastical corporation to set up and to maintain its own authority against the authority of the state; its canon law against the civil law, and the will of the church above every other will. In effect this power enabled professional religionists "to get away with murder"; no clerical crime was, in the Middle Ages, so bad that the civil arm could punish for it. You will recall how a generation after the abrogation of papal authority in England, the great comic poet Ben Jonson was able to escape the consequences of a conviction for murder by claiming "the privilege of clergy." It is harder to claim it against murder, nowadays, but other privileges as customary are still in force. Church property, for example, is tax-exempt, and, at least in New York, to deface it is a felony. Churchmen are exempt from the force of certain statutes: the prohibition law, for example, which is knowingly suspended so that the priestly may sell "sacramental wine." New York State exempts churchmen from all taxes on real or personal property up to fifteen hundred dollars, where laymen are exempt only up to a thousand. The clergy are not required to sit on juries or to render military service. They may lawfully obtain free telephone, telegraph and railroad service (in practice they get rebates). In towns or cities where a prison is located, clergymen of any denomination are entitled to visit it without a permit; sharing this privilege with the governor and the judges of the State. Nor are they required to pay the village poll taxes nor to do their part of the road-work required by the transportation laws. Great Britain exempts them from arrest during the performance of their professional duties.

Parallels to this status of privilege may be found anywhere

in the civilized world that has developed churches. The churchman occupies an indubitable position of civil advantage over his fellow citizens. His social advantage is more ambiguous, especially in pagan and Protestant countries. Certain types of common censorship do not touch him at all; on the other hand, he has been everywhere in the world an object of ironic amusement and bitter indignation when he appeared to be deviating from the rigidities of behaviour his choice of profession seems so often to impose. Shaman and medicine man, hierophant or flamen, monk, bonze, prophet or rabbi or priest, his approach to the supernatural as often as not is postulated upon a certain personal hardship and self-denial as well as a skill in the handling of religious vessels and the utterance of liturgical formulæ.

To compensate for this social restriction the churchman is endowed with certain extraordinary liberties. Infallibility attaches—how could it not?—to the supernatural and this aspect of *mana* thoroughly permeates the mouthpieces of the supernatural to man. As we have already mentioned: the clergy may, without any loss of face whatever, declare the sinfulness or the virtue of this or that aspect of sumptuary behaviour; this or that event in the arts or the sciences. No proficiency in the subjects they pass upon is expected of them. They step in where experts fear to tread. The current pope admonishes American women that modern dress is indecent: “Christian modesty in dress must be taught at any price. Indeed, it is in the very name of humanity that it is necessary to fight for decency of dress.” Mgr. Dubois, the Cardinal Archbishop of Paris, has another view: “Religion,” he declared, “is no enemy of fashion. Fashion is the most widespread form of art, and God is the friend of true artists. . . .

Please God, no Archbishop of Paris will ever forbid the women of Paris to follow the fashion with tact, moderation and intelligence." "Science itself," says the current pope, "proves the existence of miracles." For, he tells the Sacred Congregation of Rites, it enables them to know whether a miraculous cure is the cure of an incurable disease or not. The Congregation has available resources of science: "All the examinations that science makes possible for the introspection of the human organism, for not only inductive but visible conclusions, are so many elements in favour of miracles." Said the Reverend Dr. Christian F. Reisner, apropos of the recent flight to the Pole, "The talents of the Christian and the flyers are the same." "Nobody can say now," declared the Reverend Dr. Edward S. Young, "that the heroic has been hopelessly deadened in men by crass materialism." "Byrd's mastery of the blasted skies," announces the Reverend Dr. Henry H. Howard, "marks a new step showing the obedience of mankind to the will of God."

The instances are legion. They exemplify the antiquarian interest and conservative bias of churches. Events, regardless of their intrinsic quality, are expected to demonstrate the evil of customary evil, the good of conventional good. So religion will bless fashion in Paris and science will prove miracles in Rome and a polar flight will be a demonstration of human obedience to the will of God—whatever that may be—in New York. Thus folkways of thought and behaviour are defended, confirmed and preserved against upsetting heretical novelties.

IV

Churches are possessed of instruments of destruction as well as habits of appropriation. Conformity can be imposed by

means of excommunication and interdict, in their varying degrees. It is a mistake to imagine that those devices are obsolete. Their use has never been frequent, for delinquents have been brought to penance before it was necessary, but the tenth Pius used excommunication against Modernists in 1907 and currently the interdict is being imposed against the State of Mexico as part of the conflict over secularization. There are instances of orthodox Jewish rabbis using excommunication against the reformed section of the same cult within recent years. The function of excommunications and the interdict is to cut off a person or a community from the professional services of the clergy; they are sacerdotal strikes.

The Roman Catholic Church maintains a blacklist as well. This blacklist applies to books and ideas. The ideas are studied by the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition and, according to their judgment, condemned and proscribed. Books are condemned by the Sacred Congregation of the Index and public notice is given that they are placed in the Index Expurgatorius. Then, without very special permission, no faithful Catholic may read them. Books may also be forbidden by special interdict, as in the Encyclical *Pascendi Gregis* Pius X ordered should be done with works suspected of the slightest Modernist taint. To have the endorsement of the Church books must be passed upon by the censors and licensed prior to publication. No other church has established quite so elaborate or effective a system for maintaining a monopoly in the belief of the faithful or for cutting off competition, but each, within the limits of its powers, approximates this perfection. States have on occasions imitated it—both czarist and communist Russia, for example, and in recent years, the United States of North America—but their success is indifferent by comparison. . . .

And the existence of various Protestantisms and the rise of Modernism are a commentary on the efficacy of the Roman Catholic devices.

All churches that attain a fixed and infallible revelation, a set of sacred scriptures whose meaning is in the custody of a specially ordained priesthood trained for the purpose and organized in an ecclesiastical hierarchy, require a considerable material equipment not only to win greater power but to keep from losing ground. A customary section of this equipment is the machinery of suppressing variations, exterminating differences, keeping the revelation secure from the menace of rivalry. The struggle to gather up possessions on earth in order that treasure may be laid up in heaven is an immemorial one, but it has its own history and is a concomitant of the complication of civil and economic society. As we have seen, the manipulation of the supernatural was in the first instance an aspect of family duty, a task first of the fertile mother, who kept the hearth and ploughed the fields and bore the children; then of the house-father; then of the tribal headman or priest-king; then of the professional priest. The later mediators between the group and the supernatural succeeded the earlier without destroying them; they were functional additions and took religion from its original simplicity down the road of complication that history traces. Churches, as we saw, are founded on professional priests. They rest upon the establishment of a vested interest in the art of manipulating the supernatural. The products of this art constitute a commodity that churches sell and that they seek, each in its own way, to monopolize.

v

The story of the elaboration of the arts and crafts of manipu-

lating the supernatural is like the story of any other enterprise of man that has come down the years as an institution. You begin with a technique in which the house-mother or the house-father or the tribal headman is especially skilled. The technique is a patterned action, involving the formal use of various objects such as we have already observed to be constantly recurrent in the practice of religion. The action is accompanied by incantations, by liturgical formulæ, also patterned and highly stylized. It works upon the dead, the doubles of the earth and air and mountains and rivers and sea, the doubles of vegetation and animal life; and the far less articulated supernatural forces. It enlists or coerces their co-operation with the purposes of the group in whose behalf the rite is celebrated. Times come, however, when it is recognized that the familial or tribal technique is inefficacious. A more potent influence is required. Such an influence is the possession of the medicine-man, the shaman, the rhapsodist. It is known to be in his possession from the peculiarities of his behaviour. These may be due to some internal and uncontrollable psychopathic condition; they may be artificially induced, by self-suggestion or a technique of self-excitement or hypnosis. In either case, the peculiarities are remembered, stereotyped, and identified as the stigmata of an especial capacity for contact with the supernatural. They are made the subject of a religious lore, and are transmitted from father to son, from master to disciple. He who is endowed with them, either by nature or by education or both, signalizes his possession, by an especial garb and an especial way of life. He has his equipment of tools—his tom-tom, his feathers, his crystals, his animal and human bones, his cornstalks, and what not. He has his terrible and holy house for them. When he is hired to “make medicine” as a supplement to the priestly ac-

tivities of the family or tribal head, he brings them out and applies them to the supernatural. For his collaboration he receives payment or a gift. Often he receives a gift to refrain from intervening. His living does not, however, yet derive entirely from the exercise of his priestly powers. That supplements his income, and is called on occasionally. Usually, he does what his fellow tribesmen do—hunt, fish, fight, cultivate the soil.

Let the millennia pass, and look at the heirs of his tradition on a more complex level of social organization. We see them not among tribesmen, but among citizens. They and their fellows have come together in their families and tribes and are living behind closed walls. They are living in cities, and are citizens of the state in which the functions of government and war are distinguished from economic functions, in which the homogeneity of tribe and family have been broken into social orders—aristocrats and populace, freemen and slaves, soldiers, workers and traders. The shades of ancestors, animals, vegetation and the natural scene, have been replaced by gods, and the gods are not only the concretions of these doubles, but the symbols and protectors of the state and the projections of the heart's desire. Stories of their lives and adventures have been superimposed upon the primitive technique of manipulating the supernatural. In formal, open, public ceremonials, in hidden mysteries of initiation, they are re-enacted, either fully or symbolically or both, together with the infinitely older procedure of the family and the tribe. In the public ceremonial, before the public altars, the officiating priest is often a citizen elected by his fellows; more often he is the head of the state, or a citizen appointed by the head of the state. Often he is not only king and priest, but in his own turn god, receiving divine honors. This was the case in

Ancient Greece, in Asia Minor and Egypt, under the Diadochi, in imperial Rome, in Byzantium, in Russia, in China, in Japan. So far as public religion is concerned, the head of the state and the head of the church are one. The priestly duty is a part of the civil duty. There is no segregation of religious labour; there is no person whose vocation is to be a priest and nothing else.

But in the secret cults, in the mysteries, there is. The hierophant, the sanyassin, the prophet, has set himself aside. He is the owner of a secret into which he initiates any who will pay. He is permanently attached to places and temples—like Eleusis, Delphi, Ephesus, Jerusalem. He and those who share the secret with him constitute a brotherhood. They own an allegiance to each other which differs from and is independent of their other allegiances. In principle, they are already a church. The hierophant is the heir of the medicine-man and shaman. Sometimes his inheritance is direct and ancestral. Priesthood may be the exclusive vocation of a certain line. This, as everybody knows, was the case in Israel, where the tribes of Aaron and Levi had reserved to them the vocations of temple service, and got their incomes exclusively therefrom. In Japan the priests who sacrifice to the shades of the ancestors are hereditary. Jewish *Kohanim* and Levites received a subvention from the state in the shape of tithes—the equivalent of ten per cent of the total income of the commonwealth. During the Roman Empire the sources of income of the Judaistic establishment in Jerusalem were, in addition to the tithe, gifts, donations, penitential offerings and regular contributions from innumerable Gentiles as well as Jews.

The temple hierarchy of Jerusalem fell short, for a number of interesting cultural reasons, of becoming an overwhelming religious caste. The Brahmins in India, already in the

ninth century before the beginning of the Christian Era, succeeded, by means of their monopoly of the arts of manipulating the supernatural, in establishing themselves as a caste of supermen—against both warriors and artisans and traders. The hypostasis they effected with Soma they also applied to themselves. Since their rites could influence the gods to do what they desired, did they need to supplicate the gods merely? On the contrary, they commanded and coerced the gods. They were greater and more powerful. To account for the status they had established they declared that they had sprung from the head of Brahma, while the Kshatriyas came merely from his arms, the Vaisyas from his thighs and the Sudras from his feet. Having sprung from the head of the Lord of the World, where could they be but at the head of the families of men? Thus they established their overlordship by divine sanction and sustained it on infallible supernatural cause.

VI

Except, however, where church and state are utterly one and government is a "theocracy," the transmission of the priestly vocation from father to son is not of great importance. Ecclesiastical organization, the forms of church government, the management of the religious economy count for a great deal more. It is natural that for those matters the palm should go to the evolution of the priesthoods in Rome. There the presence of an ecclesiastical hierarchy is first indicated during the third century before the beginning of the Christian Era. Of early Rome, the kings were the priests, and the tradition of the king-priest was continued during the republic, as in Athens; the practice was to appoint the priest of the temple of Janus, King of the holies for certain rites.

His wife was "regina." The effect was completely to separate religious from civil functions and to enable an independent ecclesiastical organization to take form. This came about by the investment of the College of Pontifices, under the leadership of the Pontifex Maximus, with the management of the religious affairs of the state. Legislative enactment in the course of time increased the number of members of the college from three to fifteen, and its administrative organization became the ground-plan for the organization of the bishopric of Rome. The Pontifex Maximus appointed all the other priests—the *flamens* or the specialists in temple service, and the *augurs*, or specialists in the interpretation of omens and the reading of the future. The care and nourishment of the gods, the vegetation and fertility festivals, the rites of the various functional divinities—as Birth, Coming In and Going Out—were all arranged on an elaborate calendar, each divinity having its set feast and day.

The calendar was a systematization of the chronic crises of the economy of husbandry and the fortunes of the state, and the ordination of the rites and incantations by which the supernatural could be influenced to render the outcome propitious. To make this all the surer, rites and studies were ordained to discern the intentions of the supernatural in advance. The College of Augurs were the keepers of a minute and elaborate learning regarding the courses of heavenly bodies, regarding the movement of lightning, regarding the formations of geese in their flight through the air, regarding the order in which chicks would pick at grain, regarding the marks on the livers of sacrificial animals. This learning is ecclesiastical learning as such. It was highly systematized and there were in addition detailed and circumstantial descriptions of the rituals proper to offset evil and to bring in good according to the

occasion. The punctilious adherence to the prescription was essential, since the slightest misstep invalidated the whole procedure.

In addition, the limitations of civil activity and personal behaviour of the priesthood were considerable. Political office was *taboo* to the Rex Sacrorum; the life of the Flamen Dialis was so hedged in with prohibitions that the post remained empty from 87 B. C. until Augustus filled it in 11 B. C. The burden of the priesthood, as the carriers of a church subordinate to the concerns of the state, grew to be too complicated and too heavy. There were too many minutiae to observe, too many dates to remember, too much relegation of ritual. They would not carry on. The whole structure declined, and did not pick up again till Cæsar reformed the calendar and Augustus re-established the cults. Then the organization remained, but the religion was for all practical purposes dead. It was a new Rome—a Rome which had learned to recognize alternatives in belief and to practise liberalities in life. It was a disillusioned and sceptical Rome, whose fears had grown greater, as its certainties had grown less, with its power. The state multiplied the number of gods and established the cult of emperor worship throughout the empire.

But it was too late. What Mr. Gilbert Murray calls the failure of nerve had set in. Foreign non-official religions, unsupported by the state, opposed by the state, persecuted by the state, set up their autonomous jurisdictions in competition with the state cults. They were the guardians of a mystery, a secret which their neophytes and initiates could learn and thereby win ultimate security, be born again into new life. Their priests were independent of the state and derived their income from their institutional endowments and the gifts and fees of their initiates. Such religions were the religions of

Isis and Osiris, of Attis and Adonis, of the Great Mother, of Dionysus, of Mithra, of Jehovah.

Their temple organization was minute and imposing in its ranks and division. The thousands of priests of the cult of Jehovah, for example, were divided into twenty-four grades and orders. Other cults had even more imposing hierarchies. An independent temple economy had developed early in the history of priesthoods. Temple officials in Babylonia and Assyria, in China, in Japan, not only held and administered great wealth but maintained their own armies and waged war against the secular opposition and against heresiarchs and heretics. They early undertook extensive missionary enterprises, and by the second century after the beginning of the Christian Era, the problems of the church government, under the eye of a secular power whose favour tended to be ambiguous, was a serious one. The picture we get in the New Testament of the administrative problems of the insignificant Christian communities can be enormously enlarged for the greater cults with their million adherents. Church organization tended more and more to parallel state organization, and to be independent of it. Even when a cult had the endorsement of the state, as for example, the cult of Mithra, and was a state religion, its trend was to compact its organization and to convert the association of its communicants into a cosmopolitan religious state. The Judaistic cult is the conventional example of this process in the Western world, but the great mystery cults easily rival it, and the Buddhist theocracy of Thibet presents an interesting analogue. And, of course, the Roman Catholic Church is an example of especial interest to the Western world.

VII

The accretion of civil power to religious functions by which autonomous churches develop into ecclesiastical states turns upon the possession of great properties and the consequent tasks of administration. Even under the completest domination of life by the supernatural, there remain extensive areas which are secular and stay so. Religion is never quite coincident with life, and the secular excess calls for supervision and control. The larger the scope and the greater the variety of the secular interests of its possessions, the more civil power a church requires, and the more certain it is to become a church-state.

The Christian Church in Rome began as an autonomous religious association in competition with the state and treated by the state as a competitor. In the course of time, through the idiosyncrasy of Constantine's temperament and the fortunes of war, it became the state-church of the empire. Constantine endowed its priesthood with large properties and clothed them with many privileges over other citizens and ministers of rival cults. He devoted the power of the state to suppress, to exterminate the rivals. His successors shut down the great schools at Athens, Alexandria, Pergamos, and elsewhere, and gave the Christian Fathers control of education throughout the empire. But for long the civil power allowed them no liberties of independent civil or even theological government. Constantine, himself, decided dogmas and set rules of faith. The priesthood were under the imperium, and they jolly well knew it.

In Byzantium, where the civil government was continuous, the Christian cult remained a state-church. The Czar of all the Russias succeeded the emperor of Byzantium as the head

of the church when the empire was destroyed, and remained the head until czardom was destroyed. In Rome, however, civil government became intermittent and for a period was entirely suspended, while the church continued not only as the state-church but as the administrator of the total economy of the lives of thousands of men and women on its estates. When the civil power lapsed the church became the civil power.

And therewith, the old order of values, the values that had prevailed in the classical world, was overturned. In that world, the church existed for the sake of man. Even the religions of disillusion, whose inmost secret was initiation into a mystery whereby one's spirit underwent a rebirth and was thus redeemed from death unto eternal life and joined unto the fellowship of the saved, even these religions existed as devices to enable the good life here and now. But with the accession of the Roman bishopric to civil power, the ecclesiastical organization became the end, and the community the tool. Man was made for the church, the view was, not the church for man. A claim was set up to the complete and exclusive submission of all men to the authority and discipline of the priesthood. This claim, through all the chances of fate and fortune, has never been relinquished. It is made as absolutely by the present pope as it was by any of his predecessors. It is effective in the degree in which it is sustained by property.

CHAPTER X

CHURCHES (CONTINUED)

I

IN the warfare which the church-state conducts against the state the ecclesiastical organization would seem to have certain initial advantages. These advantages are proved by the event to have the force of boomerangs, but that, of course, cannot be foreseen when the policy of power is initiated. The advantages derive from the commerce in the supernatural which it is believed that the priesthood alone can successfully conduct. Rivals in this commerce keep springing up continually. A church is challenged at every point—on the nature of the gods, on the methods of reaching them, on what they do for and to men, on the life after death, and so on. Variation on a minute point of ritual is enough to make a sect and to establish a heresy: whether the robe of the priest shall be red or yellow, whether a benediction shall be made with two fingers or three, are typical issues on which the formation of new religious groups turn. The standardization of a creed, its vindication as immutable and infallible, require time and power, and power rests on property and is exercised as police-power. It is of the same nature and works in the same way as the power used to enforce any secular regulation. It is a definite material agency. It takes possession of the bodies of heretics and inflicts hurts on them, either through imprisonment and torture or through the withdrawal of needful or strongly-desired goods. Conformity can be coerced; and

coercion of heresy is the essential task of the police-power of ecclesiastical government. The exclusive possession of the one and only mystery of salvation is indispensable to the priestly claim on the submission of mankind. This claim, Machiavelli declares ironically in "The Prince," enables ecclesiastical states to endure, in spite of the incapacity and misfortune of their rulers, and "no matter how their princes behave and live."

"These princes," declares this wise and candid observer of political behaviour, "alone have states and do not defend them, they have subjects and do not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are not taken from them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care, and they have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate themselves. Such principalities only are secure and happy. But being upheld by powers to which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak no more of them, because, being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the act of a presumptuous and rash man to discuss them." The intent of these observations by the great Florentine political scientist will be clear to any one who cares to read the rest of the passage in which they occur. His great exemplar of ecclesiastical statecraft is Pope Alexander VI, "who," says Machiavelli, "of all the pontiffs that have ever been, showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to prevail."

The sentence sums up the secret of power, not merely of ecclesiastical organizations, but of all societies that seek lastingly to prevail. The revelations of your Ghandi, your Savonarola, your Dowie, your Buddha, your Lao-Tze, your Paul, endure so long as their personal contagion lasts; after that, unless their disciples and followers have obtained property and power, their message is lost. The difference between the few successful cults and the countless defeated and forgotten ones is—money

and arms; in modern dissenting communities, money, property. Only with these can an ecclesiastical society maintain its monopoly of the secrets of salvation and vindicate its claim against perennially new competitors in the sight of the seekers after salvation.

For a discarnate revelation is soon dissipated; a scheme of salvation existing only in formula and not materialized in vehicles of power that can render it visibly manifest and physically enforce it, fades into the thin air. The word of the master—whether he be a hypothetical Jesus or an actual Siddhartha, a historical Mohammed or a legendary Moses, a Mary Baker Eddy or an Abd'ul Beha, a Blavatsky or an Alexander Dowie—is dissipated in the disputes of the disciples, and the original integrity of the gospel dissolved into æther until one of the disputing heirs of the master, getting property and power behind his propaganda, establishes that as the authentic right view of the magisterial revelation; and by means of his property and power vindicates it with exterminative thoroughness against competing alternatives. This is what, in the beginning, Catholicism did with challenging heresies; this is what, as the treatment of the Catholic Modernists some years ago shows, it still does so far as it can. This is what the various Protestantisms in their turn, after they had successfully established themselves, tried to do. This is what they failed to accomplish because, on the whole, no one of them attained at any time that fulness of economic and military power which such a religious action as, say, a crusade against the Albigenses might require. The consequence is that in Protestant countries a rule of live and let live has come into play; they are countries distinguished for "tolerance." Ecclesiastical societies, like nations and trusts, make terms with what they cannot destroy, and acquire the manners of neighbourliness

even though they do not surrender the passion of enmity and the conviction of supremacy.

II

The instruments on which churches and sects ground their claims to be the sole and unique bearers of the authentic revelation are usually embodied in the confessions and the creeds. Such documents, like the sacred scriptures of the various religions, are as a rule syncretic texts; the results, however, of conscious instead of unintentional co-operative thinking. Creeds and confessions are standard and infallible. Exception may at no time be taken to any proposition they lay down. Nevertheless successions of them appear—like the Nicene, the Athanasian and the Apostles' creeds—and they contain differences on which, when the absolute identity of their infallible meanings is not a postulate of faith, sectarian conflicts are based.

In the Christian world, there was a time when to depart from the mere letter of the creed had the effect of eliminating the divergent from the fellowship of mankind. Ecclesiastical police-power is applied first of all to search out dissidence and to destroy it, secondly to prevent even the ghost of dissidence from arising. The first duty is discharged by the Holy Inquisition, the second by the Index. The record of the Inquisition is notorious, and the connection between accusations of heresy and the possession of great wealth demonstrates one of the interesting virtues of its zeal for the faith. The Index, to a liberal, is likely to seem a catalogue of the documents that mark the steps in the progress of mankind. The documents are forbidden to true believers lest their minds be contaminated. The principle of the Inquisition and the Index is organic to any religious

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society based on an infallible dogma. None, as we have already observed, has elaborated a machinery so efficient as the Catholic; all have made use of something analogous in principle at least. Catholicism possesses, however, another device for which the other cults have no parallel. This is the confessional. It was instituted in 1216 to acquire more effective control over the Catholic masses. Mortal sins must be confessed and absolution secured at least once a year. One of the mortal sins is to miss mass on Sunday morning.

III

We have now seen what, in organic nature, churches show themselves to be. Let us now look at some of the effects of the institution upon churchmen. The dependence of doctrine for stability and of religious societies for continuity upon property, tends automatically to transfer the interest of the priesthood from the superstructure of faith and communion that first attracts them to the foundation of possessions that finally holds them. The manipulation of the gods for the benefit of men gives way to the management of properties for the benefit of Mother Church. The vision of destiny and the rule of life on which the ministrations of the Church are set and which are offered as the grounds for the church's claim to infallible correctness and insuperable authority, fall into disrespect. Familiarity breeds contempt. Creed and dogma are recognized as tools merely in the aggrandizement of the ecclesiastical institutions and the fortunes of the priesthood. Within the security of the sacerdotal organization an anarchy of thought and conduct develops without parallel in the civilized world. It is not merely that princes of the church commit the ordinary crimes of the ordinary criminal. It is that their sophistication becomes so comminuted and final that even the

ultimate *taboos* have no terrors for them and incest is as frequent as simony and pederasty as poisoning.¹ Withal, the complete relaxation of restraint within the Curia makes possible a ruthless imposition of it upon the believing masses without. The deposit of faith is handled purely as a device for the accumulation of wealth and the concentration of power. Competition is suppressed not because "the faith" is true but because income is threatened. It is the most enfranchised popes that work the Inquisition and the Index hardest, that refuse to stir in the face of the Lutheran revolt. It took a generation and the failure of thirty years of horrible religious warfare to convince the ecclesiastical authority that its sources of income could not be restored by the customary devices of the Inquisition, the Index, the crusade and the sword.

When housecleaning finally was undertaken, at the Council of Trent, its first intention was so to define Catholic dogma as to afford a precise standard for the condemnation of heretics. And it took the "counter-reformation" another generation and more to become effective. Its efficacy, significantly, is greatest where the rivals and critics of Catholicism are most powerful. In the English-speaking countries, in Germany, almost everywhere in the Protestant world where the church stays on sufferance and must watch its step, its standards do not fall far short of the level of the general environment; competition sharpens its arts and strengthens its virtues.

In the continuously Catholic countries the inertia of custom and habit is stronger. The picture that the church makes in Mexico and in other countries of the Americas, in Spain, in

¹ Every one remembers that tale of Boccaccio's in which a Christian seeks to convert a Jewish friend to the faith. He does not succeed. But the Jew has occasion to go to Rome and returns—a convert. Because, he declares, a church that could be so wicked and survive cannot but be of God.

Italy, is not any better than the picture that the populace makes. There the church meets illiteracy with superstition; mistress of the schools, it will neither provide modern education itself nor permit others to provide it. It bases income on the same general merchandise that brought in the treasure during the heyday of the papacy: indulgences, relics, amulets and charms among them, all somewhat disguised as medals, bulas, and the like, but functionally unmistakable. There the church persecutes, so far as it dares—who does not remember Ferrer in Spain?—and in Protestant countries it makes use of every available device and insidious connection to suppress criticism, to cover up faults, and to abort and punish opposition; the scandals of the Catholic charities uncovered in New York City, during Mayor Mitchel's administration, and the political defeat of that honourable and patriotic Catholic public servant have been said to be not without intimate connection one with the other. The church fights public education and seeks to divert the children of Catholic parents to parochial schools; it demands a proportion of the public funds for the maintenance of these schools and it endeavours by every device, even the improvement of Catholic instruction, to nullify competition by them.

As for the lesser and individual clergy, they are what the institution and the general community make them. The practice of their profession sets them in a fixed routine, of which to repeat interminable prayers and litanies in a strange tongue is a large part. Facility and familiarity play their usual rôle. Habit in liturgy leads to heedlessness and boredom. The point is, to get through. "Hocus pocus" is what remains of the solemn mass with its "Hoc est corpus meus." The Buddhist parallel is the prayer wheel. In that the *mantram* is brought up to the highest mechanical efficiency—every turn a

prayer : time-saving, breath-saving ; relief from the burden of detailed repetition of the oh-so-familiar words, and mass-production of power over the supernatural ! Liturgy and ritual and sermons and other priestly duties are to do, and to be done with, as quickly as possible, that other, more interesting and novel things may be attended to.

The range of the non-professional concerns over which the evangelical clergy cast their professional eyes is measurable by the themes of their sermons. They, too, have a lively interest in church property, while to the primates of the episcopal orders, the bishops and such, it is automatically primary. The problems of great churchmen are problems in the management of properties, in the care and acquisition of properties ; the Catholic Church once owned as much as a third of England.

Ecclesiastical methods in the field are not different from the methods of any other institutions. There used to be no stratagem at which a church would stop, no device it would reject, in order to increase its property and enhance its power. The record of the Roman Catholic Church is one which even its apologists cannot explain away. They seek to mitigate it by declaring that the church had been infected by contagion from the general wickedness and immorality of the age of faith. No doubt it was because of this infection that they created an enormous trade in relics. Greeks, Jews and Turks provided, in quantity, bones of saints, navel cords of the Saviour, wedding-ring of the Virgin, her milk and hair, her linens, as well as those of the Infant Jesus, pieces of the true cross, different spears of Longinus that pierced the side of the Saviour,² and many other charms bringing health, fortune, fertility and sal-

² In 1492 the Sultan of Turkey sent the pope such a spear as a sign of friendship for the equal head of another faith. There was already one such spear in Paris and another in Nürnberg. Each performed appropriate miracles.

vation. Churchmen multiplied sins that they might sell forgiveness. They made crime a source of revenue for the marketing of indulgences. They sold the expectation of succession to churchly offices to the highest bidder. Nepotism was a venial sin beside. They murdered one another for the apostolic succession. They forged documents first to establish the primacy of the Roman See in the Christian world; then to appropriate and to claim land and dominion as freeholds of the ecclesiastical establishments. The writings known as the Donations of Constantine, the Donations of Pippin and of Charlemagne, are forgeries designed to establish and confirm claims to enormous Italian and continental territories. The pseudo-Isidorean Decretals are forgeries to establish Roman primacy. Hildebrand attempted to annex all Europe to the papacy. Boniface claimed the world: "He who resists this power," he declared in the Bull *Unam Sanctum*, "resists God. We ourselves, affirm, define and pronounce that to be subject to the Roman pontiff is without qualification necessary to salvation for every human creature."

The claim of universal sovereignty over the petty things called temporal persists. The conflict with the temporal power that the claim brought on, also persists, though many times, there being rival popes, one in Rome and one in Avignon, it has not been easy to determine which vicar of God on earth should have been considered the legitimate one.³

Monastic orders are, of course, no better than the ecclesiastical establishment of which they are part. The poverty,

³ Cf. Lea's "History of Sacerdotal Celibacy and of the Inquisition," White's "The Warfare of Theology with Science," H. Delshaye's "L'amphithéâtre flavien," Kirsopp Lake's "Beginnings of Christianity" and "Landmarks in the History of Early Christianity," Gibbon's "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," Peter Damian's "Book of Gomorrah." This last is a review of the morals of the clergy and monks, which the author presented to Pope Gregory VII.

chastity and obedience of the individual is paid for by the wealth and pride and self-will of the corporation. Their forms and vocations were various. Some were mendicant, like the orders of St. Francis and St. Dominic. Some were military, like the Hospitallers, the Knights Templars, the Knights of St. John and the Teutonic Knights. Some were missionary like the Society of Jesus, and many others. All were acquisitive, the Templars being in the thirteenth century the richest order in Europe and therefore destroyed by Philip the Fair, of France, with the connivance of Pope Clement the Fifth at Rome. All are at present possessors of considerable corporate wealth, secured by gifts and donations not always scrupulously obtained.

IV

I have used the Roman Catholic organization more than any other to illustrate the character and behaviour of churches because it is the dominant ecclesiastical institution of the western world. It has the largest number of communicants, the longest history as a sacerdotal establishment, the most varied record of experience, the greatest wealth and power, and the most unified and disciplined priestly hierarchy. In short, it is a successful religious institution. If it be not representative, no other can be.

But to make the demonstration as definite as time and space allow, let us look at a successful church from the benefits of whose communion Roman Catholics are excluded. This church is of extremely recent origin, with a relatively small body of communicants, no sacerdotal organization as such, and a body of dogmas as disarticulate and ambiguous as Catholic doctrine is organic and precise.

I refer to Christian Science. The behaviour of the hiero-

phants of this church repeats in principle the behaviour of the Catholic hierarchy. The mechanisms by which power is secured are precise analogues. The devices by which competition is offset and nullified are alike.

Mary Morse Baker Glover Patterson Eddy, the founder of the sect, records that she had been healed of an incurable disease by her "emergency into the light." She makes her own legend. She tells how heavenly voices spoke to her as a child, how she had acquired logic, natural philosophy, moral science, Hebrew, Greek, Latin; how she had tried to cure herself by doctors and by homeopathy and by the help of the mental healer, Phineas P. Quimby, and had failed. This had been, she opines, preparatory to her revelation of divine healing. "God," she wrote in "Science and Health," "has been graciously preparing me during many years for the reception of his final revelation of the absolute divine principle of 'scientific mental healing.' " We are to understand this is God's last and ultimate revelation. In the divine order of succession the Virgin Mary came first, then Jesus of Nazareth, then the author of "Science and Health." The immaculate idea of that document is represented "first by man, and last by woman." The lady vehicle of the immaculate idea claimed that she was descended from the British aristocracy, that she performed "such small miracles" as making fruit and other trees bloom in winter, and that merely her spoken word had the power of healing since people with crutches who had heard her sermons walked out of church with the crutches on their shoulders. She claimed to have healed incurable diseases, but it is of record that she never herself demonstrated healing, though often challenged and invited to. She taught only. The demonstrable failure of her pupils was always to be at-

tributed to the insufficient understanding of the practitioner or the weak faith of the patient.

Mrs. Eddy was, indeed, a teacher before she became chief hierophant of a new cult. In 1883 she opened her Massachusetts Metaphysical College under a charter from the State and gave twelve hours—later reduced to seven—in the science of healing for \$300, six in metaphysical obstetrics for \$100, in theology for \$200, and six in a normal course for \$200. A complete metaphysical education from the lips of the Divine Mother was available in from twenty-three to thirty hours, at a cost of \$800, terms strictly cash in advance. Invalids were not admitted to the college. Accepted students were required, beside paying their fees, to sign a contract obliging themselves to pay Mrs. Eddy \$100, and ten per cent of their earnings when they started to practise healing and \$1,000 flat if their healing brought them no income at all. In 1889 when Mrs. Eddy closed her college, four thousand students had acquired her wisdom. Of course many broke their contracts, and the Massachusetts courts, to which Mrs. Eddy resorted to secure their enforcement, threw her case out on the ground that she had passed no consideration of value to the contractee. There is a rule of the Church of Christ, Scientist, that none of the faithful shall resort to the law to recover payment for treatments given.

Healing is the ritual act upon which the cult of Christian Science is grounded. Its prophetess, herself, emerged into its light from disease, and its "metaphysics" is the categorical denial of the reality of that which she emerged from—of the reality of disease and of the reality of death. The reality is God alone—divine, supreme, infinite mind, spirit, soul or principle, all health, all life, all truth, all intelligence. Matter is the opposite of this. It is evil, it is error, it is null. Man

is made in the image of God. So long as he thinks the thought of God he lives and is well. When he falls into the mortal error he is ill and must die. To treat disease the healer silently recites the following liturgy: "There is no life, truth, intelligence nor substance in matter. All is infinite Mind and its infinite manifestation, for God is All-in-all. Spirit is immortal Truth, matter is mortal error. Spirit is the real and eternal; matter is the unreal and temporal. Spirit is God and man is His image and likeness. Therefore man is not material; he is spiritual." ⁴

This is the Rock of Faith upon which the Church of Christ, Scientist, is founded. The rôle of a rock for a church seems to be an afterthought. In her beginnings Mrs. Eddy rejected churches. She saw the whole history of Christianity as a mistake of churchliness. Creeds and rites were to her akin to mortal error. But events led her to change her mind. In the course of time she applied to the State of Massachusetts for a church charter, with herself as president. She set forth a creed and established rites. The substance of the creed is in the healing formula already cited. By implication, the parity of Mother Eddy with Jesus Christ is added, together with the sanctity and infallibility of her works as the scriptures of the cult.

These exist in standard authorized revisions, from which nothing may be taken and to which nothing may be added. Like all orthodoxies, Christian Science rejects absolutely what would be the equivalent of the "higher criticism." Researches into Mrs. Eddy's early life, into her social and intellectual environment, her contacts with Phineas Quimby and Bronson Alcott are prohibited to the faithful and anathema in the sceptical. The Eddyian revelation comes without any other

⁴From "Science and Health, with Key to the Scriptures," by Mary Baker Eddy, p. 468.

mediation. Straight from God. The Eddyian service consists in the alternate reading of the especial scripture of the sect and the Christian Bible. There are two readers, a man and a woman. The man reads from "Science and Health," the woman from the Bible. Save "the Lord's prayer" and a silent prayer, there are no prayers; there are no sermons. All "readers" must be members of the "Mother Church," in Boston.

During the prophetess's lifetime, the absolute power of government of the church was vested under its by-laws in her alone. Since her death, it has been vested in the board of directors of the Boston "Mother Church," who fell into a dispute which they took to the courts, thus enabling the profane eye to observe the mechanisms of the inner shrine. This board, originally under the appointment of Mrs. Eddy, is self-responsible and self-perpetuating. Although legally without the right, it inherits from her the absolute authority she had quietly assumed over the branch churches, as well as over the dogmas, policies and possessions of the faith. It maintains a Board of Lectureship and a Committee on Publications.

The Committee on Publications consists of a head, residing in Boston, and one member in each state of the United States of America, agreed upon by the three largest churches there. The state head appoints an assistant for each community within his territory. The duties of this committee are to prevent the publication of harmful statements in the public press; to controvert harmful statements that get published, if not on free space then to buy space; to oppose health legislation in various states. No Christian Scientist not a member of this committee is permitted to print a word in defence of his faith. Disobedience, in this, or other matters, is punished with excommunication.

The range of the suppressive power of the church is ex-

tensive. Early editions of "Science and Health," and others of Mrs. Eddy's books that differ from the standard official scripture are practically out of reach, whether of the scholar or the Christian Scientist. Miss Georgine Milmine's "Life of Mary G. Eddy and History of Christian Science" has had a similar fate. Bookstores ceased to carry it; McClure's, the publishers, refused to sell it; and finally announced that the plates had been melted down and that the copyright was not for sale. The withdrawal by G. P. Putnam's Sons of Dr. Woodbridge Riley's discussion of Christian Science in the "Cambridge History of American Literature"⁵ was a public scandal. An attempt was made as early as 1901 to exclude from the mails Frederick W. Peabody's "Complete Exposure of Eddyism or Christian Science." The fate of Dr. Dresser's "The Quimby Manuscripts," published in 1921, would make an interesting research.

It is a rule of the church "that a member . . . shall not patronize a publishing house or bookstore that has for sale obnoxious literature."

The rôle of property in the development and activities of the Church of Christ, Scientist, has already been foreshadowed in the contracts which Mother Eddy drew with the pupils of her College of Metaphysics. She had passed well into middle life a poor woman; she died leaving an estate of three millions of dollars, besides a very valuable library. The manner in which she acquired the site of the "Mother Church," in Boston, is under suspicion. The Board of Directors who succeeded her in absolute authority over the dogmas and possessions of her church, who manage its publishing business,

⁵ The article suppressed by Putnam's is reprinted in Chapter I of "The Faith, the Falsity and the Failure of Christian Science," by Dr. Riley, Dr. Frederick W. Peabody and Dr. Charles E. Humiston, published by Fleming H. Revell Company.

its newspapers and journals, its real estate and its officialdom, are shown by court records to be implicated in graft and speculation, speculation even of collections for the benefit of recruits in the army in the Great War. Their prime function, assuming their entire honesty, has been so to manage creed and institution as constantly to increase its possessions and prestige.

In this church, too, heresy has already reared its horrid head, and the public eye is assailed in the public prints by long paid advertisements in which Mother Eddy is invoked as authority against her collective vicar on earth, the Board of Directors, in Boston. The fate of this heresy is in balance; the one thing more than any other it depends on is the cash in hand. For the gospel, no more than the mare, can go without money.

V

Is it necessary to draw the moral? Orthodoxy and heresy, the Church of Christ Saviour and the Church of Christ Scientist follow, when due allowance is made for the difference of time, place and circumstances, similar courses. In view of just those differences, the similarity can hardly be attributed to accident. The two cults are representative samples of the cults of the world; the chances are not small that any other two would exhibit the same behaviour-patterns.

Certain social consequences follow from this organic relation of the sacerdotal institution to property. Whatever the first intention of a cult may be, its last and enduring one is on the side of the property, on the side of the upkeep of that which keeps it up.

The most conspicuous example of this situation that tradition provides is Judaism. The prophets were nothing if not social reformers. The cult of Jehovah was associated in their

minds with a way of life in which human rights took precedence over property rights. The ritual codes—the code of the Covenant, Deuteronomy, Leviticus—mixed the ordinances of temple worship all up with laws of land tenure, slavery, wages, debt, and interest. The intent of all those laws was to protect the poor man from exploitation by the rich. But they were hardly ever heeded; Nehemiah complains of the exploitation that the rich men of restored Israel practise on the poor, and by the time the Judaistic church-state, with its 24,000 priests, is fully established, legalistic and other devices for keeping the letter and evading the spirit of Leviticus are customs of unremembered origin. Talmudical Judaism carries on these customs from decision to decision, and precedent to precedent. Orthodox Judaism is a cult of such evasions, and if reformed Judaism disregards them, neither does it regard Leviticus. Reformed Judaists have been as heedless of the rights of man as their orthodox brethren; only within very recent times, since the Great War in fact, under the stress of war emotions, was the Central Conference of American Rabbis shamed by Protestant and Catholic example into adopting a social and economic program that looks ridiculously timid beside the robust statements of the Federal Council of Churches and the Catholic Welfare Council.

The latter statements are new and striking phenomena in the history of churches, anywhere in the world. The Catholic one, indeed, is an accident of the exigencies of political climate and the pressure of temperaments. It is not approved by the Vatican and can be easily shown to fall under the condemnation of the Encyclical *Pascendi* of Pope Pius X as the heresy of Americanism.

Nevertheless, it registers as does the programme of the Federal Council of Churches, the negative pressure of industry on

the affairs of the Church. Both programmes signalize an inversion of historic policy and a break with tradition. Historically churches have stood on the side of the powers that be. They have defended slavery or have held their tongues about it. They have maintained serfdom and kept serfs. They have opposed every movement undertaken for the liberation of the masses of men; the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity are the creations of the camps of their enemies, of the rationalists of the eighteenth century and the liberals and socialists of the nineteenth. They have opposed the labour movement. They have defended and condoned the industrial exploitation of children. They have fought bitterly the enfranchisement of women. They have justified unjust war. They have fought with book and bell and candle and fagot every new great step in the advancement of science from gravitation to evolution. Wardens, ever since Constantine gave the schools of antiquity into the keeping of the Christian bishops, of the education of the people, they have fought with all their power the establishment of free public schools and the spread of literacy and knowledge among the people. These are conspicuous where the secular power is least tradition-bound, as in Denmark, Germany, the United States. Ignorance and illiteracy are greatest where the churches are most powerful, as in Spain, Italy, the Balkan countries, the South Americas, Czarist Russia.

Withal, churches are always on the side of the victorious, for the sustenance of their continued institutional survival is drawn from the power of the victorious. The compromises of its claims which the Roman Catholic Church makes with the theory and practice of government in strong democratic Protestant countries like the United States, England, and the Scandinavian kingdoms are illustrative. Let the radical Mexican government but attain appropriate stability and strength and

the Church will add to its own precedent. The social programmes of the churches—in Britain as well as in the United States—coincide with the manifestations of strength and solidarity of workingmen's organizations and the emptying of pews in churches. Successful social revolution brings about a complete change of sacerdotal doctrine, as in Russia.

In Russia the orthodox church maintained a traditional existence quite parallel to that of the Roman Church. With the secular arm at its command, it persecuted heresies, compelled conformity, and held the usual ecclesiastical heyday. Revolution in the state was, however, instantly followed by transformation in the Church. The Patriarch Tikhon, sacerdotal head of the Church under the Czar, was unfrocked and condemned by the vote of forty-six bishops for denouncing the Revolution. "The All-Russian delegated synod," declared the resolution promulgating the Tikhon's punishment, "bears witness before the whole church and humanity that the world is divided into two classes: capitalist exploiters and the proletariat, on whose blood the capitalist world builds its well-being. In all the world only the Soviet power of Russia has entered upon a struggle with this great social evil. Christians cannot be indifferent in this struggle. The synod denounces capitalism as a deadly sin, and the struggle against it as a holy duty for Christians. In the Soviet power the synod perceives a world leader for fraternity, equality, and peace among the nations. The synod denounces the international and national counter-revolution with all its religious and moral authority.

"The synod calls upon every true Christian citizen of Russia to a united front under the leadership of the Soviet government, to enter into the struggle against the world evil of social injustice."

In connection with the unfrocking of the former patriarch, his successor, Vidensky, declared: "The church of the czar served not Christ, but the czar. It printed the name of Christ in small letters and the names of the imperial family in large letters. It spoke of 'holy Christ,' but of 'the most holy Patriarch.' When the autocracy fell the church staggered and was afraid, because it was founded on the autocracy and not on Christ.

"Yet already in the early days of the March revolution there were some of us in Petrograd, young priests, inexperienced, who proclaimed that capitalism, which is the stealing of one man's work by another, is a mortal sin; and that men should live as brothers, sharing the goods of the world. But this was not the voice of the church. If it had been, then the church would have had its share in the social revolution, instead of bearing to-day the shame of armed attacks and underground plots against the Revolution.

"But the hand of God turns the pages of history, writing what it will. The Soviet government, though it calls itself atheist, is the only government in the world which goes out to champion the toiling masses. It is carrying into life the principles taught us by Christ, of brotherhood and common sharing.

"The church is being reborn. It greets the workers and the peasants and wishes to work with them to build a new society. It wishes no longer to keep the peasants in darkness and submission, but to educate itself also, together with them. We take back the anathema pronounced by Tikhon against the Soviet government. We say to the White Guards: 'Go away, we don't need you.' Why need we plot with soldiers when we are in the midst of our own people?"

VI

Vidensky's "young priests, inexperienced," have of course their compeers in every sacerdotal organization. But except in the rare instances of radical social change, their lovingkindness, their ardour, their idealism, gets worn down by the inertia and policy of the institution to a disillusioned resignation, a cynical materialism, or a career of personal aggrandizement. Siddhartha could not be a Buddhist, nor Jesus a Christian, nor Lao-Tze a Taoist, nor Isaiah a Judaist. The principles of St. Francis are dissipated in the order of the Franciscans. Ecclesiasticism interposes an impassable gulf between profession and practice. Churchmen therefore tend to be either cynics or dullards. They work at their crafts, and the rest is as God wills.

Both episcopal reports and secular records reveal what God wills. European literature is rich with evidence that there is no necessary connection between personal character and priestly vocation. As a physician may be a scoundrel and still a good doctor, so may a priest be no saint and still a good priest. The vocation of the one is to heal the sick and keep the healthy in health; the vocation of the other is to manipulate the gods on behalf of his clients. Why should the vocation of the latter impose a strict way of life any more than the vocation of the former? In our world, the notion that it should, that a priest should be a better man than his betters is a persistent one, but it is only since the Protestant reformation that it has gained any ground; noticeably, only within the last hundred years or so. At that it is not coercive. The criminal record of the arch-evangelist of the current Ku Klux Klan cost him nothing in power and prestige. His function as propagator of the Klan gospel was independent of his private life, or automatically

washed it clean of sin. The laity, from the early Middle Ages down, is bitter and amused about the clergy. Churches and churchmen are the butts of indignant sarcasm and ribald laughter the world over—from Chaucer and Langland to Boccaccio and Rabelais and Voltaire and Dickens and Tolstoy and Anatole France. Churchdom is despised, its services are called for nevertheless; and because the vestige of the supernatural they work on is believed somehow to adhere to the meanest of them, priests are a little feared—some thin effluence of *taboo* attaches to their persons and being.

In the long run, churches and churchmen adjust themselves, as we have already sufficiently observed, to the changing scene of the life of civilization. Once established, they are however slowest to make the change, and for this reason variants of dogma and establishment, sects and schisms, keep rising up and breaking off from the older trunk, multiplying thus religions and churches. When churches do make the adaptation, they do so on the principle of least effort. As nearly as possible the sacred books, the symbols, the rituals, the institutional order are kept materially intact. It is their meanings that are changed. The same Christ, the same Buddha, the same Isaiah, can stand at once for capitalism and communism, for liberty and slavery, for peace and war, for whatever opposed or clashing ideals you will. For the life and the power of a church is in the persistent identity of its symbols and properties. Meanings change anyhow, but things endure. The rock upon which a church is founded is not the word of God; the rock upon which a church is founded is the wealth of men.

CHAPTER XI

SOME FUNCTIONS OF RELIGION IN THE MODERN WORLD

I

CHURCHES are craft organizations of men and women skilled in the manipulation of the supernatural. Each has its special trade secret or open mystery on which it bases claims to superior competency over all its competitors. To the hierophants of the mystery its initiates or communicants turn in the first resort when, confronted with the crises that beset our life, they require the intervention of supernatural aid. Those crises which are cyclical and recurrent become the basis of the sacraments of the churches: they are birth, puberty, marriage, sickness, sin and crime, death, in the biography of the individual; drouth, hunger, disease and war, in the history of societies. Sacerdotal mediation is invoked also in all those untoward situations for which the calendar has no place but which are unhappy enough to call for the intervention of the gods. The property and tools whereby this intervention is sought are the foundation of churches and make up the vested interest of the priestly craft whose skill is to use them. Regardless of the legal ownership of church property, real or fundamental ownership rests in the churchmen whose professional tools the property is. And their behaviour accords. They compete for survival as other vested interests compete for survival, fixing standards and either crushing competition, absorbing, or compromising with it. This, the record of Christianity, from the days of the innumerable Gnostic sects to the days of the innumerable Protestant ones, sufficiently shows.

In the course of this struggle, some church functions that had once been altogether proper and sacred have been sloughed off; others have become objectives for new sectarian formations, still others retain their status in one sect and lose it in another. Divination and prophecy belong, with us of the Western world, to the first class. Although the functions of the augur, the haruspices, the oracle and the prophet were alive in antiquity, and remain still a part of the formal priestly vocation in the Orient, they have fallen among us to a religious underworld of astrologers, palmists, fortune-tellers and the like. Prophecy is limited to predicting the Second Coming of Christ, the End of the World and the Last Judgment, sects being often founded with a view to preparing for the precise day of these ever-future events. This order of prediction, together with various forms of miraculous healing, sloughed off by large numbers of Christian sects, is often the basis of new ones, like Adventism and Christian Science. Exorcism, which is practised by the Roman Catholic branch of the priestly craft, has been dropped by most Protestants.

The lapse of divination from ecclesiastical respectability to the religious underworld is highly symptomatic of the status of religion in the modern world. It is a phase of the retreat before the enemy, a moment in the contraction of religion's sphere. For the concern of religion is pre-eminently with the future, since the future is the locus of all momentous doubt and insecurities. This has two aspects. One is immediate; it is our future here and now, in the world of our labour and leisure, our pain and delight, the world of that which happens to us as we go day by day, from childhood to old age. The other aspect is otherworldly; it is the future when we are dead, the future of what happens to us in a life we can never experience, an experience we can never have

while we live. Religion has long resigned divination regarding our fortunes while we are alive. It has tremendously enhanced and elaborated definition of our destiny when we are dead. This is why prophecies about the end of the world remain ecclesiastically respectable, while prophecies about any proximate day have been depreciated into superstitions; a modern Saul seeking a modern father's modern asses would meet short shrift from a modern Samuel, who would denounce him for blasphemy and bid him ask the police.

For our modern Samuel would recognize that the police are more efficient than Jehovah in finding even lost asses. He would thus concede the success of the competitors of religion as tools in the struggle for survival day by day. He would acknowledge its displacement by its competitors and would compensate the contraction of the field of religion with an exaltation of its supreme instrument. What I am trying to say is that the closer we have come to the natural, the remoter, the less necessary and important has the supernatural become. If the half-gods go when the gods arrive, the gods go when science and industry arrive. In a certain sense the whole growth of civilization, since Galileo first threw two unequal stones from the leaning tower at Pisa and Lionardo sent an apprentice to his death on wings, has been marked by the recession of the supernatural. From theism to deism, from deism to pantheism, from pantheism to transcendental idealism,—that has been the logic of the progression. One after another food, clothing, shelter, health, sex, the seasons and the weather have been taken from religious manipulation. Largely, even the traditional accessory reinforcement of a natural technology by a religious ritual has ceased to be called for. Science and industry do without help. They not only manage much of our present, they predict not a little of the day-to-day future with

a ratio of accuracy the predictions of religion cannot parallel. But concerning a life after life, on which religions make infallible deliverance, they are dumb, or deniers.

II

This situation is met within the churches in several ways. A contraction of the sphere of religion and a compensatory exaltation of its object is one, constant way. Another is schisms and the multiplication of sects, each defined by some varying emphasis on old religious instrumentalities or the projection of some, to its projectors, novel one.

One very interesting development in this mode, is the Young Women's Christian Association. This organization seems to be growing into a woman's sect of the evangelical churches. Christianity, as is well known, does not think highly of woman. To Paul, its founder, she is a secondary creature, to be tolerated as a servant but never to be endured as a comrade. To the church Fathers she is, next to Satan, the incarnation of evil, the figure of temptation, to be kept ever in subjection. The question even came up before one of the church councils whether woman had a soul. And in all church matters woman was secondary; her maternal function was held a degradation, and the services of religion were often *taboo* to her when she was menstruating or after she had borne a child. With the unique exception of the Quakers, no Protestant sect did very much better by her. Yet for the last couple of centuries she has been the mainstay of the sacerdotal institution. Without her self-humiliating devotion its case would have been far more precarious. Her status, nevertheless, in church life, was worse than in civil life, and its improvement lagged considerably behind its improvement in civil life. The Young Women's Christian Association is an aspect of this improvement. Or-

ganized as an afterthought to be the woman's counterpart to the Young Men's Christian Association, it was like that, an item in the struggle of the evangelical churches to hold their communicants against the transformations of mood and attitude caused by the growth of factory work and city life. At first the Women's Association was a mere pietistic accessory and supplement to the regular churches. But its functions multiplied, its scope expanded. It became a channel for the suppressed emotions of vigorous female personalities. By its means they reacted upon the repressions with which the Christian community had hemmed in their sex on all sides. It developed a social programme and intellectual restatement of the function of religion entirely its own—and modern. In the matters of the way of life, it turned quietly liberal, in many instances, radical. Ministers no longer patronize it. Churches fear it as a competitor and fight it. Within its own ranks the old prayerful management finds itself in conflict with a young efficacious secretariat. Through the Young Women's Christian Association "Christian" womanhood seems to be coming of age, but alone, as an independent sect, a woman's party in the Church.

The Young Men's Christian Association is no counterpart among the men of evangelical Christianity. It is far more conventional, conservative, and dogmatic, although the sacerdotal intention has become secondary to such secular functions as adult education, vocational classes and athletics. The men of the evangelical churches have found their way to enrichment and freedom in quite another direction. The churches themselves supply them opportunity for Modernist intellection if they want it. But phases of affectional expression for which the orthodoxies are a channel were cut off by the Reformation. Material symbols for religious feeling were attenu-

ated merely to words. Feeling requires more substance for its projections. This substance was provided by the organization of the great totemic confraternities of orders such as the Masons, the Elks, the Lions, the Odd Fellows, the Eagles, the Eastern Stars, the Moose, the Owls, the Redmen, the Knights of Pythias, the Knights Templars, down to the Ku Klux Klan. The sacerdotalism of these orders is notorious. Their vestments, their liturgical language, their vessels, their rituals of initiation and communion and their mystery have long been subjects for jest and causes of not a little envy and insecurity on the part of outsiders. But they are obviously the renewal, among the emotionally starved evangelicals, of the ancient pomp and circumstance of religion. Toward some of the orders, especially the Masons, the established churches, especially the Roman Catholic Church, manifest a bitter antagonism, and conversely one order or another—the Ku Klux Klan notably, may be founded in antagonism to established religions like Catholicism and Judaism. As the astrologers and fortune-tellers have inherited from the churches of antiquity the arts and lore of divination, so these fraternal orders have taken over the other aspects of curious learning which is exemplified in the scholasticism of Masonry. Moreover, the orders are true brotherhoods in the classic sense. Aside from the insurance and convivial features that characterize their organization, their initiates are vowed to help one another in need and sustain one another in danger.

III

Another reaction to the contraction of religion is self-criticism, overhauling and reorganization by its own authorities, so as to enable the church to meet the exigencies imposed

by the competitors, sacred and profane. This last method is worth dwelling on a minute. The Catholic counter-reformation was an event of this latter sort; the recent assent of the Methodists to dancing and card-playing; of the Presbyterians to evolution; of the hook-and-eye Mennonites to buttons; the Julian revision of Olympianism in the fourth century of the Christian Era; the social programme of the Federal Council of Churches, are all aspects of the same thing. The administration and uses of church-properties come in for revision in such cases as well as creed and ritual. Church histories are full of records of administrative housecleanings, of which the scandal of the tenement properties of Trinity Church in New York is a trivial example.

IV

Far more significant in such church changes than the competition of their ecclesiastical peers is the pressure of industry and science. Science comes first in the order of time, industry comes first in the order of influence. Except that both are general beliefs, science and religion are opposites. They are opposites because the fundamentals they believe in are opposites. The fundamentals they believe in are *causes*; the causes that science believes in are fixed, regular, orderly, inexorable; if once one event is related to another as a cause to an effect, it is always so related. The relation is necessary and can never conceivably lapse or alter. It is expressed by eternal law. Always the law of gravitation requires that the attraction between two bodies shall be in direct ratio to their masses and in an inverse ratio to the square of the distance between them. Always the law of the combination of elements requires that two atoms of hydrogen shall join with one of oxygen to pro-

duce water. The rule is invariant. It works regardless of time, place or circumstance. Another equally invariant rule may offset or neutralize it but nullify it cannot.

Against this scientific determinism, religion asserts two opposites. One is also a determinism, a religious determinism. The other is an indeterminism. The schools call the first kind of cause, the cause which religious determinism believes in, teleology. Seeing the world teleologically, religion agrees with science that events are related to each other inexorably in a fixed and orderly and rigid way, that the laws of Nature express. But the order of the sequence religion reverses. What science calls the effect, religion calls the cause; what science calls necessity, religion calls purpose, design, providence; what science sees as an impersonal mechanism, religion sees as a dramatic agency, puts a will and a personality into. The laws of nature, religion says, are the providence of God.

Religious indeterminism also has a will and a personality. But it is a *free* will, and an elusive personality. Regularity, necessity, rigidity, providence, are its opposite. It is the contrary of both the teleology of religion and the mechanism of science. Its action is unequal, sudden, unconditioned, and sheer. It breaks up order and infuses an unpredictable event into a necessary sequence. Such an event we call a miracle, and miracles, we all know, are the especial testimony of the presence of the supernatural. The supernatural is regarded as pre-eminently a *free* cause, at least psychological in substance if not human in form, and the craft of the religionist is conversant with the arts of inducing this free cause to bring about desirable effects in the affairs of men. This kind of cause is extremely obnoxious to science.

V

We may now turn to industry. In one sense, industry depends on science. The structure and processes of the machines on which industry depends are illustrations of precisely the kind of causation that science believes in. Mass production presents man's nearest attainment of Nature's continuous effectuation. In a more intimate sense, however, industry doesn't depend on science at all. In its beginnings, it is the reaction of mainly illiterate artizans who know nothing whatever of science to the limitations of their tools and their materials. The feel of manipulated material under the hand, the hesitation and clank of a wheel, guided them to modifications in tool and changes in the lay of a material that rendered manipulation smoother and more harmonious, that eliminated the excess which prodigal nature always makes. To the intellect, to a habit of skill, such an excess is *waste*, and a machine is by first intention a waste-eliminator. A machine is a device which does what nature does, cheaper, quicker and better. A machine is purpose incarnate. Machine inventors liberate actual and possible natural sequences from the clogging and neutralizing and exceeding complications that in nature always accompany them. For in nature nothing is pure; there is no one single thread of causation spinning by itself alone; there is never just length, just light, everything is mixed up with other things, manifold, rich, confused, impure. Your machinist is to practical matters what your scientist is to matters of thought. He abstracts, he simplifies, he reconstructs, so that things that he wants to follow each other, follow each other at last in the simplest and directest way. In a successful invention, therefore, you get, by intention, unrestricted and pure mechanical causation.

But when you combine a number of such causations you find you can disregard the accompanying human attitudes and postures while the machine is at work; you don't require the elements which man contributes to the tool of care, of consciousness of manipulation, to account for the process or to get it done. The industrial worker isn't a craftsman, he is a machine-tender. All he need do is start something, touch something, stop something. The machine does the rest. He is not at work in the same sense that an artizan is at work when he manipulates materials. Is it not the boast of many manufacturers that their product is pure, "not touched by the human hand"? Think a moment of the difference between typewriting and quill-driving and you will get a good illustration of what I mean. Typewriting requires only the same up and down poking motions of the fingers, endlessly repeated. There is no shaping of letters, no making of varied patterns that correspond to the movement of the hand itself. Quill-driving does do that. The quill-driver is inside while the typewriter is outside the process of causation that puts a sentence on a page. So is the engineer, the spinner, the salesman, who you will. And his feeling about it is correspondingly different. The work goes on in an automatic invariant way, from the time a raw material enters and a finished product leaves, the shop or mill. It goes by a necessity like that which natural law is assumed to express. The worker, his feelings, his thoughts, don't count in it. In the process of production, he doesn't belong.

In the human linkage of this process of production he does belong however, he finds, and in a very mixed-up way. As a craftsman on his own account, our worker was a personality, a free agent, self-sufficient, independent. As a machine-tender, he is a "hand," with a set place, and a number perhaps. Con-

trast him with what the poet calls the "independent farmer" of olden times. That farmer had to meet his own needs and that of his family with the work of his own hands. He did not earn a money wage. He grew grain and vegetables from the soil; leather on a calf, milk in a cow. He cut his wood to build his house with and to build his fire to warm himself by; he grew sheep and sheared them, and he or his wife spun the wool to make him a homespun coat and dipped it in the tallow to make him candle-light. There were very few things that he didn't do for himself. He was the kind of person that made up the great majority of the population of our world before machinery spread and towns grew. He was the "natural man" with his "natural rights" that political philosophers idealized so, the equal of every other natural man. He is the type that the Declaration of Independence refers to when it declares that all men are born equal. He was, in the circle of his family, nearly self-sufficient. The things he couldn't make he would pay for with the things he could. Shoes for instance. He would take a bag of corn and a calfskin to his village and tell his friend the shoemaker to make him up a pair of shoes.

That shoemaker was a craftsman. Have a look at him. There wasn't any United Shoe Machinery Company to mortgage him up for life. He had his needle, his hammer, his knife, his awl. With those he made every bit of a pair of shoes, all the parts, from last to eyelet. And take a look at his son or grandson in a shoe factory to-day. A machine-tender, doing one thing and one only with a tool he doesn't own to a piece of leather that has come to him he doesn't know how and is going he doesn't know where. Before that piece becomes a whole pair of shoes, I have heard some one say, two hundred different men will have done something to it with dif-

ferent machines. Two hundred. A shoe worker in a shoe factory is only one two-hundredth of a shoemaker with respect to the making of a whole pair of shoes!

One two-hundredth or one-twentieth—the proportions are unimportant! Important are the relationships the figures express. These shoemakers depend on one another as men have never before depended. Let any one of them change his rate of work, relax his attention, suffer an accident, stop his machine, then all the other nineteen or one hundred and ninety-nine are thrown out of gear. Even, continuous motion of the machines; even, steady movements of their tenders, one in all and all in one—that's the connection. The interdependence is that of a mechanical sequence of cause and effect. All the preliminary steps must have taken place before the final result can appear. The machine worker belongs, and in such a way! As he never belonged with his God, or even his mother. He is bound on the wheel of economic necessity to a social group, a group of fellow workers, whose individual co-operation is essential if the collective result of their labour is to produce for them their separate wages. This is a fact of factory production long before it is an idea in the producers' heads. They begin as separate and competitive workmen, they come to be, in the course of time, organized members of a labour union.

VI

What influence do such events exercise on creeds and rituals and sects and churches? Direct testimony, assembled by chaplains from men in the army, is to the effect that at least the American soldiers in the war to make the world safe for democracy knew very little about the faith of their fathers, and cared less. They owned some kind of sectarian church membership and had had some kind of religious education, but

it didn't seem to last. The clergyman, who wrote the report, thought that their education was defective and advised changing the system of religious education. No doubt the system would benefit by reform, and the churches would, but it doesn't belong to the picture. . . .

In the foreground of the picture is the fact that the men were largely city-dwellers and factory-workers, machine-tenders, that they had the mental set and emotional tone which such an environment makes the funded mentality of those who live in it. And to this funded mentality the faith of the fathers is alien and irrelevant.

For the faith of the fathers is the faith of the farmers. Christianity is the religion of an agricultural economy. It is the heir and concretion of the religions of all the husbandmen of antiquity. Its central divinity is a dying God who is reborn after he has died his shameful death, and his death and resurrection are celebrated in the Spring of the year, as were those of Osiris, of Dionysus, of Mithra, of Attis and Adonis and Tammuz. His birth is celebrated at Christmas, at the winter solstice, and he was cradled in a manger, like Dionysus, and the calendar of the older orthodoxies, Greek and Roman Catholicism, the Syrian Christianities, list a series of feasts that correspond specifically with the other feasts of the sacerdotal-agricultural calendars of antiquity. They set feasts for the worship of Mary, virgin at once and mother, protector of the poor, intercessor, nourisher. She is the heir of Demeter and Proserpine, the mother of Dionysus by Zeus; of Isis, of Aphrodite, of Cybele, of the Great Mother of the Phrygians. The mystery of the Christian religion is concentrated in the Eucharist, the feast of bread and wine which are at the same time the flesh and the blood of the god, agricultural *sacra* of diet, renewing life and force. In the orthodox cultus,

the mystery is repeated in the Mass, with its dramatic hieroglyph of the death and the resurrection of the god.

That the source of life dies and is reborn; that the cycle of the seasons is an alternation of death and renewal; that men, in sympathy, must also die and undergo renewal, that they must be *twice-born*; this was the burden of the ancient mysteries, whether of Dionysus, Apollo, Demeter, Isis, Mithra; this is the burden of the Christian cultus, St. Paul himself designating it as a mystery. Those who are initiated are born anew. They become mysteriously elect to eternal life. They have been vessels of sin, doomed to eternal death. But by believing that God sent his only-begotten son as their surrogate; then, that the latter died an ignoble death, was buried, descended to hell and on the third day rose again, they are saved. They compose a fellowship which is the City of God. Here, on earth, they are strangers, travellers passing through, not natives, not inhabitants. The natives and inhabitants of earth are the rulers thereof. They are wicked and unredeemed. They do not believe in the divine sacrifice and the vicarious atonement. They compose the City of the World. Between the City of the World and the City of God there is an everlasting warfare. The City of God is at the mercy of the City of the World, is brutalized, persecuted, and shamefully treated. But this cannot be forever. In the fulness of time the Redeemer will come again. He will judge heaven and earth. He will condemn the City of the World to eternal hell. He will seat the City of God on his right hand, to dwell with him in heavenly joy forever.

Such is the outline of the Christian vision of the world and man and man's place in it, elaborated by St. Augustine, and serving in effect as a rationalization of the immemorial rites which have been made the central mystery of the Chris-

tian cultus, the rites of the husbandman, getting his living by tilling the soil and raising flocks. It is of the soil because its elemental action has always been of the soil; its elementary conception is a metaphor for the phenomena of the soil; its ultimate outlook is the farmer's outlook upon the alternations of the seasons. If it did not stir the unknown depths of the farmer's spirit, whose would it stir?

Not the city-dweller's and machine-worker's. The workmen of the great factory and trading towns in which the bulk of our civilization nowadays live are no more free from fear, from insecurity, from crisis, than the farmer ever was. They are no less likely to require the intervention of the supernatural. But the vehicle of that intervention must take a form appropriate to the setting which defines their "minds" and sets their attitudes. Hunger and disease and death menace the industrial no less than the agricultural worker. The menace is not winter, however, but unemployment; not drouth, but business depression. It is the business, not the seasonal cycle, that they more immediately experience. And the two are far from coinciding: business may be plethoric in winter and starved in summer; employment may be poor in spring and excellent in autumn. As the seasons are always with us, so the moods that are our perennial responses to them cannot fail to be; but they are crossed and overlaid and confused by a succession of other moods which respond to the fluctuations of business as well, and which call on their own account for utterance in art and ritual and prayer; call, in a word, for projection by means of religious images and symbols and doctrines.

VII

The symbols of traditional religion are as inadequate for such moods as its rites and calendar are irrelevant to the busi-

ness cycle. They are now eccentric to the basal patterns of our social structure; they used to be direct projections of them. The first divine societies were patterned partly on the patriarchal order, partly on the order of the city-states. The gods used to be families of aristocrats, exercising the social functions and enjoying the pleasures of the ruling classes of their respective worshippers. Then they became ministers and agents of an imperial supreme god, a King of Kings, officials and functionaries of a heavenly bureaucracy, like the governments of Rome, of Byzantium and the other empires of antiquity. Angels and devils the Christians made them into, without otherwise changing their rôles in the Otherworld or their earthly departments and functions.

And imperial and bureaucratic, heavenly society has remained. Even for so democratized a mind as Mr. H. G. Wells's God is an "invisible King," and the peasant Pope, seeking to signalize afresh the pretensions of the Roman Church to universal dominion over men, ordains a festival of Christ as King. Religious literature, the latest hymnals, the last liturgies, equally with the unchangeable Sacred Scriptures, refer to heavenly society first in patriarchal and familial, then in royalist, feudal, aristocratic, and military terms. God is a father, a lover, a bridegroom. Churches and women are his daughters, his mistresses, his brides, his spouses. God is a heavenly King; his Son is a "prince of peace," but the leader of the heavenly hosts, and his angels are thrones, dominations, principalities. Men are the children and the all-submissive subjects of their heavenly King, his servants, his slaves. They are "Christian soldiers," battlers in "the army of the Lord." In heaven they live in palaces and wear crowns, themselves.

Now the ground-plan of modern political societies and

economic institutions is not royalist, nor very much military. Authority is not less authoritative than it used to be, nor aspiration less snobbish, but things go by different names. Modern times are times of republics and democracies; of elections instead of inheritances, of factories instead of fields; of foremen, gang-bosses, superintendents, managers, and hands, instead of lords, masters, farmers and men; of trades-associations and trades-unions instead of guilds where the two mixed. The individual has a different standing before authority and his peers. He does not feel inevitabilities of status any more, even under the utmost domination of authority.

Nor is his household what it used to be. With the urbanization of life under the stress of machine-craft and mass production, the status of woman has changed, and with it the pattern of the family. "Obey" is not so often heard in the marriage service, and the continuity of marriage is reduced. The family changes from a unit of vital economy into a conventional association of convenience. Children cease to be assets and necessities of living and become luxuries and drains upon life. Housing is often so constructed as to make household economy a mere matter of sharing a common roof. More and more men and women marry, do live together, even beget and bear children, but do not make up a family; do not establish, that is, those habits of interdependence and mutuality which *are* family life.

But if the patriarchal family of the agricultural community has at last worn itself out in the industrial community, there is no prospect that it will be replaced by a matriarchate. The extension and elaboration of the public school systems tend to replace that basic mother-child relation on which family continuity rests. And it is true that bearing children and bringing them up are, beyond the purely physiological limits, only

accidentally connected. Schools and nurseries provide experts trained to bring children up while the physiological mothers go back to their tasks in the industrial system. They are thus only the peers of their men, not their superiors. Slowly, as new engines of our political economy wear down age-old customs by their mass and momentum, men and women get loosed from the corporate mutuality that characterizes their relationship from of old. To offset their economic interdependence with their fellow workers, they tend to become with respect to each other, free-moving, footloose individuals, equal at last. "Father," even psychoanalytically, ceases to mean what it used to.

To the political economy of republicanism, machine production and the business cycle, and the distortion that these exercise on the relationships of women, men and their children, how can the religion of an agricultural economy, of a royalist and military political order, of a patriarchal family life, carry any sacred significance? Is it merely a stroke of chance that the warfare of Fundamentalists against Modernists is a warfare of country ministers against city ones, and of more or less unindustrialized farming populations against industrialized factory populations? Is it for nothing that a book drawing Jesus Christ in the image of a successful Rotarian and Kiwanian is read by the tens of thousands? I cannot think so. The whole history of the churches since the industrial revolution points to their dislocation and the development of a new faith, a faith directed to overcome the exigencies and crises of the industrial economy.

What this new faith is for the majority of the industrialized world I have already said. Socialism is the name we give it. And Socialism is at least as definite and precise a common denominator for the identity and aspiration of the

clashing Socialist sects as Christianity is for the Christian ones. The range of these sects is unlimited. It may be the programme of the British Labour Party or of the Socialist Party of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, U. S. A., or of the All-Russian Communist Party or of H. G. Wells or of Bernard Shaw, or of Leon Trotsky, or of Robert Owen, or of any of the pre- and post-Marxian doctors and saints of the cult. The underlying pattern is the same. And not merely is the salvational pattern of one Socialist sect the same as that of another. It is, in a broad way, the same with that of the agricultural economy. As it could not help being, since it is directed upon the fundamentals of life and is a talisman of salvation from ultimate dangers. Observe how in its own materials it echoes the Augustinian rationalizations of the basic agricultural rite—of dying and being reborn.

For the City of God and the City of the World, read Proletarians and Capitalists. For the eternal warfare between them, read the class-struggle. For the incarnation, read the transformation of labour-power into capital. For the crucifixion, read the exploitation of the workers by their employers, the growing poverty of the poor and the growing enrichment of the rich. For the resurrection and the faith in it, read the increasing class-consciousness of the poor. For the Last Judgment, read the Social Revolution. For heaven and hell, read the Socialist State. Whoso believes this gospel according to Karl Marx shall be saved; whoso does not believe shall go down with the Capitalists when the Revolution comes off. Then there will be no more crises, no more business cycles, no more unemployment. Men will produce for service and not for profit. They will own the tools of production in common; they will work together and play together, and rich and poor shall be no more.

The process by which this destiny unfolds itself is described as that mechanical causation which science postulates as the form of all change. And since Marx and his compeers have had as much to do as anybody with the postulation and spread of the notions "economic determinism," "materialistic conception of history," there is a widespread tendency to believe that this is so. It is not so, however. Marx borrowed his rule of change from the transcendentalist theologian Hegel, who believed that things change by turning into their opposites and then combining—thesis, antithesis, synthesis—as labour turns into capital and capital uses labour to make other kinds of capital. The process is dialectical not mechanistic, and its conclusion is determined not by its beginning but by its end. It is a foregone conclusion. Marx is really a teleologist thinking in matter. To him there is a providence that shapes for Socialism, rough-hew the steps of history how we may. This providence is immanent in the process of history; it is omnipotent, omniscient: the saving force.

If this is not of the potency of the supernatural, what would be?

Historically, such changes as the traditional cultus has undergone have tended to assimilate it to this new religion. When the lives of men were first radically upset by the use of machine production, they grasped at stability in the form of a freshened restatement of the ancestral faith. This was Wesleyanism, as we have already seen, which swept the translocated industrial workers like a fire. But Wesleyanism had nothing for them; it was irrelevant to their situation and the Wesleys had no interest in meeting it. "Obey your employers" they told their converts. "Endure your hardships as best you may. Look not to earth but to heaven." Wesleyanism lapsed from the industrial scene. It was replaced by

the endeavours of such men as Kingsley and Toynbee. Social settlements appeared. The churches were moved to consider amelioration and prophylaxis in this life, as well as preparation for the next. Charity and remedial work became supplemented with—shall I say—repayment, and constructive help? The Socialists were inimical to the churches—in their gospel, God and Capital were equally the devil—and the churches hated the Socialists, but more and more they thought and behaved in the Socialist way. Numbers of the clergy joined the new faith, reconciling it as they might with their old professions. The sacred Scriptures began to assume a new meaning. As Jesus Christ is now made over into an efficiency expert and a business man, so earlier he was made a master of the social question. Finally he was rendered by many altogether a Socialist. Evangelical churches registered such compromises and transformations in programmes like the social programme of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, of which I have already spoken. The speech of a successor of the Wesleys in his capacity as presiding officer of the Methodist Episcopal Church Conference in New York is a sign of how far the change has gone.

The Church [declared Bishop McConnell] would be reduced to a mere social institution if it persisted in compromising with truth on great issues, particularly those involving wealth and political expediency. . . . In the glorious days of the first century, before the Christian Church had hardened into an organization, before there were Episcopacies and equivalents, and when being a Christian was a dangerous thing for any individual, it had an heroic spirit.

It realized what we in these days sometimes forget, that to bear the cross meant standing boldly forth and telling the truth to a world that didn't want to hear it,

understanding the while the certain consequences of that stand.

If the Government is morally wrong on some vital issue, it is not only the duty of the church of Christ to say so, but to stand firmly in its position. Too many ministers make "adjustments" to meet the needs of political expediency.

And the same criticism applies to the way the Church treats the problem of wealth in its relation to social conditions. Christ did not soften His messages. He did not seek to make His truths pleasant in order to get the world to accept them.

But to-day there is too much effort on the part of some preachers to soften the meaning of the admonition that it is easier for the camel to pass through the needle's eye than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven.

They know full well how few there are who can handle great wealth without spiritual damage to themselves and others, and yet they seek by their homilies to soften the word of Christ and to "adjust" it to the social conditions of their peculiar charges.

But Christian leadership must be found to inspire, to perpetuate, the prophetic vision, to pierce beyond the surface, find the truth and present it to the world with full willingness to take the consequences if that truth be unpleasant to them. If the Church persists in compromising on this great issue then these leaders will be found outside its ranks and the Church itself be reduced to a mere social institution!

Yet another citation. The Steering Committee of the Joint Legislative Conference, which consists of Miss Mary E. Dreier, Miss Rose Schneiderman, Miss Mabel Leslie, and Mrs. Samuel J. Bens, are concerned deeply about social legislation. To save the forty-eight-hour bill, which was up before the legislature of the State of New York, they wrote a letter:

Republicans in the Assembly [they said in this letter] repudiated their party pledge and ruthlessly slaughtered this measure when the vote to discharge the committee

came before them on April 6. Our only recourse is to pray that God give us men of courage in the Legislature in future years who dare repudiate their leaders rather than betray the good faith of their party.

Even if this particular resort to prayer should be nothing more than a cover for denunciation, it still serves to show how completely transformed is the point of view in modern religion. Crises in situations hardly ever before in the purviews of the churches are being met with religious action. We are here in the presence of the socialization of religion. It implies a new type of causation and a different dogma of salvation, the Socialist dogma. Not souls but bodies are to be saved; not heaven but civilization is to be happily inhabited. Salvation, which was of the lone soul, private and personal, in the Otherworld, is now far more conspicuously of the group, public and general, in this world. The churches have taken on a "social creed" under the impact of Socialism. They also attach community centres to their establishments and social service departments to their organizations. Their emphasis has shifted from the saving of souls to the saving of society. Nevertheless their halls are empty and their establishments are subsiding from inattention and disuse wherever the industrial economy has long prevailed. Their modification of function is their struggle to survive.

VIII

So much for the modification of religious function by industry. Now let us again turn to science.

If we take science and its especial theory of causation simply, uncomplicated by either the record of history or the data of experience, what more is it than alternative to the religious way of seeing the character and destiny of the world? In

and by itself it has no more validity than religion. It presents itself to belief like religion, and is no more than religion entitled to prerogatives or privileges or special interest. Nevertheless, in the three hundred years since that which we moderns mean by science was born, religion has suffered a progressive dislocation in every field of knowledge, economics included. This secularizing process has gone on steadily and with a gathering momentum, so that one domain of study after another has passed from the care of the churches to the care of specialists in the field. Let us recapitulate once more what has happened. The assurance of the food supply, the determination of the weather, medicine, health and education, which had been provinces of the clergy, have passed into secular keeping. Nature, man, society, winds and markets, crops and epidemics, are studied and charted. So is religion. The studies bring about forecasts of events like the weather-man's. They are acted on with hardly ever a doubt of their correctness, and they lead to success. They thus replace the supernatural, driving it out of the picture.

But the methods of science are directed also upon the churches and the other vehicles of the supernatural. The higher criticism applying the canons of scientific research to the lives of saints and seers, to the history of churches and their tools and possessions throws upon them an untoward perspective and alters radically their valuation. Of course the churches did not submit to this process without warfare. Outsiders they condemn, denounce; members of their own communion they degrade and expel; if it were *convenable*, they would destroy them by fire: the Encyclical *Pascendi Gregis* of Pope Pius X is definitive. Churches have met every single new step of the higher criticism with the characteristic technologies of inquisition and repression. The weight and inertia

of tradition are on their side; as the late William Jennings Bryan pointed out in his defence of the legislative proscription of evolution in the public schools of Tennessee, the majority lives by tradition and defends it. Nevertheless, the higher criticism goes on and Science rules the sacred precincts of the faith itself and is seated in the inner shrine. Why? Because tradition and custom and the churches, which are at the inmost heart of life, are left behind by life. The inmost heart of life is its dead centre. Life, like a tree, grows from its outer rim. Hence controversies are not often settled and very often dropped. Vitality and attention pass on. Aristotelian physics, Ptolemaic astronomy are not unworkable, but even Roman Catholic sages, prescriptive followers of St. Thomas as they are, would hesitate to use them. You and I might make a flivver of the 1890's take us where we want to go, but would we, if a current model is at hand? The current model would take us where we want to go more quickly, comfortably and cheaply. We would not dispute the merits of Model 1898 against the merits of Model 1926. We would simply mount Model 1926 and ride away. So in every field of thought and action—old techniques are abandoned for newer and better ones; displacement is unceasing and the struggle for place ruthless. In this process the Church is more and more recessive. Before science its authority collapses and its power is dissipated. Its functions pass to other institutions one after another. The priest is pushed out by the specialist in science, in industry.

IX

The priest is displaced, but not expelled. The church is left empty, but not torn down. Both are subject to secondary use, a use still involved in the exercise of their primary func-

tions. Like any tools abandoned but preserved, they are insurances against the failure of their substitutes, reserves to call upon when the regular agencies of the conduct of life break down.

And that the conduct of life does break down, again and again, we have sufficiently seen. A fringe of insecurity prolongs the firmest isle of safety. A margin of doubt extends every certainty. Our best machines fall to pieces under us. Our most heady philosophies go *caput*. Then, helpless though we be, we must continue, and we continue on the lower levels of action and purpose available. If Model 1926 fails us, we haul Model 1898 out of the garage; if legislators will not be persuaded, we pray for others that will; if scientific medicine fails, we try unscientific healing. Whenever the sense of breakdown is so intense that we just cannot take the time and the patience to reassemble the pieces, to wait until they knit, we drop back upon the lower level of function, to the older way of meeting the situation. We call in the expert in the manipulation of the supernatural.

Two types of situation especially call out these ancient reserves which are religion and the church. One is inward and personal, an aspect of the tangle and cross-currents of motives, impulsions and interests in a life, of delicate intricacies and complexities that have come to conflict. This is the realm which the psychoanalyst is exploring. It is the realm of what evangelical religion calls sin, the dwelling-place of the organized conscience. Since disillusion became a permanent trait of the civilized mind, religion has been a means of relieving the inward strain and a way to peace. The religions of disillusion—Buddhism and the other Asiatic cults of negation, Epicureanism, Christianity—have each offered an especial way out of the conflict, and a fresh integration that shall

make life endurable. Personal, as distinguished from churchly, religion is motivated by the need to resolve conflict and to reintegrate individuality.

In just the degree that the religions of social righteousness and common endeavour fail to do this, the cults of the twice-born survive. The question naturally arises, why not the psychologist instead of the priest? The answer is that in these circumstances the psychologist becomes a priest, and because he is without the seal of sacerdotal approval, rather a poor one. One need only to turn to the literature of the psycho-analytical schools to see how unconsciously and spontaneously they emerge in the traditional language and mysteries of immemorial cultus. New gods, new supernaturals, new eschatologies, new priests! Jung and his school are nothing but a repristination of inherited cultus; the other schools are other things as well, but in "therapy" they are that first. On the whole it would seem more advantageous that the "spiritual director" of a soul in conflict should be a psychologist than that the psychologist should be a "spiritual director." In this field something may be credited to the accumulated wisdom of the generations and the garnered and generalized experience of the race. Religions are the institutional keepers of these, and they need only the repristination of the scientific approach.

The other situation which calls out the ancient reserves of religion is death. Here science is at an impasse. Neither its assumptions nor its method find a thoroughfare. True, there is psychical research. But that is either dubious or negative. And science is both by logic and by experience negative when it is confronted with the task of saying that and how we are alive when we are dead. Preoccupation with this condition is universal and endemic. When we do not wish immortality for ourselves, we hope it for our dead friends

and lovers—our enemies, too, for that matter, if we hate them enough to be sure they must suffer. But with respect to immortality science cannot help us. It denies or is dumb. The life-after-death, hence, is one of the chief remaining precincts of religion. Even on this ultimate of belief religion has however changed its form. It began with great precision. As we have had occasion so many times to note, religion often starts in a sort of commerce with the dead, tendance and exploitation both. It makes use of a calculated technique to nourish, to protect, to use: the pyramids of Egypt are witness. It provides a detailed topography of the habitations of souls, and offers a method of facilitating advantageous changes where those are possible. But little by little these specifications and concreteness lose form and substance. Words replace the food, the clothing, the weapons, the magnificent dwelling-places. *Proofs* of immortality replace the conviction of it; arguments for it replace the proofs. The soul itself becomes first an entelechy, then a principle of life, then a transcendental ego of apperception. Its destiny after it is dead becomes a matter of dialectic. Experience of the shadow-dream-image-reflection-breath-name ceases to count. The nature of the soul is implicated in one or another *interpretation*, not perception, of the character of the world. And in interpretation, attitude counts for far more than event, preference than experience, value than existence. Interpretation defines the seen in terms of the unseen, and the unseen, like every negation, may be anything; may be, therefore, the heart's desire.

X

Thus religion, a device for the manipulation of supernatural causes for human ends, becomes religious philosophy, an interpretation of nature in supernatural terms, for human

ends. This transformation takes place relatively early in the great historic religions. But in former times the theology, the dogma, the metaphysic, were accessory to the saving ritual. Now the ritual is incidental to the metaphysic of destiny. That is the important thing in religion—the generalized salvation from the generalized insecurity, concentrated at death and extending thence to unknown, and to science perhaps unknowable, regions of the residual universe. Religion is still a technique of salvation—but as a philosophy of life and death, not as a manipulation of the courses of nature.

CHAPTER XII

PHILOSOPHIES OF RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHIES

I

BORN into an existence we do not seek, into a world which does not seek us, it is our destiny to maintain ourselves and to grow in it, and to maintain ourselves and grow by struggle. There is, as Job long ago discerned, a warfare to man upon earth, he is born unto trouble as the sparks fly upward. Religion is man's oldest and in many ways his dearest engine of victory in this warfare of his life. It is his array of instruments to overcome trouble, to banish fear, to go secure. The instruments are projections of his feelings in crisis, feelings of hunger for food and drink, feelings of love for the mother, feelings of fear and hate of the father; feelings of dread in the dark, of joy in the sunshine; of anxiety at the turn of the seasons, of terror in winter and release in spring; of dread of the shadow of the dead. To banish fear, to enhance well-being, in these and other untoward circumstances, is the task of religion. This task is accomplished first by the release of feeling in movement, in dances that utter the emotion and imitate the desired event—evil banished, good brought in. In the course of time the imitation is projected beyond the body to accessories, to sticks and stones and animals and plants; movement becomes action with tools, skills develop, the action becomes standard and stylized, an event capable of being in itself good or evil. It is now a ritual, and in the course of time the ritual becomes referred to a performer

to explain it, the ritual generates a god; the god generates a myth; the myth is generalized into a theology.

Two elements contribute to this accretion and elaboration of the content of religious belief. One is the inner momentum of the material itself. It exfoliates copiously; like other things in nature and man, it exceeds. Religions present for examination a very jungle of divinities and divine events. Each fresh development becomes a condition and circumstance for the exfoliation of others. There is a pyramiding. This is checked in some degree by the other contributive factor—the slow selective action of the process of trial and error. By this means excesses are worn down, a hinterland forms of ideas, imaginings and ideals; set perspectives appear, of existence and of values. These perspectives are the overt, articulate theory and practice of religion. They are the creeds and the cultus that the churches publicly offer the worshipper for his salvation. They are actual and imputed parts of the world the worshipper lives in, chosen as most efficacious in manipulating the rest of that world, particularly the worst of that world, for his present and eternal benefit. In this, however, they are confronted with competitors, competitors that do the same work so much better, that the history of religions is the record of the recession of the objects of religious belief from the near fields of human endeavour. Civilization seems almost synonymous with secularization. Religion moves up into the attic of society; out into the untilled and unhusbanded fields of life. Its dwelling-place is now the dubious, grey frontier of knowledge and power, the everlasting fringe of insecurity our safety strings out into. Here belief replaces knowledge, and the gods, Nature. Here is the marge where the supernatural enters in. Individuals find this marge when some strong interest is obstructed, some hope defeated, some

wish repressed. Sex-hunger finds a very frequent terminus there; hungers for personal expansion, for health, for fulfilment trail a live end there. And into the feeling of deficiency and conflict, which is the conviction of sin, the saving power of the god moves in its mysterious way his wonders to perform. The experience of societies in their larger, more obvious crises is the same: war, epidemics, famines, drouths, are heights of insecurity that bring religious tools into play. And death, for societies and individuals both, is especially such.

Indeed, religions of disillusion, like Christianity, might be described as a contemplation of death, a device for overcoming it after it has happened. Science and industry acknowledge death and are used to delay and prevent it. Religion denies death and is used to prepare for the "after-life" of the dead. Science and industry are affirmations; they make life more abundant. Religion is a denial, an insurance. It guarantees, not fulfilment, but security. Its work is salvation, its goal to make us safe. This is why religion is so intimately associated with prohibitions, why asceticism is so commonly implied in its regimen, why, to some authorities, its essence lies in *taboo*. All the ten commandments but one begin, *thou shalt not*. *Thou shalt* is focussed for the Otherworld of the dead and the gods. Here belief and ritual are prescriptive and affirmative.

What, belief and ritual say *Yes* to, in the topography and affairs of the Otherworld, is, as we so many times have had occasion to recall, of the Unseen. Its visible parts are symbols that the imagination has fashioned to embody the emotions which aroused the imagination and set it to work. Its substantial invisible parts are precisely those emotions; they are what a mind seeking the unseen finally comes upon—they, and the film

of words that give them the last refinement of body and shape. Inward to them, therefore, religion turns. Sin, which began as a material error, becomes an immaterial, that is, an emotional conflict. Salvation which began as bread in the belly, ends as the grace of God in the soul. Now, we can suffer conflicts of feeling, but we can neither see them nor lay hands on them; we can appreciate the grace of God, but nothing in it sticks out for the senses to lay hold on. So we call sin and grace "spiritual" and their originals, material: sin and grace unseen, and their originals corporeal. But they are only the ghosts of the originals, something converted into almost nothing. They go with the philosophic essence of soul, that distillation of the shadow-reflection-dream-image-breath-name into the thin *I* of grammar and the *transcendental ego of apperception* of metaphysics. For the soul recedes with the gods before the conquering feet of the sciences. It diffuses into the body's functions and becomes their persistence when the body is no more. In effect the soul is the "after-life" of the dead. This recession beyond death was buttressed already in Plato's day, and then it was that dialectic replaced ritual and inference knowledge. The "after-life," the gods, the ancestors, the heroes, all became subjects of belief and proof. Philosophy set in. You had, against the constant spatter of contrary evidence from perception, to *prove* that immortality and God and freedom were so.

II

Philosophy is born, thus, of religion, to be its handmaiden. It must establish in words what the fathers used to experience in perception. It must elicit by inference what used to be the fathers' common knowledge. That we have a soul able to exist without the body, that the soul does so exist, that it

lives in an Otherworld with God, are doctrines which all but very few of the great philosophic schools are devoted to proving. The form which any school attributes to the immortal soul, the character it gives to God, the connection with God it ascribes to the soul, vary with the state of the community for which the school speaks, with the constellation of interests its thought expresses and serves. Those supply the ground-plan and the special symbols of the system. Plato's order of eternal ideas among which the soul takes its pleasure, the companion of the gods, reflects the structure of the republican aristocracies of Hellas; Plotinus' unutterable and ineffable God in whose power and glory the fortunate, impotent soul loses itself, reflects the imperial autocracy of Rome. And so with whatever classical system you may choose to name. Vindicating in some sense the reality of the soul and the gods and the happy life of the one in the company and providence of the other, such a system gives that heavenly society articulation by patterning it upon the ruling passions of the group-personality dominant in its time.

In the ground-plan of ruling passions on which each philosophy builds its "stately mansions, O my soul," two constituents are to be distinguished. One is immemorial, the emotional subsoil of the changing phases of civilization. It is made up of those continuing relationships between men and women and children that are the foundations of the group-economy. It underlies the family and its ramifications, the basic techniques of getting food and shelter, obviating fear and establishing security. It is the patterned lasting response of a human group to its environment, its funded mentality.

The second constituent is more superficial than this funded mentality. It is the sequence of patterned secondary responses to an environment of which the funded mentality is now a

unit, and a foremost unit. These secondary responses are partly exfoliations of the funded mentality, partly responses to it. They are changeful and discontinuous. They may be called the "spirit" of a group or people and are related to the funded mentality as an individual's habits are to his anatomy. Group-spirit supplies the intellectual environment, the emotional climate, into which an individual is born. Some of the psychoanalytic schools call it his unconscious mind, some reserve that eulogium for the funded mentality. Either school may have its way. The point is that in so far as the individual minds anything, that is what he minds. If it be unconscious, it is so because it is not merely his personal idiosyncrasy, but the collective attitude of the community into which he is born. It affects him from the moment he enters the world, and the obstetrician and the midwife handle him in one way and not another, and talk about him in one voice and one vocabulary and not another. It is the menstruum of all he touches, and he himself lives and moves and has his own being in it. He cannot escape it. He can only repudiate and fight it, but he lives in it and on it as on the air he breathes.

III

From such stuff, then, is the ground-plan drawn of the invisible world, the metaphysical world of God and the soul. Mr. Cornford has traced the event in the very beginnings of Greek thought. Do you remember the rôle of Fate in Greek drama? What dithyrambs have the critics not written about it! Fate inexorable—with the majestic march—Fate revealed by Æschylus and Sophocles—the tragedy of Fate. Mr. Cornford tells of a line in Euripides, put in the mouth of Athena, the Koré of Athens. "What is ordained," the

Goddess declares, "is master of the gods and thee." The word for ordination is *moira*. The gods are bound by it no less than men. What, however, are they bound to? You find that when you seek the earliest uses of *moira*. The word named a division of land, a province or dominion within whose limits the ruler has power. It is the domain of a tribe or a king. Its boundaries are not to be passed, for passing the boundary is a declaration of war. Many of the gods began their careers as *phalloi* marking off one dominion from another. Boundaries are *taboo*; the power dwelling in the guardian stone crushes the violator of the *taboo*. And as is usual, the keepers of the marches become the lords of the land. Boundary *phalloi* become tribal or national divinities. Quarrels between them, like wars between their worshippers, are by primary intention jurisdictional disputes. Fate here appears as the boundary of landed property, impassable alike to gods and men.

But there is an earlier property than land. Woman, the mother, the sister. Exogamy begins as *moira* with respect to these relations. Mothers and sisters are the province of the father. To marry the mother the son must kill the father. He must violate a *taboo*, transgress *moira*. When he does so, he pays. *Ædipus Tyrannos* is the standard sample of such a transgression of *moira*. *Ædipus Tyrannos* is a "tragedy of fate." In the unending stretches of forgotten time, fate, the rule of the boundary, became justice, the rule of balance, and justice becomes reason, the rule of proportion, or measure, the *ratio* of human behaviour and divine providences. The equivalences, fate: justice: reason, are in fact equivocations and rationalizations. Each step carries the authority of custom farther, until what was a restraint imposed by superior force becomes a self-restraint arising out of perfect wis-

dom; what was the near menace of neighbouring power becomes the inherent principle of the cosmos.

Let us consider the word *cosmos* a little. It is a common symbol of the philosopher. It has meant for God knows how long a well-ordered world. But that was not its first meaning, Mr. Cornford tells us. Its first meaning was the domain assigned to a clan or a tribe; like the lands over which the tribes of Israel or the sons of Hellenus received dominion. By first intention a *cosmos* is a political precinct. The *cosmos* which Plato so loved and admired was an attenuation and exaltation of a political order he liked indifferent well. His purpose as a philosopher was to demonstrate that the one he exalted was real, the one he disliked was *nil*, and to establish a way by which we might all pass, if we were capable of being Platonists, from the *nil* to the real.

IV

Plato started the classic tradition in European philosophy, and the end is not yet. Whatever the *Zeitgeist* whence a philosopher draws his specific materials and symbols, the funded mentality is consubstantial with Plato's, and soul and god are in some form vindicated and confirmed. It is possible for both the Stoics and the neo-Platonists to derive their ground-plan from the bureaucracy of imperial Rome, and it is possible for each to be at daggers drawn with the other and St. Augustine with both, though he, too, gets his ground-plan from that source. It is possible for St. Augustine to lapse before the authority of St. Thomas, whose ground-plan of the cosmos derived from the feudal structure of the Middle Ages, and for both to be Christians. Because the indispensable elements, God and the soul and their life together,

did not change. What changed was the manner of their life, as did the manner of human life, with the times.

Modern philosophy, with a vastly different spirit to draw upon for its ground-plan, continues the Platonic purpose. In one fashion or another the reality and eternity of God and the soul are established and vindicated. By Kant, through rejecting reason as a test for the objects of faith and through declaring those objects essential to the conduct of life. By his transcendentalist successors, Fichte and Schelling and Hegel and Schopenhauer, through declaring the ordered world to be the self-projection of the Soul, and demonstrating that the Soul and God, now called the Absolute, are the same.

The transcendentalists, bar Kant, ignore science. They continue in effect the mediæval tradition, and their religious character is unmistakable. The line of philosophy which embraces scientific thought is, however, only a little less obviously religious than transcendentalism. Its task is complicated by science, but not altered. It must prove God and immortality and freedom in a world seen through the eyes of Galileo and Newton, not of Aristotle or the metaphysicians. Politics and the family are no longer the sole sources of the ground-plan of the cosmos. Physics appears as their competitor, and in the first phase of the philosophies taking account of science, the ground-plan of the unseen derives straight from mechanics. Spinoza and the rationalists of the eighteenth century demonstrate God and the soul somehow in the context of a Newtonian cosmos. Kant gets round it by dissolving the cosmos in the soul; and he supplied a lead which, until after Darwin, philosophers of the nineteenth century who took science into consideration were relieved to follow. Darwin's discoveries shifted the emphasis on biology. "Reason" was succeeded by "will" and "will" by "life" as a metaphysical

category. The new vindications of God and the soul relegated physics to a secondary place, and devoted themselves to biology. Thinkers like Eucken, Driesch and Bergson, particularly Driesch and Bergson, set a precedent in proving God and soul with evolution instead of mechanics as the ground-plan.

v

I mention, of course, only the variations, the new departures and fresh views. The tradition of philosophy is massive and continuous, and its phases are contemporary as well as successive. Roman Catholicism maintains its official scholastic adaptation of Aristotle intact, and the Church's seraphic doctor has his successors in our own time. Pious Platonists are plentiful, and neo-Platonism is a recurrent note in the progressive theology of advanced and eccentric sects; it has its modern echo among Judaists, one of whom, Philo of Alexandria, began it. In all those circles it is a competitor of a rationalism which prevails in its romantic rather than pure modes, the strong note of the schools. Hegel and the transcendentalists still dominate the academies, and God and the soul and their life together continue to be proved in the manner of Royce or the italianate mode of Croce. All these, however, are reproductions, not variations, not transformations. The changing line of thought alive is currently the life-line of evolution and biology.

On the whole, what is not religious in origin and religious in goal; what does not seek somehow to demonstrate the soul (that is, immortality, or the proposition that we are alive when we are dead), and God (that is, supernatural power consubstantial with ourselves), and the life together of the two in happy companionship everlastingly, makes a very little

part of the history of philosophy. Its importance is not in question. Regardless of the incomparable worth of its secularist parts, the whole of philosophy bulks as religious philosophy.

VI

Each religious philosophy is a philosophy of religion. But a philosophy of religion need not be a religious philosophy. A religious philosophy may be, like Mr. Russell's, atheistic; a philosophy of religion may be antireligious. The task of philosophies of religion is to evaluate religion in the light of some standard not itself primarily or traditionally religious. Nietzsche's teachings make a philosophy of religion which rejects the tradition for a new ideal of immortality and godhead. To Nietzsche religion is a phantom and an illusion, a sapper of the freedom and strength and growth of the spirit, the chief factor in the degeneration of mankind. He wishes to replace it by another mode of after-life—the superman; and another mode of divine being—the Will to Power. William James, on the other hand, formulated a philosophy of religion which set in a scientific framework the polytheism of the common man. He examined the inferential *cause* behind the gods; he investigated its status and sought to dissect its substance. He did not argue, he studied. And he came upon the supernatural, as the great, great mass of men have ever known the supernatural. Harald Höffding, studying religion as a social phenomenon rather than an event in a biography, found religion as such to be without philosophical content altogether. As theory it was false, as a deliverance about the nature of reality it was a symbol of emotion, not a statement of fact, an embodiment of the aspiration of men that their "values"

shall be preserved. Religion, says Mr. Höffding is the conservation of values. Religion, Mr. Santayana finds, is an unsuccessful endeavour at harmony or reason—at the reconciliation, that is, of man with himself, and with the world he lives in. . . .

And so it goes. Philosophies of religion are rarely, like Höffding's or James's or Santayana's, not at the same time religious philosophies. The tendency of the systems, manifestly, is to reject one mode of the religious attitude for another: to repudiate the event, to exalt the principle. Their differences are like the differences between the sects. They also are carrying old wine in new bottles.

CHAPTER XIII

RELIGION, PROGRESS, AND HAPPINESS

I

IF you ask anybody in our wide American world to-day whether there is a crisis in religion, he will tell you Yes. You will find the professional religionist and the general public prone to insist that something is happening in and to the church, and that religion, at least in its institutional form, has a bitter fight on its hands, and probably a losing fight. The idea that the churches are confronted with such a crisis is so widespread that nobody pretends to challenge it. People go on this assumption and argue from it that times present are profoundly critical for established religion and that the religious situation is more difficult, more dangerous, to-day, than ever before in the history, at least, of Christendom.

I have already made clear why this view seems to me an illusion. The whole history of religious institutions is a history of crisis. There never was a time since churches were established when those churches were not fighting against all kinds of inward heresies and outward opposition.

Religion, like the other works of man formed as institutions, maintains itself by a struggle which endures no rules. Whether religion as such has been weakened by the course of time, particularly during the nineteenth century, is a question to which there can be no instant answer. Take up the Year-book of the Federal Council of Churches—the last one I could get hold of is dated 1923—look at the comparative statistics

of church membership in the United States between 1890 and 1922 and be astonished. You read that, whereas between 1890 and 1923 the population of the United States increased about 6.8 per cent, the church membership of the United States increased 118.4 per cent. In 1890 the church memberships were 34 per cent of the total population; in 1922 the church memberships were 45 per cent of the total population. Approximate ratios to the total population are: seventy-seven Protestants of all sects, eighteen Roman Catholics, three of all other faiths; ten of no faith at all.

Do not doubt these figures. Forget that the computations have been made by churchmen under church auspices. Ignore the idea that consciously or unconsciously a special interest might direct the computation. Take it at its face-value. Then consider: this miraculous growth of the churches has taken place at precisely the time when churchmen themselves feared they were dying of inanition. Look up, for example, the report of the Committee on the War and the Religious Outlook, which made a survey of the religious attitude and opinion of the enlisted men in the army, and read:

If there is any one point upon which chaplains agree it is in regard to the widespread ignorance as to the meaning of Christianity and church membership. . . . We might well hope that in a "Christian" country men generally, even those without any allegiance to Christ and His Church, would know what Christianity is. Chaplains say that they do not know. And they go beyond that and say that men nominally within the Church, men who have been to Christian schools, are in much the same condition. . . . The Church as a teacher has failed to instruct its own membership and present its Gospel to the men just outside its doors. . . . If we learn our lesson the result will be a vastly greater emphasis on our teaching function.

Again:

When one looks back over our forty years of relatively barren teaching during which the "uniform" habit was fastened upon the churches of practically every community, and when one realizes that the churches believed for more than a generation that this was all that is necessary for the religious development of youth, he begins to understand why it is that the cross-section of young manhood brought together by the selective draft could be so pitifully ignorant and undeveloped in their religious life.

Now put two and two together: you get what on the face of it appears to be a contradiction. A steadily and rapidly growing church membership ignorant, on the testimony of professional religionists, of what they are in the church for and what religion is all about anyhow. The situation may be general, may be as true of Judaists and Mohammedans as of Christians.

II

If this conclusion is correct, would it not follow that the living force of a religious affiliation does not lie in its institutional connection? Churches may be moribund, churches may be dead, churches may be jazzily alive and tremendously competent in extending their power and increasing their incomes. And religion may vary inversely with the strength of the churches and directly with their weakness. The contents of the record show that there is no necessary connection between the quality of being whereby religions are alive and the size or power of church organization.

Church organization is fundamentally an economic fact. It is an institution centring about the control and administration of property and properties. And living religion is pri-

marily an emotional event, a function, as we have so many times in the course of this discussion had occasion to observe, of life-crises of individuals and societies, rather than of a treasury of established and standardized devices for meeting and resolving such crises. The gains and losses of churches, therefore, need to be correlated with their functional attitudes, not with the limits or significance of their possessions. Membership, wealth, and power of churches have not generally to do with manipulating supernatural causes. They concern, rather, the upkeep of an institutional convention which gets imposed on the young at a very early age and which is so indifferent to characteristic habits and dramatic novelties of their lives that they pass through church schools and church services less affected than if they pass through one of the New York subways not during the rush hour.

We have seen what a crisis can do, in their opinion, to those it overtakes. It may shut off access to free adjustment. It may cripple or lame, or otherwise limit movement. It may starve, stamp out, obstruct, frustrate, imposing in one way or another a feeling of weakness and helplessness, a mood of despair. We have seen what the supernatural is called upon to do in such cases—in sum, this: to liberate in the individual or the community the living flow of energies from the pressure that dams it up and strangles it.

I say, to liberate the living flow of energies and interest. The living flow is itself never an abstract or indeterminate thing. It is always, itself, defined by certain limits. It is compressed within the characteristic forms the ruling passions of the age realize themselves in. Recall now how we found the story of institutional religion to be one of steady recession from the general field of life to those points where dangers and uncertainties, crises, come as permanent or at

least perennial events. Thus, whereas the religious agency, the supernatural cause, is at first invoked to intervene in all the projects of life, it is at last invoked only for those tangles and depths of action where the projects themselves turn doubtful, sick, and insecure. Of these the greatest and last is death. And here religion changes from a device to insure the kindness of nature to a device to insure that the "after-life" will carry prosperously on after death. This, we saw, was especially the burden of Christianity: to save your soul, though you lose the world.

But now churches appear that deny the soul to win the world. Attention has shifted from security in the after-life to decency in life before death. The new emphasis in the churches on social justice, as they call it, or social service, is to a very great degree a returning of religious interest from a very sophisticated level of religious disillusion, from other-worldliness and metaphysics, to a more primitive, a more naïve level, a level of concern for the body's well-being. It is an endeavour after a more abundant life on earth, an abandonment of a blissful life in heaven.

The fact that this reflects the basic interests of the machine age, I have more than once already called attention to. It is now to be observed that these interests, the vision of the good life by which the age lives, is basically at variance with the salvation of souls. The conviction of sin and the need to be saved do not take hold of the minds of men any more. The clergymen themselves have told us, studying men's minds in war. Salvation ceases to be a marketable commodity, even at the traditional blood-price. The Church is giving up the propaganda of the salvation of souls. It no longer can live by salvation alone. Yet salvation was once the dominant ideal of Christendom. From the fourth century after the

beginning of the Christian era until the fourteenth men lived to be saved. But from the fourteenth on men only pretended that they lived to be saved. They bought salvation in order to live. That was when the Church waxed fat and strong, and made the great claims we have referred to in another place. That was the time that was followed by the Protestant reformation and the religious wars.

III

Although the propaganda of salvation has neither lost in volume nor been depleted in force, it has swung from the centre to the outskirts of men's interests. Of those that replaced it at the centre—reason, freedom, wealth, progress—the greatest variation in character and prestige in usage attaches just now to progress.

Progress may be described as a functioning contemporary ideal. Prior to Darwin's formulation of the origin of species people didn't think of themselves and their affairs in terms of progress at all. They thought about death, and they thought about salvation and about happiness. But they didn't think about progress. Death and salvation and happiness designate limits of action, goals for conduct. They lay down definite tracks along which behaviour must run and upon which behaviour must conform. They impose unchanging and unchangeable standards. There isn't any ideal men lived by, East or West, before Darwin, that was not a definition, limiting, static. After Darwin there came more and more into the foreground of opinion and of teaching the notion of an ideal which was not a definition, that set no limit, that meant simply "moving." This is the ideal of progress—the notion not merely of getting on but of going on. The going on of progress doesn't mean merely becoming better; it means becoming dif-

ferent. To make progress is not just to improve; it is to become different without becoming another, without altogether losing identity. A physician who practises the art of medicine more and more perfectly as he goes along doesn't make progress in this sense. Perfection, while not the antithesis of progress, is not the same with it. Sometimes, it may be the opposite of progress. In the ultimate sense, it is the opposite. The physician who without ceasing to be a physician becomes a banker, the physiologist who becomes a philosopher, the banker who becomes a poet, these make progress. There is at once continuity and variation. The country school-master who becomes president of the United States, he makes progress. The poor boy who becomes a rich man, he makes progress. Progress is a notion which requires the budding of novelty upon an ancient stem, branching and change of quality, form, direction; morally, it calls for a transformation in the inward pattern of a character.

Where this notion of progress comes from is easy to see. It is applied to the life of man by analogy from the life of life. It is a concretion in terms of human society of the general concept of evolution. You start with something like a protozoön and you end with a human being. A human being is a current phase of a series of transformations of the protozoön. What makes man man is not what he has in common with the ape. What he has in common with the ape is what keeps him apish. What makes man man is what he does not have in common with the ape. Man's humanity is the constellation of traits which have been added to his ape-like qualities. The notion, spontaneously current among us, that what is different from and has been added to our ape-like qualities makes us better, is simply and purely our vanity. If the ape could discuss the transformation what, in view of his

needs and his powers, would he call it? And what would the protozoön call all its successors?

In strict logic and honest ethics, progress has nothing to do with the concepts of better and worse. Better and worse apply to things of the same quality. One piece of wool can be better than another piece of wool, but wool cannot be better than the North Pole, or a soldier better than a clergyman, or a clergyman better than Mr. Coolidge, or Mr. Coolidge better than Mr. Wilson, or Mr. Wilson better than Mr. Daugherty, or Mr. Daugherty better than Salt Lake City, and so on. These are, from the point of view of fundamental valuation, incommensurables. Nevertheless, the conventions of nineteenth and twentieth century thinking do make comparisons of just such things. Especially they ordain the latest stage in transformation to be the best stage and to say, that is bad which is old and that is good which is new. You are thus enabled always to sit on the top of the world. If you refuse this practice, you are neither progressive, nor progressing.

This view, which identifies progress with perfection and recency with superiority, is a delusion. Perhaps it is an inevitable one. It is the type of delusion which arises whenever a company of men accept the fact of change and then seek to confine it in the frame of human history, the nearer and more intimate end of which is *Now*, wherever in time one be. In such a history, emotion points the immemorial beginning in the direction of the present end, and the heart doubts not that one increasing purpose runs with the courses of the suns—to ourselves. But if we recognize that progress designates transformation and that it excludes judgments of better and worse, this delusion is precisely what we destroy. Judgments of better and worse are always relative to the character, idiosyncrasy and status of the judge. Progress admits of no

limitation, no specification. A candid modernist can only acknowledge that events have a course, that change has a process, that there is branching and altering and growing. Under certain conditions he may call this progress.

In the United States, for example, progress is identified with increase in measure: a city is said to make progress that has more inhabitants; architecture, that raises buildings higher and higher; individuals, that get more and more millions. Quantity, increase, of whatever stuff, is progress. Accumulation becomes, then, the index of progress. That changes in quantity bring about qualitative transformations is neither considered nor recognized. Yet this is the teaching of the natural sciences. Both physics and chemistry use accumulation of identical units to bring about qualitative change. Starting with a constellation of protons and electrons, you knock one off and the constellation becomes a different being; you add one, and the constellation becomes still another being. Why should it be any different with men and societies? Piles of gold, stacks of bonds, one hundred per cent skyscrapers, make new Americans, as ten electrons or twenty electrons make new elements. Differences in income level will create direct differences in personality. Thus our American way of judging all things in quantities may be the foundation of a new metaphysic, even as it is a derivative of the old natural philosophy, as it is already the ground plan of a new religion. It sets the criteria for the nature of the new god. Progress in America must incarnate not primarily quality; not primarily perfection; not even primarily direction. It must integrate rapidity and multiplicity and complexity of change. The late Mr. Henry Adams is its prophet. Under the coming dispensation, that civilization is most progressive whose members and institutions are so loosely knit and so flexible that the restrictions

upon individual fortune and institutional alteration are at a minimum. In such a society he builds ill who builds for ages; twenty years are the limit. In such a society, impulse will initiate action both of individuals and groups, and once begun, never done until exhausted, and exhausted when begun.

Of course, such a society is only a shade seen as in a glass darkly, as Faust saw Helen on the Witches' Sabbath. It can be hardly more than a compensatory ideal. For most of the societies of the world reject it. The sort of thing that social regulation is in the habit of upholding is stability, and stability consists in an established cycle of definite changes, a repetition by the generations of the funded mentality of the race. This was the way of life in China before the revolution; in India, everywhere among the masses of men, even in the United States of America. For this way of life, progress is movement toward excellence; perfection, not change, is a goal; the conflict between perfection and transformation is to the knife. For the ape to seek to be a man is suicide, merely; progress is to seek the appropriate perfections of the ape. What is man to the ape? The death of the ape. The same is the superman to man. Between becoming another and perfecting the same, the notion of progress oscillates like a boat on a choppy sea. Take your choice.

IV

Religion at its institutional heart enshrines the extreme development, the limit of action in opposition to progress. Religion is exclusively conversant with ultimates and finalities; with the soul, that is, and with God. That it cannot arrest change its own history fully shows, but it does delay change. The story that religion tells about the nature of man and the universe, about the place and the destiny of man therein, is

told infallibly and as a final story. Neither the gods of the world can change, nor man can change, nor can the relation between them change. Each one of these things, once revealed, is established eternally. How, then, can the order of life be anything else than an adjustment to these eternal finalities, an adjustment to first and last things? The notion of progress excludes the first and last things from reality altogether. There is no first, there is no last, in a progressive world. Institutional religion comes, hence, constantly into conflict with the adventure of human life, with the adventure of civilization on the growing edge whether toward excellence or toward transformation. The churches sit always at the dead centre of organized society, enfolding the inert pith of vested interest. Once more, the crisis which alarms them so to-day is no new thing at all. Established religion has always been in crisis because established religion has always insisted on first and last things in a world that rejects all firsts and all lasts, in a world where things start and stop, and nothing begins and nothing ends. "There is no conclusion," William James says somewhere; "what has concluded, that we should conclude about it?"

Things stop; churches offer infallible conclusions. Therefore, they are always subject to the challenge of events and always undergo the correction of heresy. Therefore, the history of religions is not the history of the unification of churches and the unity of religious systems, but a tale of constant multiplication of churches and sects. Against the conventionalism of the final infallible revelation which every new sect claims to possess, each new crisis in life calls for a new salvation to meet it more effectively than any before.

In this the church shares the secular fate. Life doesn't offer a guarantee in advance of its own successful outcome. In the transformations that civilization imposes on our growing up

and growing old, on our adjusting ourselves to the community in which we enter and live, danger is ever present, risk ever lurks. So fundamental are these, so integral with our very beings, that we have come to imagine we are safe when it is merely that danger has become habitual. Set an acclimated New Yorker and his country cousin to crossing the traffic at Broadway and Forty-second Street. Both run the same danger, but to the city-dweller the danger is habitual and he thinks he is safe, to the country-dweller it is a novelty and he feels the risk of it. Only when we pass from a familiar danger to an unfamiliar one do we recognize danger's presence in the earlier experience. It has been there all the time, but we acknowledge that only when we miss it.

All life may be described as a movement from familiar to unfamiliar insecurity. There isn't any guarantee, no matter whether the enterprise is the limited enterprise of an idiot or the highly elaborated one of a person of intelligence who has been able to develop a philosophy of life. Business is a recent common endeavour in which failure is tremendously more evident than what is called success. Any enterprise which human beings undertake shows a greater proportion of failures than successes. Nevertheless, men carry on. Life goes on, and goes on experimentally, always with a certain recognition of crisis, of speculative insecurity, and always with the inward faith that the new enterprise will be successful. Such faith—such faith as we have, for example, in crossing the street during the rush hour that we will cross it alive—we don't recognize or think of as faith. But what guarantee do we possess that we will cross the street alive? What guarantee that the whole process of urban existence is such as won't overwhelm us in the end? Not any. Only our will to carry on and our familiarity with the danger is it that keeps us carrying on.

What keeps us so is inward, not outside. It is our acceptance of the risk that enables us to take it successfully.

Now, when we project this risk cosmically, when we project it beyond the fringes of the seen into the residual universe itself, we think we confront ourselves with the problem of adjustment to the universe. We may reject the universe, or like Margaret Fuller, accept it. But we are again victims of our own delusion. We have been misled by our facility with language. Our problems are in fact limited to very short spans in time and space, from which we pass from next to next by easy and not readily perceptible gradations. They are limited by what our senses can apprehend and our memories hold. From that island of perceptual experience we reach out by means of words to the unseen and unseeable. The feeling which attaches to the perception irradiates vaguely beyond. Words impart to that beyond form and content and meaning.

We are now confronted with the universe as a crisis. We feel like Job that God is against us, and our demand for a resolution of our crisis is a call to God against himself. Remember what Job says:

"I know that he will slay me, I have no hope. Nevertheless will I maintain my ways before him." And, "Till I die will I not put away mine integrity from me. My righteousness hold I fast, and will not let it go. My heart shall not reproach me so long as I live." And: "By hearsay only had I known thee; but now mine eye seeth thee, I recant my challenge and am comforted."

Job is saying that about the universe, about what he calls God. His attitude declares that the validity of each man's struggle to live has to be an inward validity never to be sanctioned from any outer source; that it consists in a kind

of self-acceptance, in an acceptance of the circumstance of one's struggle, in acquiescing to the quality of one's own life and defending it; in being true on the basis of what one finds within one's self, not on the basis of what one finds outside one's self. God, in the Book of Job, agrees with Job. With this self-acceptance, it becomes possible to accept without self-reproach the universe also. Thus a view of the nature and destiny of man in a world not made for him becomes charged with religious meaning, and religious meaning in the primary sense of the term. The Supernatural is invoked to resolve an insuperable crisis of which it is itself the occasion and the cause. All the forces are in issue. Into the unseen we project our conception of what we are and of what life and the world are and what they do to us. We project also our acquiescence in these things. And then we judge them; in the light of our integrity which we hold fast and will not let go, we judge them. However, judging, we are free to take trouble no more, we accept life, we accept ourselves. Then such harmonies as are possible between us and the residual worlds get established, actual ones are perfected. Life gets integrated. No longer are we at war with our nature because we are at war with its conditions. The conflict between the ground of our existence and its intent has lapsed. Heart and head have, so to speak, been reconciled. If happiness names anything, it names this state of self-acquiescence, of reconciliation and self-integration.

v

Religion may, I think, be said to function in any individual's life where such an event takes place. Religion functions there as the instrument of integration, the tool of reconciliation. Whether it be the vehicle of supernatural agency or not, this

tool is fundamentally something quite human, man-made. It is a symbol, and it needs be a symbol adequate to express the changing relationships between the individual and his world. When we strip the clash between sects and churches of all other issues—numbers, power, wealth, prestige—when we bare their conflict to the religious realities from which their institutional growth and corporational warfare started, we find they are fighting primarily over the adequacy of their respective integrating symbols.

We may now say why church members, as churchmen tell us, neglect their religion; why they don't know what it is that they are supposed to believe. It is because that which they are supposed to believe serves no longer as an adequate symbol of the possible integration of them with the new world. Between Fundamentalists and Modernists the issue is primarily not one in religious emotion at all. Primarily, the issue is the integrating symbol which converts the negative responses of fear and insecurity toward an unfamiliar environment to a feeling of security, to a positive emotion which alters withdrawal from life into acquiescence in life as the risk it is.

And in the end churches get modernized because, to survive, they are compelled always to adjust themselves to the world's modern conditions. In the end, too, churches, just like governments, adopt the new symbols; they lose their constituencies if they don't. For religion constantly seeks new symbols of integration between the life of man and the forces among which he lives and moves and has his being. Churches constantly appropriate the symbol, sanctify and standardize it, and wear the life out of it, or kill it by irrelevancy.

Then the story repeats itself. The symbol of the integration between man and the universe is constantly subject to revision and replacement. The two integers, man and his en-

vironment, which it integrates for eternity, are both changing factors. The symbol neither discovers nor reveals what the world, in fact, is or what man, in fact, is. It offers no knowledge. It points not to existence. It simply facilitates the enterprise of living in a world which was not made for us and in which in the end we die. Whether as Dionysus or Christ, or Mohammed, or Moses, or Buddha, or Lao-Tze, or anybody, the symbol incarnates a judgment and valuation of existence, not a description of it. When our knowledge of our own nature changes, our religious symbols must change also.

As the record shows, it is practically impossible for churchmen, for professional religionists, any more than for laymen to take religion directly, literally. The Bible cannot be taken to say what it means or to mean what it says. To the pious it speaks ever in allegory. Revelation is a mystery and requires to be interpreted. Everything in religion is doubled over, everything stands for some other thing than itself. What, empirically, is this Other? That can never be shown. For the protean life takes a new form after each identification. It is the identification which makes the trouble. When a language of valuation is identified with the course of existence, men may make a religion of atheism, or a religion of science, or a religion of beauty, or of anything else you please. These terms, atheism, science, beauty, anything not in the traditional sense divine yet treated as a god, are each the sign of a certain adjustment to the world. The symbol is the vehicle wherein the people who believe in it are enabled to carry on into the unknown beyond, to step from those isles of safety where adjustment has already been made. They are like Childe Harold to the dark tower come. By the light of the symbol they enter in. The symbol is not knowledge of the darkness,

not revelation. It tells you nothing, but it inspirits you. You believe at your own risk and know it and are not afraid.

VI

Now, in this sense, in this very atheistic and non-institutional sense, religion is one of the conditions of both progress and happiness. Without this projection of the will to believe by means of symbols into the unknown in space and time and matter, there can be churches, there can be static and rigid organizations of society, there can be habit-bound communities and individuals, but there cannot be a free, flexible, changing life, there cannot be progress, there cannot be happiness. Progress and Happiness are grounded on a religious foundation, but religious in complete contrast to the traditional meanings of that word. This is the living religion of the firing line, of the danger-points of life, and at the firing line there can be no finalities and no infallibles. There can be nothing but faith in a projection, in an imagined content of value; faith that carries on only by its own momentum and by no other. Religion in this sense is at the core of personality, is the spirit of society as these move dangerously from one phase of existence to the next. Self-preservation means nothing here, for its essence is to reach not for safety, but beyond. Metaphysicians might call this will to believe and to risk all on belief in an uncertain adventure, Freewill. Sors and Fortuna are its correlate gods.

CHAPTER XIV

THE FUTURE

I

SEVENTEEN years ago, the students of the eleventh session of the Harvard Summer School of Theology gathered to hear a closing address by the great president of Harvard University, Charles William Eliot. President Eliot's theme was *The Religion of the Future*. Scientist by discipline and training, administrator by vocation, builder of the greatness of Harvard as a school of the higher learning in the sciences as well as in the arts, the theological as well as the secular branch of knowledge, the speaker was, of all men in the United States, perhaps the fittest to prophesy what, for the intellectual classes, the religion of the generations to come would be like. He foresaw a faith from which supernaturalism, infallible Church and infallible Book had been eliminated; in which the salvation of souls for an afterworld had been replaced by the establishment of the good life for this world; a faith without anthropomorphism, without gloom, without sacrifice; dealing chiefly not with sorrow and death, but with joy and life. The God of this new faith was to be a combination of the Jehovah of the Jews, the Heavenly Father of the Christians, the Energy of physics and the Vital Force of biology, immanent in all things, present in the hearts of men and working on them constantly as incessant inspiration, the generalization and concretion of the highest ideals men know. The will of such a God and the laws of nature were to be identical. His wor-

ship was to be without sacraments or priests; his fellowship without hierarchies of angels or communions of saints. The surgeon would replace the Virgin as a healer of disease, and no evil would be endured for the sake of an otherworldly good to come but would be resisted and prevented for the sake of a hitherworldly good at hand. The "consolations" of religion would be succeeded by unremitting effort to diminish their occasions. Ideas of justice and punishment would have no place in the faith, only ideas of hope and love, under whose influence religion would change and grow, with everything else in the world, toward the better. Its "chief doctrine is the doctrine of the sublime unity of substance, force and spirit, and its chief precept is, Be serviceable."

Not only will this twentieth century religion "be in harmony with the secular movements of modern society—democracy, individualism, social idealism, the zeal for education, the spirit of research, the modern tendency to welcome the new, the fresh powers of preventive medicine, and the recent advances in business and industrial ethics—but also in essential agreement with the direct, personal teachings of Jesus, as they are reported in the Gospels. The revelation he gave to mankind thus becomes more wonderful than ever."

I do not recall how the advanced clergymen who heard the great educator took this prophecy. It is still strong meat for a large proportion of Modernists. It certainly exceeds the most considered recent statement of the forward position in religion that I have seen. This is to be found in the book by Kirsopp Lake called "The Religion of Yesterday and Tomorrow." Mr. Lake is a professor of Church History at Harvard. An Englishman, brought up in the atmosphere of the national church, by training and discipline an expert in the use of the modern methods of historical study and textual

criticism, Professor Lake brings to his analysis of the religious situation in the Christian world the sympathy of a friend and the candour of a student. He is frankly on the side of the Modernists, but he knows how to put the case of their opponents with sympathy and without prejudice. He calls these opponents Fundamentalists and Institutionalists. The Fundamentalists adhere to the infallible revelation, to the Church or the Book, inviolate and inviolable, the sole vehicle of salvation. The Institutionalists are the Churchmen to whom the continuity of the sacerdotal corporation is more important than the integrity of religious doctrine. They preach like Fundamentalists and they talk like—Experimentalists. Experimentalists is the name Mr. Lake calls the Modernists by. To the experimentalist Christianity is a way of life, not a form of thought, and he proposes to translate the way into the plain and simple language understood of the times.

Such translation must ever be, and ever be renewed. For knowledge, in Mr. Lake's experimentalist philosophy, is based on experiment, and the experiments which ground religious knowledge, though various in kind and manifold in count, are classifiable under two great heads. One is the endeavour a man makes in the consciousness that there is a purpose in life of which he is only a part, a purpose he can co-operate with if he choose, and he does choose. The other is the endeavour a man makes in the consciousness that he can and does receive from a great source of life, help when he is weak, comfort when he is in sorrow, purification when he is sinful.

These major modes of the religious consciousness verify themselves in a thousand ways which must be considered together, none excluded, none stressed, to reveal their central intent and ultimate certainties. Therefore, there cannot be one and only one infallible Church or infallible Book, one and

only one certain order of sacraments, one and only one creed. Time and place and circumstance will incarnate these laws of the religious life according to the unique constellations they make from age to age. Old creeds may be kept as parts of an uplifting liturgy, for their emotional force and imaginative content, but they must not be regarded as statements of thought. As statements of thought, creeds would kill chemistry and may easily kill the Church. For a creed is an opinion petrified, and a living church needs a living opinion, viable, in clash with other living opinions and undergoing constant revisions. Churches, Mr. Lake says, paradoxically for an historian, exist to find the truth and to further life, not to preserve past opinions.

The Great Purpose and the helpful Source of Life are to the experimentalists, God. They are "immaterial reality," the eternal Values of Beauty, Truth and Wisdom. The religious life is the endeavour to serve under them, to validate them by experiment. Then is man obedient to the will of God and furthers His Kingdom. The experimentalist will reverence Jesus and rank him among the great prophets of all history because his teaching is in the main true and stands the test of experiment, but as an inspiration and guide for the future, Jesus' teaching will always be required to be understood in terms of the time and place and circumstances that gave rise to it, and to be interpreted from that standpoint.

Such, in Mr. Lake's view, is to be the religion of to-morrow, even though the Fundamentalists hold, as they are likely to, the churches. Religion, to-morrow, will concern itself not with personal but with social, industrial and financial questions. It will colour psychiatric work. It will seek by education to do for the emotional life what has already been done for the intellectual, cultivating a deeper sense of the values

of life, and focalizing the mystic vision of immaterial reality.

How much more forthright, positive and optimistic is the earlier prophecy of Eliot than the current one of Lake! Yet how essentially at one they are in their conspectus of God and of the content of the religion of the future as a way of life! What the seventeen years that intervene between them have done has been to dim the hopes, to blur the outlines, to introduce an element of uncertainty regarding the ultimate event. The younger author of the later prophecy sets forth a more cautious oracle. It is extremely significant, however, that neither of these seers takes a view of religion like Bertrand Russell's, that both remain, after all, exponents of the classic tradition. "Will of God," "Great Purpose," "Unity of Substance, Force and Spirit," "Source of Life," "Values," "Immaterial Reality," are not new *dramatis personæ*. Only the local colour drawn from the age is new. Jesus continues to figure as the superlative concretion of the religious outlook; a little more dubiously with Lake than with Eliot, but he figures. Mr. Eliot stresses sermons, Mr. Lake liturgies. Both are anti-sacerdotal. Yet anthropomorphism and supernaturalism withdrawn by the right hand are restored by the left. Again, as ever, old symbols get the new meanings that the times push forward, so that ancient ways and lasting preferences may somehow live together with current facts. These prophecies exemplify as well as anything the influence of science and industry on religion.

II

What is significant about both is the recession they foretell of the church. The new "religious society" appears to be a loose and free society, a society without priests, with a

minimum of ritual, and a maximum of spontaneity. The Society of Friends and the Ethical Culture Societies at their best, might be regarded as pioneers of the new church. These societies fulfil the general conditions both our writers set for "the religion of the future." The Quakers are nearly as old as Protestantism itself,¹ Ethical Culture has been going for a generation. But has not every age, and every clime, to the last syllable of recorded time, had its religion of the future, which quite meets with specifications our Modernists and experimentalists make, and often, indeed, passes beyond them? What was the Garden of Epicurus but a religious society, or the academy of Plato or the Assembly of the Stoa or the fellowship of Lao-Tze, or of Confucius, or of Comte and the Rationalists, and a thousand others less known? And where are they now, these religions of the future, except still in the future, the most powerful of them but small communities struggling to keep their lights aloft in a heedless world? Can any survive without creed and cultus? It is, I think, doubtful. As Mr. Lake observes, "creeds not taken into the liturgy have irrevocably perished"; and we have seen how one variant faith after another, unable to incorporate its gospel in sacred writings and its cultus in sacred properties, perished before the all-conquering churches that could gather up wealth and power. In the face of the record, the question may well be raised: Can religion be de-institutionalized and still survive?

¹ It is a matter of curious interest, in this connection, that in Colonial Massachusetts the law provided that one ear of a Quaker should be cut off when he was caught there the first time; the other ear if he was caught a second time. A third occasion was to be punished by puncturing his tongue with a red-hot poker. So the true faith might be kept secure against modern heresies.

III

To answer this question it is necessary to recall still again as we have so many times recalled, what we have found to be the central event underlying all religions. It is an experience of evil, taking inward form as a confrontation and clash of impulses or interests, or outward form as misadventure or catastrophe. Both the inner and outer forms are personified in the Devil; the former as sin or crime, awakened by him, the latter as suffering imposed by him. Both are crises culminating in the final irresolvable crisis, death.

Of man's first disobedience . . . that brought
Death into the world and all our woe, sing,
Heavenly Muse. . . .

To offset and to overcome such crises men have piled up their works into civilizations, forestalling hungers, preventing disease, overcoming misfortunes and catastrophes, resolving conflicts—and perennially, at times of a most great need, failing. Such times are not times when new engines can be added to the laborious secular machinery of salvation. The crisis is then too profound, the need for help too instant. Salvation must come suddenly if there is to be anything left to save. The endangered personality may react in such situations as drowning men are said to react; its whole life unrolls before it, from the present menace to the first cry of infancy. Every habit, every movement of success and overcoming may pass in review before it as under the strain its present co-ordinations disintegrate, and it seeks in the armoury of its past experience an instrument of salvation against the untoward event. Psychoanalysis would call this process regression. It would designate as stopping-place the oldest, greatest security

that experience could possibly recall—the womb of the mother, that perfect environment wherein existence, say the Freudians, is beatitude, and the world is ineffably Good. Maybe so. Feeling, however, might never need to go back so far as this most ancient Good. If it does, it does only with the lonely religionists, the mystics and seers. In churchly religions, the psychoanalytic tale would run, regression is arrested on the level where the Father is saviour. Convention immemorially ancient establishes it there and envisions the relation between man and the saving powers of the world in familial terms. God is the beneficent father, Man the helpless child. Prayer or other form of religious action easy to take instantly, brings the saving father without delay to the aid of the helpless child. That, as we have already seen, other factors of the past of the race and of the present personality are inextricably interwoven, is not important. The nub of the situation lies in the two facts, that (1) ancient saving power capable of being brought to bear instantly is so brought to bear; that (2) it is applied to dangers which the contemporary machinery of civilization fails then and there to overcome.

Each age and generation makes a philosophy and a cultus to signalize and interpret these two facts—evil, and the machinery of instant and ultimate salvation from evil. The central experience of which these facts are the precipitates draws biography and history alike into its vortex and distributes the varying materials of both along its lines of force as a magnet patterns iron filings. It introduces design and purpose into existence that would otherwise do as well without them; throwing the indifferent sequences of cause and effect, of continuity and novelty into perspectives of good and evil. As we have already learned, the laws of nature are made the design of God, the course of evolution is described as the

realization of his providence. Thus, if science and industry coerce religion into an acknowledgment of their materials and intent, religion deflects science along lines that vindicate religion's central emotion. . . . We are shown the religion of the future with the stuff of science all compact; we do not recognize so readily that the reverse of the show is science by the foreshortening religion all transformed.

IV

Not that such a transformation is without its ground. The world we live in is a confused compenetration of orders. Things and events, each different from the others, enter into, stay in and pass out of relationships, of ways of being together with each other, that make up into an infinite diversity of patterns. Of the infinitude, how could some help being spontaneously congruous with the human heart? And how could the heart help selecting these congruous ones for special attention, insisting that they are fair samples of the residual universe, and that its whole quality and order are of their pattern?

We observe early that nothing in experience is there by itself alone. We note that it may be together with its fellows in varying degrees of intimacy. Some ways of being together we see as purely external; the things that are together in those ways are as unaffected as sands in a heap; each grain is what it is regardless of the relations it bears to its fellows. Some ways of being together are, on the other hand, peculiarly intimate. The very nature and quality of the thing seems to depend on its relations to its fellows; it is like a hand or a lung: its connection with the other parts of the pattern of being together is organic; withdrawn from that pattern, it loses its identity; here its relationships constitute its identity.

In living forms, this latter way of being connected always holds; the part is defined by the whole to which it belongs, not the whole by the part. The whole is said to be logically prior to the part and to be implied by it; the whole can exist without the part, but not the part without the whole. A man goes on living, even though he has lost an arm or a leg or a kidney or an eye; but the organs that have lost the man do not. Separated from his body, they cease altogether to be what they were.

Religious philosophers making use of biology—writers like Bergson and Driesch, for example—operate this interesting relationship of whole and part to establish the existence of God and the persistence of the soul upon foundations drawn from the sciences of life. Religious philosophers making use of psychology—writers like Berkeley or any and all of the idealists, to Royce, Croce and Haldane, operate this interesting relationship in knowledge to establish the persistence of the soul and the existence of God or the Absolute upon foundations of the psychology of knowing. Other writers, like Professor Keyser and Professor Whitehead, will draw the samples from mathematics. Still others, like Professor Henderson, from chemistry, from dynamics. All will insist on the priority and superiority of the whole, the dependence and derivative nature of the part. The whole is substance, force, spirit; the parts are matter. The whole is Value—beauty, truth and goodness; the parts derive what worth they have from their place in the whole. The whole is Purpose or Providence; the parts are the sequences of events whereby the whole is fulfilment, the goal toward which the parts are the evolution. The whole is the beginning of the parts, but even more is it their culmination or end—their culmination or end not only in logical form, but in temporal sequences.

Evolution is thus a movement in perfection, a development of the indifferent toward the Better and the Best. How, then, can man not be an improvement over the amœba? Part of an immense whole in which he lives and moves and has his being, to whose Purpose he contributes, whose Providence he realizes, and whose Values he sustains, Man is a phase of that everlasting self-realization of the whole which is evolution, and because a later phase, he is a better phase; indeed, he is the latest and therefore the best. Beside the amœba, his complexities are infinite, his purposes transcendent, his values outspanning, his providence more sure. True, the amœba is immortal, man dies; but the amœba's immortality is only its incapacity to make more extensive contacts, to establish more varied relationships with the whole. Man's death is an extension of his horizons, a still further complication of his connections with the sustaining totality whose Providence enfolds him.

As sober a statement of this view as you can find—sober in contrast with the logical and emotional swiftness of religious thinkers like Driesch, Bergson, Haldane, Whitehouse—is Mr. L. T. Hobhouse. His book, "Development and Purpose," is the latest of his series of studies of the complication of structure and conduct with the passing of time. It draws from these studies the conclusion that Mind, aware of itself and of its environment, owns a central position in that aspect of the natural flux we call evolution. Not only does mind evolve in itself, it is a cause of evolution in others. Look at the works of mind. Look at civilization. Does not mind tame the beasts of the wild and the plants of the jungle? Does it not harness up the lightning and constrain the heat of the sun? Does it not turn its natural enemies, like the

vermin and bacteria of disease, to its own uses? Wherever it takes thought, mind brings into being integrations of hitherto unrelated facts, effects a symbiosis of lives unaccustomed to living with and for one another. Mind is a maker of wholes—wholes ever greater in scope and in power. Ultimately it will master nature and perfect human nature.

Why? Because mind, itself an example of the system of internal relations whereby the essence of a part is constituted by its place in the whole, is able to discern the key relation in other such systems, and to set it to work for mind's own ends. This key relation is causality; it is that connection between an antecedent and its successor which makes it certain if you have the one, that you will have the other. In a stretch of time such as each and every living being requires for its development or transformation, the future ineluctably determines the present. The oak-to-be governs the structure and behaviour of the acorn that now is; the future chicken defines the composition of the present egg. And so on. Sequences from egg to fowl, from acorn to oak tree, for that matter from ape to man, are mechanical sequences. Events move from next to next in a given inevitable way and you cannot have the last without the first. But the mechanistic succession has, in Mr. Hobhouse's view, a teleological direction. It has a tendency, and a purpose is "a cause conditioned by its own tendency." The world is full of causes of this kind separately working or so constellated that the "tendency of their combination is toward a certain result." You can see such constellations everywhere—in the life of man, in the world of biology, in the astronomer's and physicist's universe. They have an environment which limits them; eggs do not always hatch, nor do great oaks always from little acorns grow, but in their organic totality they slowly overcome their limitations

and attain the future which even then determines the present that implies it.

v

What does this last word of the religious attitude contain which in principle the first word lacked? The dualism of "spirit" and "matter" still is here, now as "cause conditioned by its own tendency" contrasted with the "limitation" against which this cause works. The overweighting of the force favourable to man, the depreciation of the unfavourable elements, should be apparent. A shift in the perspective might turn the record the other way, and without altering the data under review, we could elicit from them the religion of Mr. Henry Adams instead of the religion of Mr. L. T. Hobhouse.

The fact is that in this instance as in all others of the kind, we again are in the presence of a literal act of *be-lief*, of preference, of a choice between alternatives the data of which have no difference beyond that contributed by the act of choice itself. The exercise of the option is the imposition of a preferred pattern on the events of experience; it is their rearrangement in an order of value. Of course the materials of good and evil are identical. It is the emphasis, the attribution of direction, that makes the difference.

Such emphasis is an exercise of the will to believe. It is arbitrary and biassed. Like any event, at any time, in any place, it has its history which may be called upon to account for its existence, but none the less, it is a surd, a brute datum, for all that; since the most that its history can do is to lead back to some other inexplicable beginning to explain this one. Valuation is beyond logic and underneath it, for the logical structure of the system of preferences that it builds is demonstrably a fallacy. Each system which aims to account for

everything actual or possible is a fallacy.² Systems of religious philosophy have no pre-eminence in this respect over other kinds. The fallacy is due to the fact that we experience only an infinitesimal crumb of the aggregate immensities of the world we live in. We transform this crumb with our preferences and then we say that the whole world is of identical nature and behaviour with this tiny humanized bit. The textbooks call this process the fallacy of composition; the mistake of attributing to a whole the characteristics of any one of its parts.

This, and the converse fallacy of division, the mistake of attributing to the parts the qualities of the whole to which they are presumed to belong, provide system-makers, whether in philosophy or in science, with their underlying constructive principles. There cannot be a system of all things which is not a fallacy, because there cannot be a system of all things which does not carry over the quality of a bit of experience to the unexperienced residuum of being. Hence systems are necessarily projections of belief rather than revelations to knowledge; perspectives of values rather than concatenations of events. We live piecemeal, from next to next. Our experience comes piecemeal, from next to next. And as it comes there are no inevitables in it, neither of mechanism nor teleology. A surd lurks under every law of nature, a flaw in every design of God. Providence invariably encounters the unforeseen; necessity on occasion is confronted by the contingent. In Paul Blood's phrase, *Ever not quite*, is the metaphysical utmost that events and aspirations tell us of themselves; spontaneities, wildnesses, the unreconciled, the untamed,

² For a full exposition of this observation see my "William James and Henri Bergson," Chapter I (Chicago University Press), and "The Philosophy of William James," Introduction (The Modern Library).

the disorderly, keep raising their heads above every law, keep breaking every discipline, keep upsetting every system.

We cannot too well remember that a system is an option, not a bare fact; an option whether it be a system of the natural in terms of the energies and the laws of Newton or Einstein or a system of the supernatural in terms of the human societies of Thomas Aquinas or Karl Marx. The system of nature is no less an option because it is of nature; and the systems of the supernatural are not more options because they are *of* the supernatural. In both cases there stands out the rejection of the irreducibles, of the surds, of that which stands out.

I said in another chapter that this kind of cause, the arbitrary, the contingent, the *out*-standing, is peculiarly obnoxious to science. Let me now add, it is hardly less obnoxious to institutionalized religion. The institution regiments the miracle also. It provides a locus for the miracle's occurrence and sets standards for its validity. It looks with suspicion upon unorganized miracle-workers and the anarchic character of religious experiences where the supernatural is authentically present renders it anxious; for on the record this experience is a focus of spontaneous variations whence new and competing religions often spring. The influence of science on religion is perhaps nowhere so evident as in the failure of the prophets of the future of religion to include in the realm of the religious experience and the religious life to come spontaneities, free causes, surds of last resort. The influence of science—and of sacerdotalism!

Yet, if religion is to be anything more than an emotional overtone of the new commonsense of the new generations or a survival of old engines of adjustment and control, kept as a kind of insurance against the breakdown of the more modern

ones, religion must be validated at the source, and the source ever was, and remains, the religious experience, the direct personal contact with the supernatural. The equation of mechanism with teleology is secondary; the attribution of the causes of nature to a purpose of God's is secondary. Fundamental is the intrusion of free force, force unaccounted for and not to be accounted for, either by mechanistic sequence or the design of heaven. Religion stands or falls on the validity of this force.

It is the trend not of experience, let me repeat again, but of preference, to reject this validity. To experience the world has ever been an open world, indeterminate in structure, plural in make-up, unfinished, ever unfinished, changing in an adventure the terminus of which can never be foretold in advance. Its unities and orders are events—and eventual. Its laws are habits of living together which have grown up with its denizens. Nothing we encounter or conceive but doesn't begin and grow and end. Together with God and the immortal soul, final saving oneness and eternity are compensatory ideals;³ *Cosmos* itself is, as we have seen, an anthropomorphism.

Since the vogue of the new physics such perceptions have become commonplaces of discussion. We talk of cosmic orders forming and staying, of their struggling to maintain themselves, of intrusions of entities from without, like comets across a solar system or immigrants into a state or spontaneous variations in established species. Such outsiders may merely touch the system they enter and pass like travellers in the night; they may move through it like foreign visitors or dwell awhile in it like foreign residents, or they may establish themselves and become naturalized. The process is broadly similar whether we deal with a new interest in relation to a

³ Cf. the essay on "Value and Existence," etc., in "Creative Intelligence."

system of habits that compose a personality, or a new individual or idea or invention in relation to a community, or a new form in relation to a genus or a species or a new element in relation to the order of the chemical elements, or a new quantum in relation to the putative aboriginal electrons or protons or a new radiation in relation to the established system of radiations. In each case, the novelty, from the standpoint of the world it enters, is contingent and disorderly and continues so, until it leaves its host or naturalizes itself and becomes an accepted citizen thereof.

So with the supernatural. Like the new, it is always *beyond* any cosmos we may convene, whether by an instant act of the imagination or the slow accretion of ways of doing and ways of seeing as customs and habits and traditions. The supernatural enters such a conventual cosmos at points where these ways break down, or where, while retaining their form they have lost their power. If it persists among them, it ceases to be supernatural. It then comes under the laws which express the established habits of community, slightly modifying them toward its own nature. Science, itself, may be said at one time to have belonged to the realms of the supernatural; and scientists used to be considered magicians. Now science has endowed conventual nature with its own character and the supernatural resides in a new *beyond*.

VI

This is not because the supernatural must ever be morally beyond. Nor yet because our characteristic inertia and love of security bias us against counting as real anarchic and unharmonizable qualities and events. It is because the supernatural is in emotional fact resorted to only in extremity, when we are at the end of our rope, and alone the *beyond* can help.

At the end of our rope both the world we live in and our inner resources are bankrupt; our harmonies and mutuality are broken up: the ends we are at are loose ends. Madness is so often a companion of mysticism that secular authority is prone to identify the two. The unassimilable character of the religious experience, its incommunicability, reinforces the suspicion of it, and the natural anthropomorphism by which it is designated sets it for scientific thought among the doubtful principles of explanation.

We have seen, however, that the supernatural and the anthropomorphic are far from identical. The supernatural is the content of private experiences; divinity is a fabrication of public feeling responsive to the communication of such experiences. The supernatural antedates the gods and survives them. It is encountered before, within, without and beyond the institutions of religion. Antireligious personages come upon it as readily as the religious. Nor is the relation with psychopathic personality one of identity. There are healthy-minded mystics, as we have had occasion before to observe; and among them not a few scientists. After every precaution has been taken to discount fancifulness and delusion, there remains a residue of testimony which until much more definitive evidence to the contrary is at hand, must be taken at its face-value. On the basis of this evidence, we must admit the supernatural.

We must admit the supernatural as free or contingent force. We must admit it as a force directly experienced, and experienced in circumstances that suspend the activities of the organs of perception. We do not experience the supernatural through any or all of the senses; it is not a thing seen, heard, smelt, touched or tasted. We do not think the supernatural; it is not subject to ratiocinative discourse; words designate or signallize, but cannot describe it.

In more ways than one it would seem to belong to the metaphysical ultimates which arguments presume to but do not illumine. Religionists are apt to assert this even of Providence and God, and would take it for granted here. But there are certain considerations of content and method in other fields of experience which can help to a decision as to whether this is so or not.

VII

The fields of experiences I refer to are of course the sciences. By practice and presumption science is made the antithesis of religion. Religion is belief, science is knowledge; religion deals with values, science deals with facts; religion is a way of life, a vision of its quality, science is a way of understanding, an appreciation of its quantities; religion works by insight and sympathy, science works by measuring abstractly—science is the quantitative method; religion deals with the supernatural and the unseen, science deals with visible nature.

We have had occasion at various times to observe how viciously abstract this antithesis is. The subject-matter of science is no less the unseen than the subject-matter of religion. Indeed, the unseen being that science deals with is far greater in variety and tremendously more extended in range than the invisibles of religion. Belief applies to those invisibles no less intransigently than to religious objects, but far less intensely. The beings discussed in such sciences as astronomical physics, microbiology, biophysics, chemistry, physical chemistry, energetics, and radiology, are as definitely beyond the limits of taste, touch, smell, hearing and sight as the supernatural. If the supernatural is an object of inference, so are they. If, when the supernatural is perceived, the perception

is abnormal, so is the perception of the ultimate objects of the sciences. Dramatic changes internal to the personality precede the perception of the religious object; machines like telescopes, microscopes, stains, and the like, must precede the perception of the objects of the sciences. If the changes incident to the perception of the religious object enter into the nature of the perception, it is far from established that the intervention of the machines of the scientists do not profoundly affect the integrity of the objects they are supposed to reveal. Protons and electrons, bacteria, infra-red and ultra-violet radiations, electric waves carried by no wires and defined by no known difference of potential, stars invisible to the eye and lightyears of distance away, are inferred causes of events that happen in machines fabricated *ad hoc*. Some, like various radiant energies, we have no senses whatever to apprehend; they require to be transformed into something that is able to stimulate our end-organs and be integrated into the system of our ordinary perception before we can know them even as inferentially and indirectly as we do. Of such energies the radio and the wireless are now commonplace examples. In principle, the status of these energies is not different from the status of the supernatural. In practice, the events of which they are the attributive causes are precisely foretold and minutely measured; the effects of the supernatural cannot be. In practice, the recurrence of these imputed energies has the regularity of the sequences characteristic of the better-known mechanisms of nature—the recurrence of the supernatural is arhythmic and arbitrary.

Now the perceptual continuum into which these effects of the natural unseen are integrated is a late and superficial system of the responses of living matter, a system infinitely complex, and infinitely cross-related. Within its framework, the habits

of perceiving and doing that we call commonsense undergo both continual and catastrophic transformation. Each generation has a slightly different commonsense from its ancestors'. Between the commonsense of the moderns and the mediævals there is a difference of genus. Such variations in the human cosmos could hardly fail to be wider, deeper, more radical, when we turn from man to animals. A commonsense built around smell or around touch would envisage a cosmos of an entirely different pattern from one built like man's, around sight. Living forms which are all sensorium and no differentiated end-organ—and protozoa may be so described—might experience a cosmos of an inconceivably different kind and their habits might constitute a commonsense of a metaphysical strangeness and simplicity; a commonsense integrating with the constant direct response to the constant factors in the environment which men share with them, other responses to other factors which were shut out from human experience by the development of the end-organs of sight, touch, taste, smell, hearing and the like.

Among such others might be direct responses to, for us, inferred objects: for example, the non-sensory forms of radiant energy. To the commonsense of mankind all objects of this kind would be alien; to the cosmos projected by the commonsense they would be tangential, unintegrated, lawless. So long as the cosmos maintained its cohesion, they could enter it only indirectly, through "the lunatic fringe" or through inferential reasoning. In the latter case the tools of inference, the ways of entry, could not be dissociated from the definition of the inferred. On the other hand, if such objects were to enter commonsense or the cosmos directly, they could do so only when either or both break down, when an opening has been made voluntarily or through misfortune, and a crisis ensues,

the personality having for the moment altogether ceased to go, or going too fast.

We have seen that the conditions of the religious experience meet these requirements. The mechanism of perception has either ceased to function or its functioning is heightened beyond the limits of adjustment. Sight and hearing and touch and taste and smell and movement are suspended. The personality is inert but aware. What, seen more closely, appears to have happened to it?

VIII

The idea that life is a form of radiant energy is not a new one. It goes back at least to Becquerel's treatise on electricity and magnetism, and its history is one of a steady accumulation of researches and evidences tying up various aspects of the life process in plants, animals and men with electrical manifestations. Such manifestations, as everybody knows, are coincident with the stuffs of existence. To modern physics and chemistry they are either those stuffs or the dynamic relations between them. The energies of the world are regarded as streams of electricity, passing along lines of least resistance from points of high potential to points of low potential, and capable at any point in their passage of being changed into heat, chemical energy or mechanical force. The living cell is regarded as a construction of matter in such a way that a difference of potential is established and an electric tension generated. Thus, the nucleus of a protozoön has an acid character; the cell-body has an alkaloid character. The two are separated by the soaplike membrane surrounding the nucleus. On this membrane the electric potential of the cell gathers. ". . . In the original unicellular mechanism," writes Crile,⁴

⁴G. W. Crile: "A Bipolar Theory of Living Processes," Macmillan, 1926.

"each reaction in response to the environment was an electrical response between the nucleus and the entire cell-body, the essential potential being accumulated on the nuclear membrane." Plants, the animals, man, may be regarded as complications of this irreversible duality, and very plausibly so.

But even if not, countless studies of the nervous system, of the behaviour of the muscles, the glands, the liver, the blood and other units of the organism, have laid bare an intimate, apparently an internal, organic relationship between body-functions and electrical energy. For example, it has been long known that light upon the retina sets up an electric current in the nerve of the eye. It has been known for some time that the white matter and the grey matter of the nervous system differ as conductors of electrical energy, but that both are conductors. The many various fibres that make up a nerve have been shown to be responsive to currents of different lengths and intensities. It has been shown that nerves are like conducting wires of man-made machines; if you detach those from a bell and attach them to a mazda lamp, you will, by pushing the button, get light instead of sound; similarly, if you attach, say, the nerves of the eye to the end-organs of the ear, you will get sound, conversely, light; the end-organs seem to define the *form* of the experience. If a muscle is atrophied through disease or disuse, you can, by practice, *i.e.*, by a conscious endeavour to retrain, build it up again and restore it. Where the will or the opportunity is lacking, you can apply electricity and get the same result. But you can't substitute electricity for will as readily when you are trying to build up nerve cells. The muscles, which manifest electric phenomena, are all subject to electric control. The nerves which control the muscles are not subject in the same way; the bell rings, not the wire.

There is enough evidence at hand to maintain among physiologists a powerful trend toward the conception of the personality as an electrodynamic engine, and of consciousness as a form of radiant energy which may bear to the body and to that particular part of it known as the nervous system the same relations that the light of an electric lamp bears to the lighting machinery and the carbon filament. The body is known to be an adjustment of acids and alkalis in such proportions as to set up a difference of potential and the consequent flow of electrical energy. The brain and the nervous system are known to have acid properties analogous to those of the cell nucleus, and the liver and other parts of the organism the alkaloid character of the cytoplasm. Dr. Crile thinks that brain and liver are the two major poles of the bipolar electric machine which is the human body. Whether this be so or not, precise measurements are constantly made of electric currents and energies in the blood, the muscles, the nervous system; and certain aspects of the behaviour of the latter link up directly with phases of the religious experience.

Almost everybody knows what nervous energy is and what is meant by nervous exhaustion. The brain seems to be able to work longer than any other of our organs. It also requires longer periods of rest. The curious alternations of intense activity and idleness that characterize the "artistic temperament" are traits also of all brainworkers. Concentrated attention may persist over long periods, without sleep, without rest; in the end it stops, and if madness and death are not to follow, deep, deep sleep, and proportionally long periods of "laziness," *i. e.*, recovery, must follow. Shock, fatigue, anæsthesia through drugs or discipline, tend all to use up nervous energies at a very rapid rate, and to bring exhaustion to the point where the senses no longer work, the voluntary

muscles are inert, and only the vegetative system carries on. The duration of this condition may be an instant or a day or a month—reports of the mystics vary a good deal. Up to a certain point they follow a pattern which hospitals and laboratories confirm, while beyond that point hospitals and laboratories do not think to investigate.

Ether anæsthesia, for example, goes through three stages. The last leads to death. In the first a general physiological condition is created such that the brain-temperature rises and the electrical conductivity of the brain is tremendously augmented. Responses are made to the situation with almost invincible muscular force. It is as if the voltage of a dynamo were tremendously increased. As the ether continues to be absorbed, the organism passes into the opposite case. Extreme tension gives way to extreme relaxation. There is no response whatsoever to stimuli, the patient is said to be “under.” But at the same time, stimuli from all sources pour in and reach the brain; they beat upon it as an aimless hammer on white-hot iron—it burns itself up in sparks, to no purpose. These stimuli are the reason why anæsthetics are so often dangerous.

When, however, nitrous oxide is taken, the brain does not burn itself up. Experiments show that rise in temperature is negligible, but the senses and the normal mechanisms of response are put out of commission just as fully. And the inflow of stimuli to the brain is, at the very least, as undiminished.

The same sort of thing appears to happen under the rules of Yoga and other disciplines leading to the “luminous sleep” of the mystics. In these techniques breathing exercises play a considerable rôle.

In all such cases, though stimulation of the brain does not

cease, the conventual responses break down; the common sensorium no longer works, and the commonsense lapses. Stimulation, however, does not lapse. The hospital and the physiological laboratory declare it.

But they do not declare, nor can they declare, *what* the stimulus is which is *felt* but not further reacted to, in these mystic states. The mystic is only a little better off than the physiologist and surgeon, for he reports *presence*, revitalizing, ineffable; not within the scope of words to utter; the supernatural.

What, then, is the supernatural? A mode of vibrant energy, not accessible to the ordinary sensorium; one out of a possible infinite chaos of modes of energy which are the environment of the well-ordered cosmos of our commonsense; entering that at a breach in the wall, staying not, but renewing what it touches.

IX

This is all that can be soberly said about the supernatural.

It may be a lasting form of the aggregates of realities that grow and lapse in this world of change and chance. It may be a temporary, an instant, stream of energy created by a chance difference of potential like those that bring about a lightning flash in a clear sky. It might arise as between individuals and groups of men, or between a man and a woman, or between a man and a natural scene. Its character would be as specific at least as that of the personality experiencing it and it would always have affected this personality at a tangent only. It could never have a definite form. It would always be contingent and discontinuous; therefore, always a miracle, always *beyond*

the natural system which, by touching for an instant, it transforms. But *mana* is a better name for it than God.

For the supernatural is power, and truly saving power, but it is power that saves without intention and is good without desire. The ancestors of the race were closer to this power than we, for they were weaker and lived more dangerously. Our human integrity is defined by the cosmos we ourselves construct; help from beyond signalizes degradation. History seems, however, to be a record of branching cycles of integrities built upon the cornerstones laid by such degradations, and I see no present reason why history should change its nature.

Any collapse of a personality or a society, any crisis, may lay men open to the impact of the supernatural. From that impact they will arise prophets, life-bringers, redeemers, preaching such a gospel of good hope as their times require. They may build churches or rebuild states; whatever societies they form are likely to exhibit the familiar anatomy of such societies. The churches will be many, the states various, as various, as many, as the personalities they draw together, the needs they express and satisfy, the revelations they deliver.

And as historical events, as episodes "under the aspect of eternity," or as a priest might say, in the sight of God, each such religious society is the peer of every other in existence and in value. But to be thus equivalent is a very different thing from being the same in nature. The religions of men are in this like the men whose religions they are. All men are equal before the modernist God, who because he is just can have no favourites. But precisely because they are equal, they cannot be identical. Precisely because they are equal it is in their diversities, their specific characters, their uniqueness, that they

signify. Their parity of status liberates and assures their variety of nature.

And so it is with religion, more than with any other of the institutions of man, particularly than with science, against which religion is set in so sharp a contrast. Since science is one and religion is many; science is abstract and general and impersonal, religion is concrete and historical and dramatic. Religion has been one of the institutions of civilization in which specific emotion and the plastic imagination, under the impact of the supernatural and the stress of time and place and circumstance, generate those creations whereby the heart of man clears itself of its burden and transforms the alien world into something of a home. Science understands nature and uses her; religion reconciles human nature to chance and fortune as destiny. In the community religion tends, therefore, to be of the nearness and intimacies of human life, plural, passionate and varied, enchannelling and conserving the concrete spontaneities of private feeling and public recollection. It embodies and transmits more fully than science the personality of society, its precious uniqueness.

Religions do so, of course, only where they are themselves alive. . . .

Such being the nature of religions, they rest, for their survival and development, as anxious churchmen have themselves long ago observed, upon education. They rest upon education in a way that science does not. As I have said in another connection,⁵ a religious system "depends for continuance upon verbal and visual instruction . . . it differs from the arts and sciences in the fact that its essential theme or subject-matter is in no way part of the necessary manipulable stuffs of the daily

⁵ "Education, the Machine and the Worker," New Republic Publishing Co.

life. Food, clothing, shelter, defence against disease and against enemies, do not require this instruction for their existence as they require animal, vegetable, and mineral objects. A creed, on the other hand, if once forgotten, cannot be renewed as a science like physics or mathematics or chemistry can, by manipulating afresh the natural materials of which it is analysis and knowledge. Chemistry is always probable because chemicals are always actual. A theology, on the contrary, is only accidental and possible; it is an artifact; there is no stuff in the nature of things that necessarily implies it and whence it can be renewed. Creeds, therefore . . . have to be formally taught, even to the masses."

Without education religions can survive, but not churches. The churches early recognized this, and their struggle to control education is notorious. Whether, through education, churches survive as archæological curiosities or as living faiths depends on the success with which the transmitted tradition, the religious experience and the residual dynamic life interpenetrate and become organically one; on the completeness with which the ancient symbol utters the new vision and the present feelings, purging the heart, strengthening and easing it.

Education of this special kind, service of this type, have heretofore not been provided without wealth and property. Churches rest on property, and evidence is lacking to show that the behaviour of property-getting and property-holding institutions will be other than that the record shows to be standard. . . .

The ultimate question, then, is not one in the survival of religions. Men, being what they are and the world what it is, there will be religions while men are.

The ultimate question is whether there can be persisting

religions without churches; whether a cult or creed can survive in a free religious society—a society that maintains no priesthood, imposes no conformities, uses no ecclesiastical police-power, and has no place for property beyond satisfying the immediate needs of its own membership.

THE END

